THE THOMIST

A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS: THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH

Publishers: Sheed and Ward, Inc., New York City

VOL. VIII OCTOBER, 1945 No. 4

THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE

THERE is within the human a principle of activity whose end is reached only when he has acquired in a distinctive manner a knowledge of things, when by an act of its own it has caused to exist within himself the external object. This existence of the external object under a new mode of existence—an intentional existence—is knowledge. Knowledge, then, is the end of the intellect. But knowledge is a great antiphony: to understand it we must constantly refer to now this member, now that, between which there is a constant interplay of activity constituting knowledge. The perfection of knowledge exists only in one term of this transcendental relation, and as far as the other term—the object—is concerned, knowledge is only an extrinsic affection; yet knowledge is wholly determined in kind by the object.

Since knowledge is determined by the object, since it is the intentional existence of the form of the object, we must expect in knowledge that same stratification, that same irreducible

difference in kind that we find in extramental being. Knowledge will not be a solid, homogeneous mass of ideas all of the same nature and all having the same end. As in the world we find men of action and men of contemplation, so in the knowledge which specifies these men we will find a radical difference. And as within these two general groups of humans we find many shades of difference, so too in the knowledge possessed by each class within these groups we will find knowledge shading off into many differences. But always we must look to the object for the *raison d'être* of these differences in knowledge (and activity of this knowledge). In the order of knowledge we must submit entirely to the object, we must lose ourselves to it to save ourselves.

The first and one of the most striking and irreducible differences in knowledge is that some kinds of knowledge are completed and perfected by the very act of knowing, while other types of knowledge are of such a nature that they are truncated if not put into operation.[1] The former we shall call the product of the speculative intellect, and the latter that of the practical intellect. These are not two separate intellects, but two manifestations of the power of the same intellect. The answer to this mystery is to be found in a consideration of the object—the ultimate arbiter in all questions of knowledge.

We call the practical and speculative intellect two manifestations of the power of the intellect rather than two potencies because for a formal difference of potencies there must be a

[1] St. Thomas, *In Boetium De Trinitate*, q. V, a. 1: "Respondeo dicendum quod theoricus sive speculativus intellectus, in hoc proprie ab operativo sive practico distinguitur, quod speculativus habet pro fine veritatem quam considerat, practicus autem veritatem consideratam ordinat ad operationem tamquam in finem; et ideo dicit Philosophus 3 *De Anima*, quod differunt ad invicem fine; et in 2 *Meta.*, dicitur, quod finis speculativae est veritas, finis operativae sive practicae actio. Cum igitur oporteat materiam fini esse proportionatam, oportet practicarum scientiarum materiam esse res illas quae a nostro opere fieri possunt, ut earum cognitio in operationem quasi in finem ordinari possit. Speculativarum vero scientiarum materiam oportet esse res quae a nostro opere non fiunt; unde earum consideratio in operationem ordinari non potest sicut in finem: et secundum harum rerum distinctionem oportet scientias speculativas distingui."

formal difference in the aspects under which they consider the object; for instance, the natural philosopher differs in his knowledge formally from the physicist because the former considers *ens in quantum mobile seu sensibile* while the latter considers *ens in quantum mensurabile*. We have here not two distinct intellectual powers, but the same kind of potency exercising its function under two different modalities which, while specifically distinct, are not generically different. The physicist and the natural philosopher differ by reason of their respective *habitus*, and this difference in *habitus* is due to the formality under which the object is considered.[2] So too in the case of the speculative and practical intellect: the matter proper to each of them is the true, for there is no activity of any knowing power which is not directed towards a knowledge of the true. The true is not considered under the same modality, not considered in a univocal manner in all operations of the intellect. Generically the practical and speculative intellect do not differ for they both are concerned with the same material object—the true. But the modality under which they consider the true differs. The speculative intellect considers the object as a pure object of knowledge. Scientific knowledge is through causes, and the knowledge proper to the exercise of the speculative intellect is a knowledge of the formal cause of the object. In the object the speculative intellect considers nothing but that which is the root of intelligibility, that by reason of which an object is determined to a certain place in the order of being, and consequently in the order of intelligibility—the formal cause. The formal cause of being is not primarily the root of goodness in an object, but rather is the radical principle of being and of intelligibility. The practical intellect, on the other

[2] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 54, a. 1, ad 1: "Sicut in rebus materialibus diversitas specierum est secundum formam; diversitas autem generum est secundum materiam. . . . Ea enim sunt diversa genere, quorum est materia diversa: ita etiam diversitas objectorum secundum genus facit distinctionem potentiarum. . . . 'Ad ea quae sunt genere altera, sunt etiam animae particulae aliae': diversitas vero objectorum secundum speciem facit diversitatem actuum secundum speciem, et per consequens habituum: quaecumque autem sunt diversa genere, sunt etiam specie diversa: sed non convertitur. . . ."

hand, considers primarily not the formal cause but rather the final cause. The final cause is the object, but considered under a different modality. In considering the final cause we are not considering the true as true, but rather as it is ordered to being posited in the existential order. At no time have we departed from the material object—the true—but our point of view has changed because we have shifted from a consideration of the object as intelligible to that of considering the object as it can be realized outside the intentional order. The practical intellect is still a knowing power, but the aspect of truth is not primary in its activity, for the modality of truth has been superseded by the aspect of goodness. As we have said, the movement of the practical intellect is not completed within the intentional order as is that of the speculative intellect; for its contemplation is but a *locus* in a movement that will be completed only when an act has been posited outside the order of thought.[3]

How this dichotomy of the intellect's activity can occur may be elucidated by referring again to the object. If we remember that the intellect is as it were a mirror in which the world of reality is reflected, we can see that the intellect must be quite as complex as is the structure of being. Concomitantly with the act of existence, of being, come the attributes of intelligibility and goodness. By the very fact that an object exists it can be known and can serve as a perfection to some nature that is in potency to it. The three attributes, then, of being,

[3] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 79, a. 11: "Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus practicus et speculativus non sunt diversae potentiae. Cujus ratio est, quia . . . quod accidentaliter se habet ad objecti rationem, quam respicit aliqua potentia non diversificat potentiam: accidit enim colorato, quod sit homo, aut magnum aut parvum; unde omnia hujusmodi eadem visiva potentia apprehenduntur. Accidit alicui apprehenso per intellectum, quod ordinetur ad opus, vel non ordinetur. Secundum hoc autem differunt intellectus speculativus et practicus; nam intellectus speculativus est qui quod apprehendit, non ordinat ad opus, sed ad solam veritatis considerationem: practicus vero intellectus dicitur qui quod apprehendit, ordinat ad opus. Et hoc est, quod Philosophus dicit in 3 *De Anima*, quod speculativus differt a practico fine; unde et a fine denominatur uterque, hic quidem speculativus, ille vero practicus, id est operativus."

intelligibility, and goodness are inextricably bound together. Indeed, in many ways we may consider the good as having a supremacy over the true, for although in the primitive operation of a knowing power the true is, of course, sought under the modality of the true, yet it is sought because it is the connatural good of the knowing power. The true would not be sought if it were not the good, for only the good is desirable. The speculative intellect, however, seeks the good under the aspect of the true. So too the good could not be known by the practical intellect if in this note of desirability there were not included the note of truth—for we seek only what we know as good. The practical intellect seeks the true under the aspect of the good. It is, then, because of the complex and intertwined structure of being that the intellect must proceed in two distinct modes of operation. The true is always the object of the intellect, but certain truths are not of such a nature that they are complete when merely contemplated; they demand by their nature to bear a relationship to extramental existence; that is to say that they demand to be posited in the existential order.[4]

Throughout this consideration of the difference between the speculative and practical intellects it should be borne in mind that the practical intellect is not concerned with the good in the same manner as is the will. The practical intellect is always a knowing power primarily—it is *intellect*. But since, besides the expression of the dynamism of the nature through the intellect, there is also a movement by the will—a power that seeks what is presented to it as good—outward toward objects, the need of direction being exercised on these movements of the will by the intellect is apparent; there must be a knowledge of the relationship between the means and ends. The good must

[4] *Ibid.*, I, q. 79, a. 11, ad 2: ". . . Verum et bonum se invicem includunt. Nam verum est quoddam bonum; alioquin non esset appetibile: et bonum est quoddam verum; alioquin non esset intelligibile; sicut igitur objectum appetitus potest esse verum, inquantum habet rationem boni; sicut, cum aliquis appetit virtutem cognoscere: ita objectum intellectus practici est bonum ordinabile ad opus sub ratione veri: intellectus enim practicus veritatem cognoscit, sicut speculativus; sed veritatem cognitam ordinat ad opus."

be known as an end, and with this end as a major premise a process of reasoning must take place by which appropriate means will be found to obtain this end—that is the work of the practical intellect. The most formal activity of the intellect is knowing, as exercised by the speculative intellect; but since between knowledge and desire there is an irreducible division due to the opposite movement of knowledge and desire —the former *ad intra*, the latter *ad extra*—and since the will is dependent in its functionings upon the data presented by the intellect, there must be added to the duties of the intellect that of directing the activity of the will to obtain its end.[5]

Our concern here is primarily with knowledge as exercised by the practical intellect; but to understand this less formal aspect of the intellect, we must constantly have recourse to comparisons between it and the more formal or speculative activity of the intellect. And again we must begin our study by a consideration of the object of speculative knowledge.

All objects of speculative knowledge share in the common property of being of such a nature that their ultimate perfection as objects of knowledge is attained when they have been known. They are pure formal causes and can be considered only as such, they have no trace of final causality about them. They have no other function than that of determining the intellect in its act of knowing; but within this field serving as the object of speculative knowledge, there is not a univocity but rather an analogy. All are objects of speculative knowledge but not all in the same way. Their aspects of intelligibility will differ and as these aspects differ, so the sciences, whose proper objects they are, will differ. Into speculative knowledge there must flow the attributes of both object and subject. The

[5] John of St. Thos., *Cursus Philosophicus, Logica*, II, q. 26, a. 1; Reiser, 792, a, 11-23: "... Constat enim quod intra idem genus intelligendi et in eadem potentia potest dari cognitio veritatis et directio operis seu voluntatis, quia ad cognitionem per se sequitur inclinatio seu voluntas, et ita cognitio per se est directiva voluntatis in agendo. ... Nec ratio boni, quasi respicit practicus intellectus, est bonum ut appetibile formaliter, sed ut dirigibile et cognoscibile, et sic non extrahitur a ratione veri; bonum enim etiam est verum et cognoscibile."

intellect is an immaterial power; that is to say that the origin of its activity is not dependent upon matter or its determinations, and in its terminal act we find a product, a concept, that is not bound in by any limitations derived from material conditions. Consequently the mode of being characteristic of knowledge is given by the action of the intellect; and that mode constitutes what we know as the intentional order of existence. It is an order of existence where the intelligible principle, the formal cause, of objects exists in a state of abstraction, freed from such material derivations as time, place, and motion, freed from the contingent existence which is proper to all forms embedded in matter. The mode of existence proper to the order of knowledge, the intentional order, is given by the intellect; but the intellect of itself is not determined in its activity, nor can it determine itself. For this we must look to the object. The object must be a necessary object; that is to say that it must necessarily be what it is. But necessity implies a denial of change, a denial of the possibility of passing from existence to non-existence. A necessary object is one that is immobile, that defies any change. Moreover it is in matter that we find the radical principle of change. It is the most intrinsic characteristic of matter that it tends of itself to be dissipated into indetermination, into confusion. Of itself matter is neither this nor that nor anything else.[6] It is the breeder of division, the barrier to union, the principle of limitation and of potentiality. Obviously matter cannot account for necessity: it is not because of its material principle that an essence is necessarily constituted in existence, but rather because of the formal, the determining principle. Here then in the field of speculative knowledge we are concerned only with one thing: the existence or non-existence of an essence. And according to its relationship to being, we allocate an essence at a fixed place in the hierarchy of speculative knowledge. The whole question of the speculative intellect when dealing with an object of knowledge is,

[6] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII. 1029 a, 20-21: *λέγω δ' ὕλην ἣ καθ' αὑτην μήτε ποσὸν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν λέγεται οἷς ὥρισται τὸ ὄν.*

"What is the relationship of this essence to existence?" The whole speculative order is dominated by this point of view. But once we move on to ask a further question, once we are not seeking only what is or is not, but ask what *ought* a thing to be, we have entered into the field of the practical intellect.[7]

Speculative knowledge has as its object the essences of things, their formal cause; its object may be called a pure object of knowledge. For an act of pure knowledge there is demanded a predetermination of the knowing subject—that of specification. For this specification of our act of knowledge the intelligibility of the object, its formal cause, must be introduced into our mind so that the mind may be determined in its activity. The existence of the act of knowledge is supplied by the operation of the mind; its specification is the role of the formal cause of the object. That is the most radical aspect of speculative knowledge: it is the intentional union of an object's formal cause with the mind. Once the two have been joined the completion of the act has been reached. But in practical knowledge a new element is introduced. There must be, indeed, an introduction into the mind of the formal cause of the act to be accomplished, for without such a determination there would be no reason for one act to be performed rather than another; but besides this there must be a further specification, it must be an existential determination. Practical knowledge not only presupposes a knowing faculty to be determined—as does speculative knowledge—but it presupposes also a tendency, a penchant to certain acts, that must also be specified. Consequently for practical knowledge there must not only be knowledge of an object, but that object must be known as good: the object as knowable specifies the cognitive activity; the object as good determines the tendency to action existing within the percipient subject. The need of this double determination in

[7] John of St. Thos., *Cursus Theologicus*, I, disp. 16, a. 1; Vives, 6, 437: ". . . Et distinguitur verum speculativum a vero practico, quia verum speculativum tantum regulatur per id quod est vel non est in re, verum autem practicum non regulatur per esse vel non esse rei, sed per id quod deberet esse juxta debitum et modum humanum. . . "

psychic beings arises from the greater indetermination they enjoy by reason of their greater immateriality. In things devoid of knowledge the tendencies to action are very narrow; they can follow only a very limited course of action because their nature does not allow them to entertain within themselves another form—when they receive another form as such, the original ceases to exist. But psychic beings in an act of knowledge have joined to themselves, in an act of knowledge, the form of another object as such. For non-psychic beings we have but to supply the proper conditions for their nature to act—we have only to determine the tendency. In psychic beings the tendency cannot be determined until the subject has been joined to the object in an act of knowledge. We can seek only what we *know* to be good.[8]

In practical knowledge, therefore, we find the specific object to be the final cause, the good; and, consequently, we find in practical knowledge a reference to existence that is not found in speculative knowledge. Speculative knowledge is not primarily interested in existence; as a matter of fact, speculative knowledge abstracts from existence and considers the pure intelligibility of objects. Consequently in speculative knowledge there is always a priority of concept over judgment. In practical knowledge, however, the process is reversed. The object of practical knowledge is not the true as such, but the good. The good always demands existence, we never find the good until we have found the act of existence. And only in the judgment do we find the existence included as an essential attribute. The concept as such is not concerned directly with existence; it is a pure formal cause determining the cognitive faculty alone. The judgment is directly concerned with existence, and consequently with the good, for nothing can be called good until it is fully constituted in the existential order. Hence, in the judgment we find the elements necessary for the double determination demanded in practical knowledge: there is an act of knowledge which is of such a nature that it determines

[8] Y. Simon, *Critique de la Connaissance Morale,* pp. 9-11.

the appetitive tendency residing within the knowing being. This judgment is said to be of such a nature as to determine the appetitive faculty, for it is not concerned with knowing the truth as such but rather with knowing the truth as desirable—the good.

John of St. Thomas remarks that there is great need of distinguishing carefully between speculative and practical knowledge since even an act of knowledge is a certain work, and also every work has a certain element of truth in it. Hence, merely to say that practical knowledge has to do with *operari* and speculative knowledge with *cognoscere*, is ambiguous. For a clear distinction between these two types of knowledge we must distinguish between the specific function of the two types of knowledge, between their matter and the type of their movement. We cannot call practical knowledge that which brings about a work in any manner whatsoever; it must be a knowledge of such sort that it finds its full perfection in directing, according to rules, operations that result in some work. Speculative knowledge is such only when its activity is one whose purpose is solely to know; it is not at all concerned with directing actions, but finds its perfection once it has arrived at knowledge. The matter about which practical knowledge concerns itself should be such that it must needs have rules for directing and fashioning it, and not only for knowing it. Hence the principles of practical knowledge, since they derive from a matter that is capable of being fashioned and worked, will be essentially different from those of speculative knowledge. For speculative knowledge always either has as matter a pure object of speculation or considers its object not as a matter of operation but only as matter of knowledge. Because of the difference in the matter considered by the speculative and practical intellect, and the difference in approach of these two *habitus*, the entire orientation of practical and of speculative thought is different. Hence, when we speak of the two types of knowledge being determined by the end, we mean that we do not consider the matter only from the end intended by the

knower—we do not mean that speculative knowledge could become practical merely by the knower determining that he would put this knowledge to use. The speculative and practical principles are irreducible by reason of their very nature, for they progress differently. Speculative knowledge has one function, to remove ignorance; it proceeds by a method of resolution; by abstraction from existence it comes to know the formal cause, the principle of intelligibility in the object. Practical principles, on the contrary, are destined by their nature to be realized in actual existence. They are the principles followed by the practical intellect in directing the activity that results in some work. Practical principles have one aim, to bring about existence, to be realized in the existential order. For instance, the principles of the carpenter are orientated towards making an object of furniture; the principles of this art do not proceed by resolution of principles into their causes, but by composition of principles in such wise that they may be realized as perfectly as possible in the production of a work.[9]

[9] John of St. Thos., *Log.*, II, 2, q. 1, a. 4; Reiser, 269, a, 32-b, 40: "Sed cum ipsa veritatis cognitio sit etiam quoddam opus, et rursus quodlibet opus sit etiam aliqua veritas, oportet valde formaliter inter haec distinguere. Non enim practicum dicitur, quod efficit quomodocumque opus seu elicit operationem, sed quod dirigit ad opus et illud per regulas ordinat et habet pro fine, ita quod non solum sit operatio elicita, sed etiam objectum seu materia, quae in sui executione et ut efficiatur, regulis directionis ad faciendum indigeat, et non solum regulis ad sciendum; semper enim sciri et fieri distinguuntur in speculativo et practico. Nec speculativum dicitur quod cognoscit quomodocumque veritatem, sed quod tantum intendit cognoscere, non vero ulterius facere, nec dirigit, ut faciat, sed ut sciat et ut ignorantiam effugiat. Unde ut sit speculativum, requiritur, quod vel materia ejus operabilis non sit, sicut qui considerat Deum et angelum aut coelum, etc., vel si sit operabile, non ut operabile, sed ut scibile et tamquam verum quoddam attingatur. Ut autem sit practicum, requiritur, ut materia sit operabilis et ut modo operabili attingatur. Unde Philosophus cum distinguit practicum et speculativum ex fine, non loquitur de fine solum ex parte intelligentis et operantis actualiter, sed ex fine intento ex vi ipsorum principiorum et regularum, quibus utitur aliqua scientia. Si enim sunt principia solum manifestantia veritatem et quasi illuminantia et fugantia ignorantiam, speculative procedunt. Si autem non solum manifestant veritatem, sed dirigunt ad hoc, ut fiat et constituatur in esse, sunt practica et ordinant praxim, intelligendo nomine praxis generaliter objectum practicae cognitionis. Unde principia speculativa dicuntur resolutiva, quia solum respiciunt veritatem, ut resolvitur cognoscibiliter in sua principia; principia autem

The practical intellect like the speculative intellect has *habitus* which perfect it by giving it a second nature. Corresponding to the *habitus* of first principles of the speculative order we have a *habitus* of the first principles of the practical order. This has been called traditionally synderesis. It differs from the *habitus* of first speculative principles by reason of the fact that its knowledge pertains to the direction of the action of another faculty, that of the will. It perceives the self-evident principle of the practical order: "Do good and avoid evil." Hence in one of the very first principles of the practical order we have a reference to its role as a directing agent of operations destined to produce something in the existential order; the *habitus* of synderesis perceives the general ends to be sought by man in his actions.[10] The intellect as such, however, is not capable of production; it can only know and direct. Its role in production, therefore, will be to direct the operations of those powers capable of producing, be they the acts of the will or the acts necessitated to produce a work of some art.[11] This is another way of pointing out the fact that the movement of practical thought is compositive. The object of practical knowledge is not given to it in the same manner as is the object of speculative knowledge: in speculative knowledge the object is determined, and it is the object that impresses its intelligibility

practica dicuntur compositiva, quia respiciunt veritatem seu entitatem ut ponendam in esse. . . ."

[10] John of St. Thos., *Curs. Theol.*, I-II, disp. 16, a. 2; Vives, 6, 459: "Practicum enim non regulat suam veritatem penes id quod est vel non est in re, sicut speculativum, sed penes convenientiam ad finem naturae rationalis, quia practicum dicit ordinem et directionem ad operandum, et regulandum aliam potentiam extra intellectum, scilicet voluntatem, et actus liberos, qui ex voluntate derivantur, aut participantur etiam in aliis potentiis. Unde talis veritas cum sit directiva et regulativa operationum, distinctam difficultatem habet in intellectu, quam veritas speculativa quae solum respicit id quod est vel non est, non quod conveniens vel disconveniens est fini. Et sic principia practica non sistunt in ipso cognoscere, sicut speculativa, sed respiciunt ipsum operari recte operatione alterius potentiae. . . ."

[11] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 79, a. 1, ad 1: "Intellectus practicus est motivus, non quasi exequens motum, sed quasi dirigens ad motum. Quod convenit ei secundum modum suae apprehensionis."

on the mind, which is undetermined until it receives the form of the object. In practical knowledge the progression is reversed: the object is not determined, but rather is undetermined and awaits the impression of the form. That is why it was said that the matter about which the practical intellect concerns itself is capable of modifications, of being fashioned. The matter which is the object of the practical intellect is contingent, and stands in need of the impression of a form by the knowing subject. In the objects of the practical intellect, therefore, we will find the matter contingent and undetermined; the formal and determining principle must be sought in the judgment of the practical intellect which the subsequent operation of the agent seeks to impress upon the indeterminate matter.[12]

The matter about which the practical intellect concerns itself is not invariable as is the case in the realm of the speculative intellect, and hence in the case of the practical intellect we will find that the " originative causes " of the objects are on their material side presented by the physical matter—as in arts—or the moral matter—in cases where prudence must be applied—while the formal or determining cause must be a judgment of our own making. Every time an artist applies himself to painting a picture or a man begins to determine some course of action to be followed in carrying on his life, he must spend a certain time in deliberating about the means he should use. In other words, practical knowledge not only allows but demands deliberation and choice. On the contrary, in speculative knowledge neither deliberation nor choice is permitted, for in this knowledge the mind is wholly subject to the object—in speculative knowledge the only function of the mind is to affirm or

[12] John of St. Thos., *Curs. Theol.*, I-II, disp. 16, a. 4: Vives 6, 469: " Ad id quod dicitur materiam horum actuum practicorum versari circa objecta contingentia, respondetur versari quidem circa contingentia ex parte materiae, non ex parte regulationis, quae pertinet ad rationem formalem, haec enim semper respicit aliquid certum et infallibile practice, quia etsi deficere possit et falsificari in re, tamen modo operandi prudentialiter aut artificiose non fallitur, prudenter enim proceditur humano modo, etsi aliquando erretur in re. . . ."

deny what is presented to it. Hence we cannot speak of the truth of the practical intellect as being a conformity between the mind and the object, for we can speak of truth being thus constituted only where the object is necessary and immutable; in the object of the practical intellect, as we have said, the formal or determining part of the object is impressed by the mind.[13]

What then is practical truth? In the knowledge of the practical reason we find that it always has reference to desire. Why should the practical reason add to its cognitive function the activity of directing operation to a certain end? Because there is desire for that particular end, because that object is a final, and not just a formal, cause. Hence as Aristotle says, the practical reason will not be concerned with affirming and denying, but rather with pursuing and avoiding in accordance with desire. However, desire must be further determined, for though there may be a desire for the production of some work of art or to perform some moral act, yet we cannot achieve either end before we have made a choice of the means leading to that end. Hence there must be a choice which is the result of a certain amount of deliberation plus the original desire for that end. Choice, therefore, is the determination of desire through a process of reasoning whereby we come to choose the means suitable to attain the end sought by the appetite.[14]

The principles of choice are appetite and reasoning, not pure reasoning but always reasoning with some end in view, the end being the object of the appetite. This reasoning always has some activity in view, the direction of the appetite in its seeking of the goal. The choice is never concerned with an end as such, since the end is determined by the nature of the agent; but rather with those means which lead to the end. Hence good choice will depend both upon the reason and upon

[13] Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*, VI. 1139 a, 11-14: *λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν. τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτὸν, οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ενδεχομενων ἄλλως ἔχειν.*

[14] Aristotle, *Nich. Eth.*, VI. 1149 a, 3-5: *τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ διανητικοῦ ἡ ἀληθεια ὁμολογως ἔχουσα τῇ ὀρεξει τῇ: ὀρφῇ.*

appetite perfected by moral virtue. There can be no good choice without the contribution from each of these components.[15] To which of these factors shall the primacy be given? It appears that the primacy should be granted rather to the appetite than to the reason as it guides the appetite. The object of choice is never the true or the false; these attributes do not permit of being chosen or rejected—they are capable of being affirmed or denied. And affirming or denying is the act of the intellect. The object of choice is the good or the bad, and they are the objects of the appetite. Hence in the matter of choice the intellect shares by reason of the fact that in practical knowledge it is joined most intimately with the appetite. That the intellect participates as a cause in choice is due to the fact that in the field of means wherein choice takes place there is need for the appetite to be aided by a process of reasoning whereby the best and most advantageous course may be taken to reach the proper end.[16]

Practical knowledge is concerned with the existential order, with positing some act in that order either in the form of a transient action as in the arts, or in the form of an immanent action as in prudential activity. It is concerned with existence but it is not concerned with what now exists, but with what will come to be. It is a knowledge concerned with determining

[15] St. Thomas, *In Nich. Eth.*, VI, Lect. 1: "Ipsius electionis sunt principia appetitus et ratio quae est gratia alicujus, idest quae ordinatur ad aliquid operabile sicut ad finem. Est enim electio appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem. Unde ratio proponens finem, et ex eo procedens ad ratiocinandum, et appetitus tendens in finem, comparatur ad electionem, per modum causae. Et inde est quod electio dependet ab intellectu sive mente, et ab habitu morali, qui perficit vim appetitivam, ita quod non est sine utroque eorum."

[16] St. Thomas, *In Nich. Eth.*, VI, Lect. 2: "Quia enim electio principium actus, et electionis principia sunt appetitus et ratio sive intellectus sive mens, quae mediante electione principia sunt actus, consequens est, quod electio sit intellectus appetitivus, ita scilicet quod electio sit essentialiter actus intellectus, secundum quod ordinat appetitum vel sit appetitus intellectivus, ita quod electio sit essentialiter actus appetitus, secundum quod dirigitur ab intellectu. Et hoc verius est: quod patet ex objectis. Objectum enim electionis est bonum et malum, sicut et appetitus: non autem verum et falsum, quae pertinet ad intellectum. Et tale principium est homo, scilicet agens, eligendo propter intellectum et appetitum."

future existence in either the order of artifacts or of moral activity.[17] Consequently, as we have said above, the cause of the infallibility of practical knowledge cannot be found in the object of practical knowledge. But to have the *habitus* of practical knowledge, to supply a foundation of necessity such as is demanded for the constitution of any intellectual *habitus* rendering the reason infallible in a certain department of activity, there must be some basis of necessity outside of the mind itself. Since the objects of the practical intellect are not necessary objects having an essential reference to existence as have the essences considered by speculative knowledge, practical knowledge cannot be judged true or false according as it affirms or denies the existence or non-existence of objects. Hence the relation of objects to existence cannot serve as the basis of the infallibility of practical truth. The practical intellect is concerned with regulating and guiding activity in performing works of some kind. It deals with rules of making and doing, with the proper method of bringing things into existence. Each thing—be it a work of art or a moral act—has certain rules flowing from its very essence according to which it must be generated. The duty of the practical intellect is to formulate judgments in accordance with the rules of action that this particular work of art or moral act demands, if it is to be produced properly. Hence the work of the practical intellect is not to know what is, but what ought to be, and what ought to be in a particular case. Of course, due to the difference of the matter to be dealt with, the rules applying to works of art and to moral acts differ intrinsically. Both artistic and moral matter are alike in that they are indeterminate and stand in need of determination by the reception of a formal principle which will be the result of a judgment of the practical intellect: that which should be done here and now according to the demands of the present situation.

In free or moral acts we use as a measuring stick to ascertain

[17] Aristotle, *Nich. Eth.*, VI, 1139 b, 7-9: *οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλεύται περὶ τοῦ γεγονότος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομενου καὶ ενδεχομένου τὸ δὲ γεγονός οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι.*

their correctness the conformity that exists between the judgment of the practical reason and the demands of a well orientated appetite. The appetite must be sound and must by reason of moral virtue, which strengthens its natural bent, incline towards the ends proper to human nature; in accordance with the demands made by these ends the practical intellect must form its judgments whereby the appetite will be guided in its movement toward this end. Hence we say that in the order of the practical intellect the final cause serves in the capacity of a first principle, for in all practical reasoning our one aim is to attain to the end sought by the appetite. The end serves as a major premise and according to this major premise we fashion the other judgments used in our practical reasoning. The means and all reasoning about the means have being and intelligibility only insofar as they are connected with the end. Likewise in the field of arts—mechanical or liberal—the truth of the practical intellect is determined by its conformity to the end proposed by that art. The rules of art resulting from the reasoning of the practical intellect perfected by the *habitus* of art, are true or false insofar as they conform to the demands made by the end sought by each art. The end of a shoemaker's art is to make shoes to protect the feet. He will be a good shoemaker who can formulate the best judgments to attain to this end. The truth of artistic work is in a conformity between the practical judgment and the end proposed by the particular artistic *habitus* one possesses.[18]

[18] John of St. Thos., *Curs. Theol.*, I-II, disp. 16, a. 4; Vives, 6, 467: "... Istae virtutes non versantur circa veritatem necessariam, et infallibilem practice, id est, secundum conformitatem ad ipsas regulas quibus res practicata dirigitur. Proprie enim intellectus practicus est mensurativus operis faciendi, et regulativus. Et sic ejus veritas non est penes esse, sed penes id quod deberet esse juxta regulam, et mensuram talis rei regulandae. Alia est autem mensura actionis liberae ut libera, alia rei ut artificiosae, et factibilis. Actus ut liber mensuratur lege, et dictamine recto, et sic dicitur ejus veritas sumi per conformitatem ad appetitum rectum, hoc est, per conformitatem ad regulam per quam appetitus redditur rectus, quae regula est lex, et rectus finis cui conformari debet appetitus, eo quod finis in practicis se habet ut principium in speculativis. Effectus autem artificiosus mensuratur, et regulatur regulis artis, et per ordinem ad illas sumitur ejus veritas. Regulae autem artis sunt praecepta, quae traduntur de aliquo artefacto faciendo

In the field of moral fact the truth of practical judgments consists in a relationship of conformity between a rightly directed appetite and a judgment of the practical intellect perfected by the virtue of prudence. But it seems that we are in a vicious circle, for we call a rightly directed appetite one which proceeds in its operations according to the rules formulated by prudence; and we say that the truth of the prudential judgment consists in its conformity to a rightly directed appetite.

Since in practical matters the material element is always contingent and hence gives no assurance, rather militates against the full realization in it of the precepts of the practical judgment, we find that the basis of infallibility can be found only in the rules according to which we proceed in fashioning and shaping this matter. In actions of the will it is quite possible that the will does not attain to the end chosen by it, since moral acts may be impeded in many ways; but the fact that the will does not gain this end does not invalidate the truth of the practical judgment by which the will was directed in a certain way to gain its end. The infallibility of this truth depends on whether the practical judgment had formulated rules of action in accordance with the end sought. Practical truth is certain and infallible if the intellect has arrived by its judgment at true and proportionate rules of action and direction. The truth of the practical intellect does not depend upon whether the end is achieved, but upon whether the true and proper mode of proceeding was known by the intellect after deliberation and counselling. So, too, in art it happens that the truth of the artistic judgment is not determined by the success of the work, for it may fail because of many reasons—poor paint, poor marble, bad chisels or brushes, etc.—but by its conformity to the end proposed by the particular art. The artistic judgment is true and infallible so long as in its direction

conformiter ad finem artis, sicut illae regulae recte disponunt de fabricanda navi, vel domo, quae conformiter ad finem navis, qui est navigare, vel ad finem domus, qui est habitare, traduntur."

of the artistic activity it is conformed to the end proposed by the art. Incidental failures do not invalidate the truth of the artistic judgment. Falsity could arise only if the judgment were of such nature that it resulted in direction of the activity in a manner that was contrary to the ends proposed by the art.

To return now to answer our difficulty that we seem to reason in a vicious circle when we say that for practical truth we need rectitude of the appetite and that rectitude of the appetite presupposes practical truth, we can say that by rectitude of the appetite we mean here not the functionings of the appetite as being ruled and directed in its choice of means by the judgments of the practical intellect, but rather we mean an appetite that anteriorly to the operation of prudence has been properly orientated toward the ends demanded by its nature through the acquisition of moral virtues. For prudential judgments presuppose the knowledge of the ends sought by moral virtue, since these ends serve as the principles whence prudence deduces its reasonings. Neither prudence nor art is concerned with reasoning about ends—they presuppose the ends and use them as the basis for their further activity. Prudence and art are concerned in their activity with a choice of the means suited to obtain these ends. There is no vicious circle—we merely must understand what we mean when we use the term "rectitude of appetite." [19]

[19] John of St. Thos., *Curs. Theol.*, I-II, disp. 16, a. 4; Vives, 6, 468: "Respondetur ergo sine dubio esse certum, quod in istis virtutibus practicis infallibilitas earum practice, non speculative sumenda est, et ita veritas earum non est regulanda per id quod est, vel non est in re. Revera enim hoc est contingens, et potens aliter se habere, et deficere, sed infallibilitas sumitur in ordine, et conformitate ad regulam. Quare licet in his virtutibus materia non sit necessaria, sed contingens, et ita ex parte materiae non sint istae virtutes infallibiles in regulando, non in essendo, nec in ipso eventu rei: hic enim saepius potest deficere, quamvis ipsa regulatio, et directio firma sit, et recta in suo genere. Verbi gratia, in voluntariis, seu quae per voluntatem agenda sunt, et in finem perducenda, si consideretur ipse eventus, et ipsa pervenio ad finem, est aliquid contingens, et fallibile; imo quia ita fallibile, indiget directione, et gubernatione. Haec autem directio utitur regula certa, et recta, non quae sit certa in assecurando eventu, sed in assecurando modum procedendi, quia est certum, et infallibile, quod qui in rebus ita contingentibus utitur consilio, et facit diligentiam quam potest, bono modo procedit. Similiter in arte

We have already mentioned frequently art and prudence. They are two *habitus* which together with synderesis perfect the practical intellect in its working. Aristotle distinguished art and prudence according as their modes of proceeding differed. He noted that art was concerned with making while prudence was concerned with doing. These terms share in an analogical, not a univocal community. For prudence is concerned with action that does not pass out of the doer himself—it is perfected in the very act of doing, hence it is immanent action. Art, on the contrary, is concerned with fashioning external matter, with making some thing outside of the agent himself—hence it is action properly so called, transient action. We have then two distinct *habitus* for they concern themselves in their operation with two different types of activity: prudence is a *habitus* for doing, for regulating the appetites, in accordance with right reason; while art is a *habitus* for making in accordance with the precepts of reason.[20]

bene stat, quod aliquando ipsum artefactum non bene fiat, vel ex indispositione materiae, vel ex imperfectione agentis aut instrumenti operantis, tamen regulatio, et mensuratio ipsa artis, est certum, et infallibile quod est conformes ideae, et fini artis, et ad illum determinate dirigit ex se, et formaliter, licet ab extrinseco, et non ex vi ipsius regulae sit defectibilis. . . . Cum ergo dicitur quod si sumitur veritas practica in agibilibus, et moralibus per conformitatem ad appetitum rectum, committimus circulum, cum rursus appetitus rectus sumatur ex regula, respondetur quod conformitas ad appetitum rectum in prudentia non intelligitur per ordinem ad appetitum rectum, qui consequitur se prudentiam, et est effectus ejus, sed per ordinem ad appetitum rectum, qui antecedit prudentiam, et est principium ejus. Nam prudentia supponit rectam intentionem finis, et ex fine tamquam ex principio consilium, et judicium sumit de mediis, et dirigit ipsam electionem, et executionem, et intentio rectificata finis se habet, ut principium prudentiae, electio autem recta, et praestitutio medii, quod eligi debet est effectus prudentiae. . . . Cum ergo dicitur quod veritas prudentiae sumitur per conformitatem ad rectum appetitum intelligitur ad rectum appetitum secundum rectam intentionem finis, a qua principium sumit prudentia, quia in ordine ad rectum finem regulat prudentia quod recte disponendum est. Cum vero dicitur quod appetitus rectus sumitur a prudentia, intelligitur de appetitu recto rectitudine electionis et mediorum. . . ."

[20] Aristotle, *Nich. Eth.*, VI, 1140 a, 2-6: *ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶν ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις . . . ὥστε καὶ ἡ μετὰ λόγου ἕξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερον ἐστιτῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆς ἕξεως. διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οὔτε γάρ ἡ πρᾶξις ποίησις οὔτε ποίησις πρᾶξις ἐστίν.* Commenting on this passage, St. Thomas says: " . . . Actio manens in ipso agente operatio dicitur. Factio est operatio transiens in exteriorem materiam ad aliquod

Hence these two *habitus* differ materially by reason of the fact that art is always concerned with fashioning external matter while prudence takes care of the acts of man himself, the acts of which he is the agent, acts which are free.[21]

Both art and prudence apply to the indeterminate matter with which they deal a formal principle by which the matter is determined; but their introduction of the form is not the same. Hence they differ in regard to their formal activity as well as in regard to the matter with which they deal. The matter with which prudence deals is moral acts, the acts of the rational and free appetite. Prudential knowledge is destined to serve as a guiding agent in directing the acts of the will toward the ends which these acts should seek. These are specifically and primarily acts of the will, hence the rule of the prudential judgment is not impressed upon them, does not join with them as does a form with its matter. The prudential judgment determines these acts but not as form determines matter. In a matter-form union the form specifies and gives being and intelligibility to the composite it forms with the matter. Nothing like this is meant when we say that the prudential judgment is as a form to the matter supplied by the acts of the will. How then does the judgment of prudence affect the acts of the will? It determines them by supplying judgments and decisions according to which the voluntary acts are guided in their seeking of the end. The rules laid down by the prudential judgment do not affect the will primarily; that is to say that the first object they are concerned with is the end sought, but by reason of the fact that this end can be

formandum ex ea. . . . Habitus qui est activus cum ratione quae est prudentia, sit alius ab habitu qui est factivus cum ratione quae est ars. . . ."

[21] John of St. Thos., *Curs. Theol.*, I-II, disp. 16, a. 4; Vives, 6, 469-470: "Cum enim uterque habitus seu virtus conveniant in hoc quod sint habitus operativi, seu directivi operationem, differunt ex parte materiae, quia, quia materia prudentiae est aliquid agibile, id est, actus ipsi voluntarii, ut voluntarii, seu liberi sunt; materia autem artis est aliquid factibile, id est, opera ipsa, seu effectus ut in se ordinabiles et factibiles, eo quod facere et agere in hoc differunt, quod facere proprie dicitur de actione transeunte ad extra, agere autem de actione immanenti, et ipsi homini propria ut per se agenti, et operanti, quod libera actionis est."

sought only by the will. Hence all the judgments of prudence are concerned primarily with the object, but since it is an object that answers to the actions of the will, these propositions supplied by prudence are drawn into the activity of the will in the role of a guiding agent for these will acts. In their specification the acts of the will are completely independent of the knowledge of prudence; the will enters into a union with the practical intellect only insofar as the course of the voluntary acts is guided by judgments supplied by prudence.[22]

In their mode of operation art and prudence differ both on the intellectual and appetitive side. Art proceeds in its operation by definite and certain ways. The nature of the matter with which art deals rules out the possibility of an indefinite number of means to attain to the end desired. The matter of art is not undetermined completely but is sufficiently determined so that it demands that the maker follow certain rules if he wishes to fashion this particular type of matter. For instance, the poet and the boilermaker are bound by their material object to adopt different methods of procedure, and all poets and all boilermakers must use in general the same ways of making their proper objects. Prudence, on the contrary, does not proceed through certain and determined ways, for its matter is the free acts of the individual, and not of any individual but of this particular and unique individual who must act in this particular and unique situation. Hence the matter of prudence is more indeterminate, more contingent, than is that of art. Consequently, the judgments of prudence do not have the same determined objective basis as do those of art. In matters of making we can lay down certain rules to be

[22] John of St. Thos., *Curs. Theol.*, I-II, disp. 16, a. 4; Vives, 6, 470: "Ex parte formae differunt, quia forma prudentiae, quam in actibus introducit, est regulatio moralis in ordine ad debitum finem; quae regulatio non introducitur in actibus moralibus operando seu imprimendo aliquid in ipsis sicut in materia; sed ex dictamine et propositione prudentiae eliciendo ipsos cum respectu, et tendentia ad objectum sic regulatum et dispositum regulis prudentialibus, quia regulationes istae primo tangunt objectum, et ab objecto hauriuntur in actu. Actus autem non haurit aliquid ab objecto, nisi mediante respectu et tendentia. . . ."

followed by all who would engage in a particular art; but in matters of prudence we cannot lay down any general rules to be applied everywhere and at all times, for instances wherein prudence must be applied are unique and unrenewable situations. Hence, although there is some need in art for deliberation, still the artistic judgment is not founded upon this deliberation about the here-and-now situation; on the contrary, the judgment of prudence is based upon the deliberation we have conducted concerning the course to be followed.[23]

The demands of art and prudence on the appetitive part differ. Both art and prudence are concerned with production but they differ in their relation to it. Before applying his art to the healing of a certain patient, the doctor must make a deliberate choice to heal this man. The art of healing as such cannot apply itself to its proper operation, for as knowledge it does not have the power of choice; it presupposes that the will has previously chosen to use the art possessed. The action of the art of medicine only guides the action of the doctor in healing his patient. This action of choice is outside the perfection of art, and hence is not contained within it. In prudence, on the contrary, the work to which its knowledge is applied is the activity of the will itself. The choice made by the will is due to the knowledge supplied by the practical judgment of prudence. Hence the application of prudence does not presuppose a choice made by the will, but rather the knowledge of prudence is presupposed by the choice of the will. The truth of

[23] John of St. Thos., *Curs. Theol.*, I-II, disp. 16, a. 4; Vives, 6, 470: "Ex parte autem modi operandi differunt isti duo habitus practici, tum ex parte intellectus, quia ars procedat per certas determinatas vias, seu regulas, prudentia autem per arbitrarias et juxta occurrentiam negotiorum et occasionum, et circumstantiarum: unde magis respicit individuationem actionum prudentia, et ipsum hic et nunc, quam ars; quae licet individuas actiones, et effectus eliciat, tamen ejus judicii rectitudo, non ex circumstantiis, et occurrentiis desumitur sicut prudentia; tum ex parte consilii, quia ad artem requiritur per se loquendo consilium sicut ad prudentiam, eo quod in arte sint determinatae viae, et modi operandi, non in prudentia, quae arbitrario modo procedit, et sic indiget consilio, ut firmitatem prudentia habeat: firmitas autem artis non ex consilio desumitur, nec ab eo quod occurrit hic et nunc, sed ex determinatis regulis quibus utitur, nisi forte per accidens ob contingentiam materiae. . . ."

the knowledge of art is not determined by the rectitude of the will; art is concerned primarily with an agreement of its knowledge with the end of the art. As long as one has proper knowledge of the art, he is a good artist; one is not a prudent man unless he both has a rightly orientated appetite and is able to make judgments that conform to the demands of this rectified will. A defect either in ability to make such judgments or in a properly orientated appetite will cause the failure of the virtue of prudence. Art, therefore, since it is not concerned with the rectitude of the appetite, but only with knowledge, can reason about contraries; for instance, the doctor is concerned about both health and sickness; his knowledge embraces both qualities. But prudence, since it presupposes a rightly ordered will, and is concerned with making judgments whereby the acts of the will can gain these ends, is concerned only with the good. It cannot deal with the bad since it presupposes, as an essential factor for the truth of its judgments, a will that seeks the good.[24]

The division of knowledge into practical and speculative is an exhaustive division, but within the realm of the practical knowledge we find sciences that differ in their relation to action.

[24] Cajetan, *In II-II*, q. 47, a. 1: "... Licet utraque ordinetur ad opus, et in hoc eodem fine conveniant (quia totius practicae rationis, qua comprehendit artem et prudentiam, finis est opus), differentia tamen inter eas est quod applicatio ad opus est ab ipsa prudentia, applicatio autem artis non est ab ipsa arte. Non enim ars medicinae applicat se ad sanandum; sed applicatur ab electione, quae est extrinseca ab arte. Prudentia autem applicat seipsam ad opera: quia ipse actus voluntatis qui est uti ipsamet ad prudentiae rationem spectat, quae in ratione est non absolute, sed ut movetur a voluntate, sicut et praeceptum. Et hinc fit ut applicari vel non applicari ad opus voluntarie non vituperet artem, sed prudentiam: neque enim minus doctus medicus consetur qui noluit, quando oportuit, sanare; sed minus prudens habetur qui, quando oportet, ubi oportet, etc., non vult exequi, a se vel alio, quae executioni essent mandanda. Et quia accidentia imitantur substantiam, sicut de ipsa substantia applicationis ad opus dictum est, ita de qualitate applicationis contingit: ut scilicet taliter applicari ad opus, puta male, si voluntarie fiat, artem non vituperat, sed prudentiam: tamquam artis peccatum sit id solum quod in defectu cognitionis consistit, prudentiae autem et id quod in cognitionis et id quod in appetitus defectu consistit. Propter quod ars est contrariorum, ut medicina sani et aegri: prudentia autem non est boni et mali, sed boni tantum. Haec enim claudit in sua ratione determinatum appetitum ad bonum: illa autem non, sed ut extrinsecum eum suscipit."

We have for instance the science of ethics, theoretic medicine, the science of positive law, practical medicine, and the intellectual virtue of prudence. All of these are practical sciences, but they are not all practical in the same way. The science of moral philosophy has as its end to know the principles of human actions; hence as far as its end is concerned, moral philosophy, like theoretical medicine, is concerned with knowledge of the principles to direct action. Neither of these sciences in its mode of constructing ideas is practical but rather speculative. Hence we may say that these sciences are practical in regard to their object—operation—but as regards their end—to know the principles of action—and their mode of knowing or constructing concepts, they do not proceed in a compositive manner but analyze their object into the universal principles contained in it. They consider objects that it is possible to bring about, but they do not consider them as objects to be effectuated but rather as objects to be known. In sciences such as law or practical medicine we have knowledge that is practical in regard to the end pursued, the object, and the mode of constructing concepts. Whereas the former sciences could be called speculativo-practical sciences, these latter can be called practically practical sciences. But in a still higher degree is the knowledge of prudence practical in regard to object, mode, and end. For although law and practical medicine are practical in these three ways, yet their knowledge does not immediately direct action. When a judge is about to hand down a decision in a particular case, the principles furnished him by positive law stand in need of a further determination to fit the particular here-and-now case. His decision in regard to the action to be taken in this case is a result of the action of prudence determining the legal principles to fit the unique situation now presented. Hence the knowledge of prudence is practico-practical, that is to say practical in the highest degree; for it is not until the prudential decision has been given that we can begin our action.[25]

[25] St. Thomas, *De Virtutibus in Communi*, a. 6, ad 1: ". . . Sed prudentia plus

Prudence, therefore, is a perfection, a virtue of the practical intellect which has as its particular function to make an exact determination of what is to be done in a particular situation.[26] It is directly concerned with the direction of the activities of the will. Its duty is not to determine the ends to be sought by the moral virtues, for these ends are predetermined by the very nature of man. The will of itself has an appetite for the good, and the moral virtues are second natures added to the will to aid it in obtaining this end.[27] Prudence finds its role in attempting to find the means that will aid the moral virtues in seeking their ends. Virtue consists in a mean between two extremes, it is a mean relative to us, determined by a rational principle as a prudent man would determine it.[28] Hence prudence and moral virtue have a certain community, for in seeking the mean to be followed in an action, the moral virtues likewise have a part to play. In seeking the mean in an action, that is, in following a course of action consonant with the good proportionate to human nature, the moral virtues participate by serving to aid the will in choosing the means proposed to it, and by aiding the will in executing the acts necessary to obtain the end it seeks. But the determination of the mean is the work of the intellectual virtue of prudence which determines the mean and then directs the will in its progression toward the mean.[29] Prudence and the moral virtues, therefore, have a common matter about which they are concerned, the acts of

importat quam scientia practica; nam ad scientiam practicam pertinet universale judicium de agendis; sicut fornicationem esse malam, furtum non esse faciendum, et hujusmodi. Qua quidem scientia existente, in particulari actu contingit judicium rationis intercipi, ut non recte judicat; et propter hoc dicitur parum valere ad virtutem, quia ea existente contingit hominem contra virtutem peccare. Sed ad prudentiam pertinet recte judicare de singulis agibilibus, prout sint nunc agenda. . . ." Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 14, a. 16; Cajetan, *In I*, 14, 6; Simon, *op. cit.*, 17-19; Maritain, *Les Degres du Savoir*, 885.

[26] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 47, aa. 1 and 5.

[27] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 47, a. 6.

[28] Aristotle, *Nich. Eth.*, II, 1106 b, 36-1107 a, 2: *ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητοι οὐσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὡρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειε.*

[29] St. Thomas, *In Libros Sententiarum*, III, d. 26, q. 1, a. 4, quaest. 2, ad 4.

the human being. Hence, materially prudence is one with the moral virtues; but formally they differ for prudence is formally a virtue of the intellect. Its primary activity is in knowing the mean to be sought by the moral virtues. It shares in the nature of a moral virtue not by eliciting acts of the will as do the moral virtues, but by guiding these acts towards the end proposed by its cognitive function.[80]

In the *Posterior Analytics* Aristotle has spoken of the genesis of the universal wherein human knowledge finds its culmination.[81] But this holds only for speculative knowledge since there is no need for it to return again into the world of the contingent to exercise its activity. In the intellectual virtue of prudence, however, we find that it can never separate itself from the contingent world so as to exercise its knowledge perfectly outside of the flux of the contingent here and now. Its aim is the *totum bene vivere*, to make man's life a good life. But since this life consists of dealing with singular events and situations, prudence depends upon the contingent much more than any speculative knowledge. The contingent matters with which prudence deals are not the ends to be sought by man in his attempt to live a good life—these ends are connatural to him for by his very nature he inclines to that which is good for him. But the ends to be sought are not to be gained in one determined way at all times and in all places. In the case of the animal there is in each instance presented to him one determined good which he perceives; he does not perceive in this here-and-now situation any note of universality. Consequently, to obtain this particular good perceived *qua* particular, the animal has one determined way of proceeding. But in each situation presented to man, who is capable of perceiving the singular incident under the aspect of universal good, there are not determined ways marked out. We may proceed in a number of ways in any particular instance in our attempt to act in accordance with the demands of the *totum bene vivere*.

[80] *Ibid.*, ad 3.
[81] Aristotle, *Anal. Post.*, II, 9 b, 88-100a, 8.

The contingent means whereby we reach the proper end in any situation are contained potentially within the universal good under which aspect the present condition is considered; what particular means shall be used here and now is to be determined by the virtue of prudence.[32]

Prudence is a virtue of the intellect, and hence can know the universal which it uses as a major premise in its reasoning; but in its chief and specifying function, which is to issue precepts applicable here and now to the movement of the appetites, it must have a certain knowledge about the contingent means which will enable the will to act according to the mean demanded in a virtuous life.

Since prudence is concerned with the particular and contingent means that will enable one to act in accord with the means demanded by the perfection of virtue, since it depends upon what we call experiences, it is clear that time and experience will enter into the genesis of prudence to a much greater extent than they do in the speculative sciences.

Youth is often found to possess a knowledge of some science —especially a mathematical science—to an amazing degree. We call such youths geniuses. But we do not find prodigies of prudence, for to gain the *habitus* of prudence we must spend much time in cultivation of moral virtue and in observation of the means necessary to the ends of moral virtue. Prudence, therefore, certainly is not natural to man in the sense that it is a virtue of intellect with which he is born. If this were so we would not find people morally depraved. If this prudence were an attribute flowing from the nature of man there would be no question of a diversity of means to an end. There is a definite proportion between the nature of man and the ends he seeks, but the means are of infinite diversity because they are affected by factors outside of the human nature. The means to be chosen are determined by the particular thing to be done

[32] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 47, a. 15: "Etiam in brutis animalibus sunt determinatae viae perveniendi ad finem, unde videmus quod omnia animalia ejusdem speciei similiter operantur: sed hoc non potest esse in homine propter rationem ejus, quae cum sit cognoscitiva universalium, ad infinita singularia se extendit."

now, by the unique history of the individual concerned, by the time, place, and many other purely unrenewable circumstances.[33] Hence over and above the inclination of nature we must have the virtue of prudence to determine the means to the ends. This virtue is the result of time and observation of human events both in our own life and in those of others; it requires likewise that we constantly attempt to act prudently, in accordance with the demands of our nature—this is practice.[34]

The difficulty to be overcome in attaining the *habitus* of prudence is not specifically a knowledge of the universal precepts governing human actions—that is proper to synderesis and the intermediate speculativo-practical sciences. The particular difficulty of prudence is the knowledge it must gain of the contingent, of the means whereby it can lead the will to attain the ends proper to human nature. It must in some way reduce the infinity of means to some sort of classification.[35] In bringing about this classification, this reducing to order of the innumerable means, there are a number of factors concerned, which we shall investigate.

For the perfection of prudence there are certain acts that must concur if one is to act prudently. We have stressed the difficulty met in the acquisition of prudence by reason of the fact that it deals with individual and unique cases. The universal truths at which it can arrive do not have that absolute steadiness that is possessed by the object of a speculative science. The universal truths it can attain to are conditioned like all universal moral truths by the fact that an element of freedom, of indetermination, exists in the object studied, and

[33] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 48, a. 15: "... Ea quae sunt ad finem in rebus humanis non sunt determinata, sed multipliciter diversificantur secundum diversitatem personarum et negotiorum; unde quia inclinatio naturae semper est ad aliquid determinatum, talis cognitio non potest homini inesse naturaliter ... ergo prudentis non est circa fines, sed circa ea quae sunt ad finem, ideo prudentia non est naturalis."

[34] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 48, a. 14, ad 3: "Prudentia acquisita causatur ex exercitio actuum; unde indiget ad sui generationem experimento et tempore; unde non potest esse in juvenibus nec secundum habitum nec secundum actum. ..."

[35] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 48, a. 16, ad 3: "Prudentia principaliter consistit non in cognitione universalium, sed in applicatione ad opus. ..."

hence forbids any truth that will hold the same way in all circumstances and at all times. The universal, for prudence as for all sciences concerned with moral knowledge, is that which happens in most cases.[36] But we know as a matter of fact that no one of us can hope to have a sufficient amount of experience of our own so that we will be able to abstract from it those rules according to which human events can best be guided to reach their proper end. The first disposition necessary, therefore, for an acquisition of prudence is a willingness to learn, a docility to the decisions of other and older persons who have seen more of men and things than we ourselves have. These truths cannot be demonstrated in the same way that speculative truths can be; they must be accepted more on faith. This, however, does not weaken their validity, since, by an acceptance of these truths stated by men of experience, we are brought into contact with principles which hold for the most part in human affairs. A young lawyer must study innumerable case histories, since to deal with a case of law demands that he have a knowledge of what is the best procedure to follow under certain definite circumstances. If he were to wait until he himself had acquired sufficient experience, he could never become a good lawyer. Even more necessary is this willingness to learn where we are dealing with the proper means to be followed in attaining the right means demanded by a good life. For the means to be followed are of infinite diversity and of infinite degrees of efficiency in aiding us to reach the ends sought by a virtuous will.[37]

It pertains to prudence itself to apply the suitable direction to the acts of the will to attain the desired end, but in order to carry out this application properly there are two aspects to be considered in our proceedings with the immediate circumstances. Each contingent act is accompanied by many circumstances that have a bearing upon the goodness or badness

[36] Cajetan, *In II-II*, q. 47, q. 3, ad 2: ". . . Quaedam (certitudo prudentiae) in sola cognitione consistens; et haec in universali quidem est eadem cum certitudine scientiae moralis, cujus universale est verum ut in pluribus."

[37] Cf. Aristotle, *Nich. Eth.*, VI, 1143 b, 11-13; *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 49, a. 3.

of the act which is to be performed here and now. For instance, in itself study is a good thing; but if on this particular evening there is a sick friend who stands in need of my company, it would be bad for me to spend my evening studying. Hence in our application of means we must consider and judge each circumstance connected with the action to be performed and consider whether this action should or should not be performed under these particular circumstances. The application of the precept of prudence must be preceded by this consideration of all the immediate circumstances. To be able to see all the circumstances and to judge correctly of their bearing upon the course of action to be followed, is to be circumspect.[88]

Having considered all the circumstances connected with a particular act to be performed, we have need of a further perfection—we must be cautious so that in the application of a rule of prudence we avoid the evil and reach the good. In no particular situation is the good apparent and determined. Our means may be completely in harmony with the demands of a rectified will, but in the application of these means we must take care that we are not deceived into applying them wrongly because we have judged as good something which here and now is inopportune. Caution applies to the application of the rules of prudence in an indirect manner: its first duty is to discern what should be avoided in this particular situation. No one can be called circumspect who does not see all the circumstances concerned in a particular situation; but he is incautious who, although he sees all the circumstances, does not take care that in the application of the prudential judgment to the acts of the appetite the evils be avoided. Circumspection is not concerned with the avoidance of evil, its concern is to know what is good or evil here and now; caution is concerned with an avoidance of that which is inopportune in this context.[89]

[88] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 49, a. 7.

[89] Cajetan, *In II-II*, q. 49, aa. 7 and 8: ". . . Circumspectio ad actum visionis interioris spectat, et habet pro objecto circumadjacentia et obvenire possibilia bona et mala, ut ipsum nomen *circumspectionis* sonat. Cautio vero ad actum applicationis spectat, et ad mala tantum vitanda refertur. Oportet namque rationem

The principal act of prudence is that of issuing precepts, of making exact determinations of what is to be done; but since the matter to be determined is the contingent situation, the course of action to be followed cannot be perceived at once. Before a man can come to a decision in a particular matter he must not only consider the circumstances connected with it but he must also pass through a process of reasoning. Therefore, preceding the act of determining what is to be done here and now, there is a process of deliberation and judgment. This is the practical syllogism which does not culminate in a general, speculative truth, but whose conclusion serves as a point of departure for action. The principal act of prudence does not concern itself with ordering the objects to be dealt with, that is to say that the deliberative and judicative functions preceding the perceptive activity do not specify prudence; prudence is specified by its application of the conclusion reached in eliciting and directing the will acts.[40] In matters of action more than in speculative matters there is need of an ability to reason well, for in practical syllogisms all conclusions are beginnings of action in regard to particular, contingent cases. Particular cases are not possessed of the intelligibility and de-

practicam utrumque actum habere: scilicet videre circumquaque, et uti tali visione applicando ad vitandum mala. Unde incircumspectos dicimus qui non vident circumquaque: incautos vero qui, licet circumspiciant omnia, non tamen student ut vitent mala quae praevident. . . ."

[40] John of St. Thos., *Log.*, II, q. 1, a. 3; Reiser, 367, b, 20-268, a, 1: "". . . In prudentia sunt duae partes, alia quae versatur circa judicium de rebus et consilium, alia quae versatur circa imperium et praeceptum seu applicationem circa res judicatas et consiliatas. Et quidem actus judicans vel consilians non est inconveniens quod versetur circa aliquid rationis formaliter, id est circa ipsa objecta sub moralitate considerata, quatenus a regulis legis aut recti arbitrii ordinata. Quae ordinatio nihil reale ponit in rebus ipsis in se, sed denominationem rationis vel relationem, quae tamen non vocatur secunda intentio, quin non convenit rebus ut cognitis, sed ut appetibilibus sub regula moris. Actus vero imperandi et praecipiendi, qui est principalis in prudentia . . . non respicit directe objecta ordinando illa, id enim ordinat lex et ratio, sed directe respicit applicationem voluntatis ad eliciendum actus circa objecta ordinata, eo quod in ista applicatione est praecipua difficultas practica. Et ideo prudentia in suo principali actu formalius respicit elicientiam actuum, qui sunt aliquid reale quam ordinationem objectorum. . . ."

termination that a universal speculative principle has. In the reasoning that is demanded of us in a particular situation we must take into account the universal moral principle that is to be observed in this case. We must then consider this particular case as it applies to us, conditioned as we are by our own unique personal history, and from this group of facts we must reason to a conclusion whereby we will be able to act in accordance with the demands of a sound and right will. Because of the multitude of mutable conditions surrounding each contingent act, the need of harmonizing this malleable flux with a universal moral principle, we can state that a prime requisite of a prudent man is that he be good in reasoning.[41]

Within the practical syllogism, therefore, we find the formulation of the act of knowledge performed by prudence, and within this syllogism we find all the difficulties militating against prudential activity as well as an expression of all the component parts of prudence. The difficulty is not so great where we are concerned with the major or universal premise of the syllogism, for this is a truth of a speculativo-practical nature or a practically practical nature. The major premise is obtained either from the principles known by synderesis or from one of the intermediate moral sciences. The greatest difficulty experienced is in our formulation of the minor premise. Aristotle has spoken of the practical judgment in Book Seven of the *Nichomachean Ethics*, and there reviews the connection between knowledge and desire, which leads to action. He notes the fact that the practical syllogism must have two premises, a universal and a particular. If we consider only the universal premise our action, which is concerned with the particular, will not be proportionate to the situation. The practical syllogism must subsume beneath the universal the individual circumstance, and in determining the conclusion to be deduced, the

[41] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 49, a. 5, ad 2: ". . . Particularia autem operabilia, in quibus prudentia dirigit, recedunt praecipue a conditione intelligibilium et tanto magis quanto sunt minus certa seu determinata. . . . Ad prudentiam maxime requiritur quod sit homo bene ratiocinativus, ut possit bene applicare universalia principia ad particularia, quae sunt varia et incerta."

relation of each to the other must be considered. Aristotle notes that in coming to a proper conclusion we must have a knowledge of the singular or minor premise if we are to conclude soundly. For instance, we know as a first principle that to be just is demanded of man, and to pay our debts is to be just; but from these premises I cannot reason to the conclusion that I must pay this debt to be just unless I have knowledge that this particular obligation is a debt.[42] So in formulating our practical syllogism we cannot come to a decision in accord with the demands of a righteous will unless we have a sound knowledge and appreciation of the minor premise constituted by this singular here-and-now situation.[43]

The minor premise refers to a singular situation, and as such cannot be known directly by the intellect nor by its second nature, prudence, which is an intellectual virtue. It is primarily the object of the sense knowledge since the senses contact primarily the singular. But we must remember that in all this matter we are speaking of knowledge and reasoning that result in a conclusion which is a point of departure for action. In other words, the appetites are intrinsically concerned in our judgment about the minor premise, and by reason of the fact that they affect our estimation of the minor premise they likewise influence our judgment concerning the connection between the universal major premise and the present situation. By this I mean that by nature and even more by constant practice there is developed a certain connaturality between ourselves and certain ends, so that we tend immediately to judge any end as

[42] Aristotle, *Nich. Eth.*, VII, 1116 b, 35-1147 a, 9.

[43] *Summa Theol.*, I. q. 76, a. 1: ". . . Considerandum est autem quod ratio secundum duplicem scientiam est humanorum actuum directiva; scilicet secundum scientiam universalem et particularem. Conferens enim de agendis utitur quodam syllogismo cujus conclusio est judicium seu electio vel operatio, actiones autem in singularibus sunt: unde conclusio syllogismi operativi est singularis: singularis autem propositio non concluditur ex universali nisi mediante aliqua propositione singulari: sicut homo prohibetur ab actu parricidii per hoc quod scit patrem non esse occidendum. et per hoc quod scit hunc esse patrem; utriusque ergo ignoranti potest causare parricidii actum, scilicet et universalis principii, quod est quaedam regula rationis et singularis circumstantiae. . . ."

desirable if we find in that object a certain aspect that is connatural to us. Hence into the formation of our practical syllogism the force of the appetites enters to a great degree, for by estimating this particular thing to be in harmony with our own particular well-being, the force of the appetite that seeks its connatural end prevents us from paying heed to the relation existing between the universal moral truth and the particular situation now present. In such cases we are led to subsume the individual instance beneath the wrong major premise. The influence of the appetite affects primarily our estimation of the minor, but in turn also causes us to err in our perception of the universal rule governing this particular activity. A man who is given to miserliness, when confronted by a money transaction wherein he sees a chance to gain some unjust profits, is so influenced by his desire for money that he will substitute for the precept of justice his own formulation, which is the product of the inordinate desire of gain."[44]

But returning to our statement in the last paragraph that it is the sense which contacts the singular situation, we ask what is this sense? As we said, in all this matter of the practical syllogism we are dealing with things not as pure objects of knowledge, but as objects of desire. We have seen in a previous article [45] that on the sense level the power corresponding to the speculative intellect is the central sense; while that corresponding to the practical intellect is the cogitative power. In the previous consideration of this cogitative power we took it as a pure power of animal intelligence. Now we must see in it a power ancillary to the intellectual virtue of prudence. In this

[44] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 77, a. 2, ad 4: "Ille, qui habet scientiam in universali propter passionem impeditur ne possit sub illa universali sumere, et ad conclusionem pervenire: sed assumit sub alia universali quam suggerit inclinatio passionis, ut sub ea concludit; unde Phil. dicit in 7 Ethic. quod syllogismus incontinentis habet quatuor propositiones: duas particulares et duas universales: quarum una est rationis, puta nullam fornicationem esse committendam; alia est passionis, puta delectationem esse sectandam: passio igitur ligat rationem ne assumat, et concludat sub prima: unde ea durante assumit, et concludit sub secunda."

[45] "Instinctive Estimation of Practical Values," THE THOMIST, Vol. VIII, pp. 185 sq.

aspect we shall find that it is of a much higher order than the estimative power of brutes, because it is ordered in its operations to serve the ends of a rational being. It is by reason of this ancillary role that the animal intelligence has in the human being that we say that instinctive action as it exists in man is not as determined as it is in animals, for it always feels the repercussion of reason in its activity. Yet it in turn affects to a great degree the formulation of all our practical judgments, be they those concerned with art or with prudence. The intangible something that we call the " spirit " of a culture possessed by a particular country or race cannot find its explanation in the objective norms of action which are the proper objects of the intellectual virtues of doing and making—these objective norms or aims are the same for all rational beings. But we know as a matter of fact that the ethos of the Western and the Eastern races, of the Teutonic and the Latin peoples, differs greatly—the tone of their laws, their art, the whole mode of life differs. This difference is not in the ends sought: all seek the suppression of crime, the production of beauty, the pursuit of life, freedom and happiness; but in the means adopted there is a difference that we cannot reduce to any intellectual category. The difference escapes the movement of the intellect, it is a difference in the irrational estimation of the good. This difference alluded to here is one of the most striking examples of the influence of the irrational, instinctive estimation of the good on the formulation of prudential and artistic judgments. The entire " way of life " of a race or a country is the summation of the means chosen by this particular people; they do not differ from other races or nations by reason of the ends sought, but they differ because in their choice of means they have approached and estimated the particular way of doing a particular action in a manner other than that adopted by a different people, in a manner that to them, with their unique characteristics and personal physical and spiritual make-up, seems best suited to bring them to the desired end.

In speaking of this animal intelligence as it plays a part in

our formation of the practical syllogism, Aristotle uses the word νοῦς, saying that this power applies to both extremes, namely, to the apprehension of the universal moral truth and to the individual particular premise.[45] This term is applied properly to the mind as perfected by the *habitus* of first principles, and when applied to the animal intelligence, or cogitative power, is more properly called intuitive reason, though we shall continue to use the term cogitative power. St. Thomas in speaking of this power used the term *ratio particularis*, when he wished to stress its discursive operation,[46] and *intellectus*, when likening it to the *habitus* of first principles proper to the intellect.[47]

We must distinguish between the terms *intellectus* and cogitative power. Properly speaking, the term *intellectus* would apply only in the case of a strict instinctive response to a situation. As we have seen, the instincts viewed as cognitive serve as first principles on the level of animal intelligence. Once the animal intelligence, the cogitative power, has been modified by experience, strict instinctive action, by which I mean an action springing up before any reference has been made to previous experience, is extremely rare. When St. Thomas speaks of *intellectus* as an integral part of prudence, he means that we are faced with a singular contingent circumstance allowing of no scientific knowledge, but which can only be known as a term, as a premise in our syllogism. As the major premise is one allowing of no reasoning or demonstration, so too the minor term allows of no reasoning strictly so called. We know the circumstance in the sense that we estimate it to be good or bad; indeed, our estimation of it as good or bad is affected by our past experience, but we know the situation immediately, not reaching it by a process of reasoning.[48]

[45] Aristotle, *Nich. Eth.*, VI, 1143 a, 35-36: *καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφότερα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὅρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἔστι.*

[46] *In Nich. Eth.*, VI, Lect. 7; *De Veritate*, q. 15, a. 1.

[47] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 49, a. 2.

[48] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 49, a. 2, ad 1: "Ratio prudentiae terminatur sicut ad conclusionem quamdam, ad particulare operabile, ad quod applicat universalem cognitionem: conclusio autem singularis syllogisatur ex universali et singulari

We have spoken of the modification of the cogitative power by experiences, but we must expatiate upon this. In our earliest activities we act in a much more purely instinctive and determined manner than we do as we grow older. As we pile up knowledge of facts, of how things happen, of what is conducive to good, or of what hurts us, we are no longer led to act immediately upon the apprehension of an object or situation as a good. The remembrance of past occurrences is called upon for data which are collated with the present circumstances. Hence we speak of men of experience being capable of acting prudently. By this we mean that these men can estimate the proper way of proceeding in a given situation. They have often experienced like situations, they have observed how the course of action has run, and from this mass of experiences they have come to know that one course of action brings success and another failure. They cannot tell why this is so; it is just a fact. Experience, therefore, is a knowledge that cannot be demonstrated rationally, it is not the knowledge which is set out in charts concerning the norm of actions of most men, for it deals with a highly variable object—the estimation of this here-and-now fact. We often say, "From experience I know this is best." This is not a demonstrable knowledge, it is a judgment arrived at by a gathering together of the many like instances I have formerly known, and a recognition that in every instance similar to this particular one, the course I am now advocating has been the best. Experience, which depends upon a collation of the data of memory, is of supreme importance in aiding us to act prudently; and in our estimation of

propositione; unde oportet quod ratio prudentiae ex duplici intellectu procedat. Quorum unus est qui est cognoscitivus universalium; quod pertinet ad intellectum, qui ponitur virtus intellectualis, qua naturaliter nobis cognita sunt non solum universalia principia speculativa, sed etiam practica; sicut, 'Nulli esse male faciendum: ' . . . Alius autem intellectus est, qui, ut dicitur in 6 *Ethic.*, est cognoscitivus extremi, id est, alicujus primi singularis, seu principii contingentis operabilis propositionis, scilicet minoris, quam oportet esse singularem in syllogismo prudentiae: hoc autem principium singulare est aliquis singularis finis: unde intellectus, qui ponitur pars prudentiae, est quaedam recta aestimatio de aliquo particulari fine."

the singular incident which forms the minor, it is of paramount importance. Experience fashions to a great extent our estimation of the minor and, with that, the course of our action; for Aristotle notes that although there are two premises—a universal and a particular—in our practical syllogism, it is really the minor premise that originates movement of the appetite and partakes in this movement, for knowledge as such remains in a state of rest.[49] Indeed, for the prudent man it is more necessary that he have this knowledge of singulars than that he clearly know the universal principles governing human acts. Prudence is ordered to action, and action takes place in the realm of the singular; we never act virtuously in the abstract, but always in regard to this particular situation. The singular, therefore, is the principle of action, the determining principle of action, for it is the singular which moves us to act. If we must choose between having the universal knowledge or the particular knowledge constituted by experience, it is more necessary that we have the particular knowledge. How frequently in the fields of politics, business, ordinary human relations, do we see the theorist completely overshadowed by the person who has little knowledge of the principles of these fields but has spent many years in dealing with particular cases in these departments. He can choose the proper means to the end not by any ability at subsuming this particular case under the proper universal, but because he "feels" from his experience that this will work.[50]

The success of the so-called "practical man" in many fields of endeavor is a well-known fact; it is so widely known and

[49] *De Anima*, III, 433 a, 16-22.

[50] St. Thomas, *In Nich. Eth.*, VI, Lect. 7: ". . . Prudentia enim non solum considerat universalia in quibus non est actio; sed oportet quod cognoscat singularia, eo quod est actio, idest principium agendi. Actio autem est circa singularia. Et inde est, quod quidem non habentes scientiam universalium sunt magis activa circa aliqua particularia, quam illi qui habent universalem scientiam, eo quod sunt in aliis particularibus experti. . . . Quia igitur prudentia est ratio activa, oportet quod prudens habeat utramque notitiam, scilicet et universalem et particularem; vel si alteram contingat ipsam habere, magis debet habere hanc, scilicet notitiam particularium, propinquiora operationi."

recognized that to be able to act in accordance with the demands of an art or prudence [51] one must have much experience in that field that in modern education and in popular opinion the study of theory has fallen somewhat into disrepute. Experience is of no use unless it is applied to enable us to cope with a situation presented to us. But what is the faculty that enables us to build up this knowledge, this infra-rational generalization of facts, and to use these data when confronted by a new and unique situation? As each new incident occurs to us in the course of our lives, there is left a residue in the memory. From this mass of memories of past occurrences there is built up a knowledge of what happens in most cases. This knowledge of what happens in most cases is what we call experience; memory as such is a gathering together, a storage of facts, it is a prerequisite for obtaining the knowledge of experience.[52] It differs from moral certitude. Moral certitude has as its object to know what occurs in most cases; but it is concerned with knowing what happens in most cases where man as man is concerned. Its knowledge is universal. Experience, on the contrary, is concerned with knowing what happens in most cases where I, the individual, with my unique and unrenewable history, am concerned in this here-and-now situation. The unrelated facts of memory serve no useful end unless in some way they can be correlated to form the knowledge of experience. The memory of itself is a power to retain and to know facts as past. It does not concern itself with the correlation

[51] There are four different prudences numbered by St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 50. He numbers them among the subjective parts of prudence. The prudence with which we are dealing is that which does not move only within the *bene vivere* of the political, military, household, or legislative life, but extends to all departments; it has as its field the *totum bene vivere*.

[52] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 49, a. 1: "Prudentia est circa contingentia operabilia: in his autem non potest homo dirigi per ea quae sunt simpliciter, et ex necessitate vera, sed ex his quae ut in pluribus accidunt: oportet enim principia conclusionibus esse proportionata, et ex talibus talia concludere: quid autem in pluribus sit verum oportet per experimentum considerare; unde in 2 *Ethic.* Philos. dicit, quod virtus intellectualis habet generationem et augmentum ex experimento et tempore, experimentum autem est ex pluribus memoriis, ut patet in 1 *Meta.*; unde consequens est quod ad prudentiam requiritur plurium memoriam habere. . . ."

of them. To build up the knowledge of experience we look to the cogitative power, and in this capacity of correlating the many singular facts stored in memory, we call it the *ratio particularis* or reason concerned with particular facts.[53]

In our estimation of this here-and-now situation, by which we form the minor of our practical syllogism, it is the cogitative power which is operative. From our fund of experience, from our past knowledge of what happens in most cases, we are led to judge this particular instance to be good or bad for us. Upon the perception of this here-and-now situation as good or bad, the sensitive appetites are aroused to seek or to flee. To act prudently we do not need to have a philosophical knowledge of the major premise of the practical syllogism, but we must have some knowledge of the universal principle governing this singular situation. When we fail to act prudently it is because upon the perception of the situation there have arisen within us certain desires, a certain affective attitude toward this situation which is the result of our past experiences. For instance, a man who has indulged much in some excess, upon perceiving himself to be confronted with an opportunity for seeking his pleasure, will experience a strong desire to follow his usual course of action. In instances where the habit is of long standing, in all probability the arousal of the sense appetites will so cloud his reason that instead of subsuming this particular situation under a universal precept such as "Lust must be avoided," he will use as his major premise "Pleasure should be sought." In this case there is no strict formulation by the reason of a major premise, for the action follows from a premise that is formulated under the influence of desire. That there is even the consideration of a major premise in such cases is highly doubtful, for from force of habit the appetites are

[53] St. Thomas. *In Anal. Post.*, II, Lect. 20: ". . . Ex sensu fit memoria in illis animalibus in quibus remanet impressio sensibilis. . . . Ex memoria autem multoties facta circa eandem rem, in diversis tamen singularibus, fit experimentum; quia experimentum nihil aliud esse videtur quam accipere aliquid ex multis in memoria retentis. Sed tamen experimentum indiget aliqua ratiocinatione circa particularia, per quam confertur unum ad aliud, quod est proprium rationis. . . ."

allowed to seek their goal as soon as the cogitative power has perceived the object as appetible.[54] In such a case the cogitative power is faulty, for from our experience we have not come to a sound estimation of our experience. The perfection of the cogitative power is reached when it estimates as good those things which are in accord with our own individual nature. In the formation of the knowledge of experience, which is a knowledge closely allied with appetitive movement, the estimation of all objects of some one appetite as good to us as individuals, will lead to a distortion in our estimation of facts.

But equally as detrimental to our prudential judgments is the case where, due to a repression of some instinctive action out of fear, prejudice, or some other motive, we fail to estimate as good that which is good to the organism as a whole. The most frequently observed fact is that wherein our prudential judgment is twisted by some excessive attachment to an object of appetite. There are some cases in which defects in instinct can be quite as detrimental. These defects may arise in two ways. The first we shall call a moral idealism. In this case there is an absolute ignoring of the data of the animal intelligence in the formation of practical judgments. Take for instance the Puritanical concept of sexual intercourse in marriage. Reasoning from the premise that "Lust is to be avoided," they come to the conclusion that even in marriage any pleasure in the marriage act is sinful, that such activity is not able to add anything to the happiness of marriage, but is solely a necessary evil for the procreation of children.[55] Married persons who would follow this type of reasoning could not come to a prudential decision concerning their own personal sexual relations;

[54] St. Thomas, *De Ver.* q. 24, a. 8: ". . . Unusquisque enim naturaliter appetit utilitatem suam; sed in hoc vel illo fine appetendo, aut hoc vel illo utili eligendo, incidit peccatum voluntatis. Sed ex aliquo extrinseco ratio deficit, cum propter vires inferiores quae intense moventur in aliquid, intercipitur actus rationis, ut non limpide et firmiter suum judicium de bono voluntati proponat; sicut cum aliquis habens rectam existimationem de castitate servanda, per concupiscentiam delectabilis appetit contrarium castitati, propter hoc quod judicium rationis aliqualiter a concupiscentia ligatur. . . ."

[55] Cf. M. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic*, 158 and 263.

the failure would not be because of a lack of knowledge due to a defect in the cogitative power, but because they would attempt to reach a singular conclusion, which must always be present at the end of practical syllogisms, without taking account of the data furnished by the cogitative power. This refusal to accept as valid the judgment of the cogitative power, to use as a premise this judgment of the animal intelligence, to apply the universal principle to the singular incident without the mediation of this power which estimates the worth of the singular situation to the particular individual, is the characteristic of moral idealism, be it Puritanical or Socratic.

The second type of defect is that wherein the data of the cogitative power are accepted, but are erroneous because of the refusal to accept as valid the information furnished in some particular instinctive action. Why should the suppression of some instinctive knowledge have this detrimental effect? We have seen that instinctive knowledge is the recognition of the first principles of action on the sense level. We have also seen that for sound prudential reasoning there must be a correlation of the previous events into a body of knowledge that we call experience and that is peculiar to the individual. In the event that the individual systematically refuses to accept the truth of one of these first principles—the instinctive knowledge—he is unable to correlate and to estimate soundly the body of facts that go to make up his unique experience. Unless the cogitative power—the animal intelligence—fully regards the importance of each of the first principles of action, it cannot arrive at a sound knowledge of experience. The recognition and acceptance of instinctive knowledge is quite as important to the formation of this knowledge of experience as are the recognition and acceptance of the principles of synderesis on the intellectual level. The minor formed by a cogitative power that is distorted will hinder us in drawing a judgment in accord with a sound will. The cogitative power that has not grouped together and ordered the knowledge of our individual experience in the light of these primary truths and impulses of

human nature can never have a true estimation of the good and evil in the particular case now presented as it affects us as individuals.

Hence, upon the activity of the cogitative power, the prudential judgment is dependent. The cogitative power, the animal intelligence, must be trained in a way that will render it sound in its estimations and that will enable it to correlate properly its experience. Prudence is properly predicated of the intellect but can analogically be predicated of the animal intelligence, for it is only by a sound estimation of the singular, which is the proper activity of the cogitative power, that we can come to an exact determination of what is to be done here and now by us as unique individual agents. The cogitative power of itself is not infallible—as we have noted above—for its object is the contingent, the here and now as it affects the individual as a good or bad event for him. It is a faculty both of principles and of reasoning, but in either of these activities it may fail unless perfected by constant and correct activity.[56] For prudence, the practical intellect must be perfected by this virtue of being able to determine exactly what is to be done; but as a necessary aid in its activity, the virtue of prudence needs a sound knowledge possessed by the cogitative power (a sound instinctive system), which lies at hand when we come to pass a prudential judgment in some particular instance.[57]

WILLIAM A. GERHARD

630 Fifth Avenue,
New York, N. Y.

[56] Cajetan, *In II-II*, q. 47, a. 3, ad 3: ". . . Cogitativa autem habitu circa singularia intellectivo et ratiocinativo perficiatur, pro quanto recte judicat de fine singulari et recte praecipit de singulari opere. . . ."

[57] *Ibid*: ". . . (Prudentia) principaliter est in intellectu, in quo habitus est subjective, et secundario in cogitativa, in qua est experimentalis habitus reddens cogitativam habilem ad cooperandum intellectui in consiliando, judicando et praecipiendo de singularibus. Ita quod hi actus principaliter sunt intellectus, ministerialiter autem cogitativae. . . ."

THE UNITY OF LOGIC

MATHEMATICAL logic involves a number of metaphysical as well as technical problems which are still in search of an adequate solution. Among the former, there is one of fundamental importance which concerns the nature of the ground of logical operations. What does actually justify the choice and the constructive power of the primitive elements of a logical calculus, and the effective application of its results to meaningful sentences? To this question there are two widely opposed answers. One is that the process of axiomatization is arbitrary and acceptable only in terms of its successful development, or that it is conditioned solely by the nature of our experience of the external world. The other accounts for the parallelism between thought and existence by looking deeper into the roots of being and into our apprehension of its characters.

The historical and technical development of mathematical logic has usually been interpreted, so far, in favor of the first alternative, which is an elaboration of the nominalist or positivistic principles which guided the efforts of the pioneers of modern symbolic logic. For this reason, those who object to these principles are generally ready to belittle the importance of these efforts and of their technical results, and to dismiss mathematical logic as having no value at all.

But disagreement with nominalism or positivism does not entail necessarily a rejection of symbolic logic as a whole. For it should be possible to dissociate the actual technique of this discipline from its historical inspiration, and to interpret its positive methods and results in the light of the second alternative, which has been wrongly considered by most as the foundation of classical logic exclusively. It is true that this new integration would require an adjustment of many standard

principles of mathematical logic. But this line of approach should not only free this science from many serious objections, but should also favor the solution of its difficulties and open new paths of investigation and progress. Incidentally, mathematical logic would thus gain the active support of those who reject it or ignore it because of its artificial positivistic inspiration.

The purpose of the present inquiry, therefore, is to establish an ontological ground for the leading logical operations. Its motive is not to "torture into Aristotelian shape" the basic forms of the logical calculi; but rather to give a universalist explanation of their principles and developments. Thus, the controversial problem of the alleged opposition between classical and modern logic could be given a new interpretation illustrating the continuity between the various phases of logic. For it is the unity of thought and its parallelism with the unity of existence that should inspire a sound logical doctrine and give color and meaning to philosophy as a whole. In fact, logic has always been affected by theories about the mind, the external world, language and signs, the nature of science, and epistemology in general.

I

Recent claims by mathematical logic of self-justification without any reference to philosophy, or at the expense of a contemptuous dismissal of metaphysics, have no real foundation whatsoever. The analysis of its assumptions will always show their general dependence upon some settled theory of knowledge, and a corresponding theory of values. Indeed, the systematic study of any branch of knowledge requires a number of assumptions conditioned by its object and purpose. There is no science which can be imagined with an absolute starting-point, and which can find within its own development all the elements of its complete justification. This is due to the diversity of our experiences, the discursive character of our reasoning, and the complex relations between things and thought.

In particular, the axiomatic method, which has spread from mathematics to other disciplines, may partially claim its relative justification on pragmatic grounds. But it cannot be self-contained: the meaning of its primitive notions and propositions, the reasons for their choice, and the modes of their development, have to be accounted for prior to their pragmatic applications. It is beyond the bounds of any axiomatic method as such that its justification must be sought. In other words, the assumptions of any discipline are the unavoidable links connecting it with the whole chain of knowledge.

These considerations point to the acceptance of two fundamental principles which are sometimes ignored in specialized research. One is the belief in the unity of thought; and the other is the belief in the unity of knowledge. Correctly interpreted, these two principles may help to solve various difficulties that weaken the value of many theories. In particular, they indicate that the discursive process of reason develops according to a general unitary law. For, in order to justify the logical unity of thought, it is necessary to establish first a principle capable of synthesizing the various tendencies of logical technique. If there be no such principle, then logic could not be one science, but many, and one would speak of logics in the plural.

We propose to show that these various specifications are satisfied by the traditional subject-predicate form interpreted as the unifying principle of logic. The explanation of the modern developments of logic by means of this form entails obviously the dissociation of their technical results from their nominalistic or positivistic interpretation. So, we shall undertake the progressive analysis of the *S-is-P* form, or *apofansis*, by the use of an appropriate symbolism; and the efficiency of this analysis will depend upon the universality of the apofansis and its elements and on their proper interpretation.

The genesis and properties of the apofansis, as well as its ontological significance, are understood here according to the Aristotelian tradition generally. This involves the formal

reality of universals, the belief in an ordered world of concepts, the acceptance of substance in an existential as well as analogus way, and the acknowledgment of a corresponding structural order of the universe. By assuming a difference in kind between the mind, the world of ideas and the realm of experience, the Aristotelian epistemology is able to describe the formation of concepts and to fix the nature of the universal. Found materially in the individual objects of experience, and existing formally in the mind, the universal has an essence and properties in its own right; these result not from the operations of the mind but from the very reality of the particulars in which the universal is buried. These account ultimately for the possibility and the characters of the judgment, and also for the basic combination of judgments in the syllogistic reasoning to which all other forms of mediate deductions should be reduced.

It is true that many criticisms have been levelled against the traditional theory of the syllogism throughout the history of thought. The Stoics, the Epicureans, and the Sceptics, in developing the principles of the Democritean epistemology, took up positions which have since inspired the various nominalist schools down to the modern doctrines of pragmatism and logical empiricism. The former maintains that the conclusion which the syllogism purports to prove must be assumed before the premises can be truly stated; hence it could not be used for imparting new knowledge. The latter, pointing to the remarkable development of mathematical logic, flatly denies any possible congruence between traditional logic and mathematical methods; and it traces the rift between the two disciplines to the exclusive and inflexible pattern of the subject-predicate form of propositions, which could not cover the variety of relations between the terms of a proposition. We do not propose here to discuss these arguments, but rather to show how it is possible in fact to extend the traditional logic in such a way as to justify at least the fundamental calculi of modern logic.

II

Before showing how the apofansis, which accounts adequately enough for the conceptual connections of universals, is also the ultimate ground of relations and relational deductions, it is expedient to determine the mode of development of the various levels of logical theory. These various levels are neither preformed nor pre-existing on a small scale in the essential properties of the apofansis. The extension of this form to cover the modern technique of logic does not take place by means of simple evolution, or even by inference from principle to consequence. The latter process is mechanical, if not tautological; it has the capacity of bringing out details implied in the principles, but without throwing any light on the principles themselves, except indirectly. This synthetic method is exemplified in the development of the many axiomatic systems, especially in the case of the logical calculi. Thus, the calculus of propositions, like the formal treatment of algebraical operations, constitutes by itself a closed system from which nothing new can be derived. The impression of progress experienced when passing from the calculus of propositions to the theory of classes, or from operational algebra to the theory of functions, points to the use of new elements which are not formally implied in the original systems.

On the other hand, the development by simple evolution is characteristic of those sciences which do not proceed from conventional definitions and postulates: at each major step it involves intuitions which are unpredictable and which cannot be reduced to pre-existent categories. These intuitions, however, may be formalized later by their integration into science as complete new categories. It is true that the synthetic presentation of a deductive system gives sometimes the illusion of an evolutionary process; when passing from the calculus of propositions to that of propositional functions, for example, it may seem that a logic of a new level emerges. But this impression, which is emphasized by the nominalist interpreta-

tion of symbolic logic, disappears entirely in the perspective of a realist background.

If the apofantic form involves virtually all the future developments of the science of thought, its true mode of extension in the direction of the modern developments of logical technique is that of progressive differentiation. This process generally implies three conditions: an irreversible direction of progress; a fixed value external to science and serving to guide its progress; and a series of stages marking successive approximations towards that value which is truth, as far as logic is concerned.

This is also the view developed in the *Introducción a la Logica Moderna* (p. 15) by David Garcia, with whom we differ, however, on a basic point of interpretation. While he considers the apofansis as the historical starting-point of logic, he establishes the calculi of propositions, propositional functions, classes, and relations as the successive stages of its differentiation. He maintains that each calculus possesses a specific originality, expressed in postulates, operations, and forms irreducible to the general properties of the apofansis. He further believes that this formal irreducibility results from the difference between the Greek and the modern modes of thought. This last point is developed in a remarkable study on the *Historical Interpretation of Logic*, which is still unpublished.

Taking into account the principle of the unity of thought, we maintain that the most complex theories of symbolic logic are ultimately justified in terms of the apofansis. This is shown progressively by an analytical reduction of the specific principles of each stage of differentiation to those of an earlier and more general level, until the fundamental subject-predicate form is reached. And conversely, the synthetic presentation of symbolic logic is founded on the apofansis and its general properties. Finally, the operative force of the specific principles given at each level of its differentiation is justified by a kind of delegation of power of the fundamental principles involved in the analysis of the apofansis.

It remains to show how relations as well as classes can be reduced to predicates amenable to the subject-predicate form; and how the elementary calculi of modern logic can be derived from the implications of such a simple categorical proposition. To begin with, let us remember that hypothetical and disjunctive propositions are really compound judgments formed by means of categorical propositions having between themselves certain relations. The possibility of transforming these compound propositions one into the other, as when a hypothetical is reduced to a disjunctive, indicates the existence of certain rules justifying such reductions. In traditional logic, these transformations are explained by means of a direct analysis of the meaning of the propositional forms concerned. It is possible, however, to establish these rules formally in a way which enhances their operational character.

This operational character may be justified also otherwise, by stressing certain distinctions already used in the elementary doctrine of propositions. It has been observed, for example, that many technical considerations apply to categorical propositions, especially when taken as parts of compound propositions, without any reference being usually made to their quality and quantity. This happens in particular in the analysis of an expression such as *If A, then C*. On the other hand, there is a set of considerations about categorical propositions which refer more specifically to their quality and quantity; as it happens with the doctrine of opposition applied to categoricals and hypotheticals as well. Again, another set of considerations refers more directly to the particular relation between S and P, when these terms are considered as classes, that is when their extension is more emphasized than their intension. And finally, it must have been noticed that propositions involving relations specifically require some supplementary considerations in order to justify their treatment.

III

These remarks entail the possibility of considering any simple categorical proposition under four aspects. In the first place, the proposition *S-is-P* can be considered as a single whole, as a logical unit, without being split into its component elements. In this case, such propositions can be represented by the letters p, q, r and so on. An expression such as *If A, then C*, will read *If p, then q*, and, special symbols can take the place of the conjunctions used in such expressions and of any relations postulated between them. With these elements, it is possible to establish a calculus of propositions dealing with the formal relations obtaining between propositions considered as single units.

Secondly, the proposition *S-is-P* can be interpreted as the simple attribution of a quality to a singular subject. In this case, the letters ϕ, χ, ψ can be used, to represent the qualities, and the letters x, y, z to represent the individual subjects. An expression such as ϕx is called a *propositional function*, that is, a form which becomes a proposition when a definite value is substituted for the indefinite individual or *variable* represented by x. Special symbols for quantifying the subject can be applied to this expression in order to obtain the standard forms of categorical proposition. With these elements, it is possible to establish a calculus of propositional functions dealing with the formal relations which obtain between expressions containing variables linked up with fixed but unspecified qualities.

Thirdly, the proposition *S-is-P* may be considered as expressing a relation of membership or inclusion between an individual or a class S and another class P. In order to indicate that a categorical proposition involves class relationship, we can use the letters a, b, c for classes, x, y, z for individuals, and certain special symbols indicating the relations involved, such as the symbol $\subset$, representing the relation of inclusion. The notion of a class may be derived from that of a universal, and more particularly from an analysis of the doctrine of the predicables. A class is an aspect of a universal the extension of

which is stressed: it is thus composed of entities linked together through their common participation in that universal. A calculus of classes may be formed to deal with such notions in so far as they can be combined by means of the two fundamental relations of class-membership (for individuals) and class-inclusion (for classes only), and some other notions and operations derived from them. It may be mentioned that the two fundamental class relationships are reducible to the subject-predicate form. Thus $a \subset b$ may be read *a is included in b*; and then by convention the relation *included in*, which appears in the predicate, can be transferred to the copula in order to abreviate the operational developments concerning classes. This transformation leads to some basic considerations about relations and their calculus.

Fourthly, the proposition *S-is-P* may represent generally a relation between *S* and a term *T* contained in the predicate *P* which would be formed then by the combination of a relation *R* and the term *T*. In other words, the status of the notion of relation being that of a category, it should be treated as a predicate and not as a copula similar to the verb *to be*. Nevertheless, it may be admitted by an explicit convention that such a predicate can be split into its component elements, namely, the relation itself and the term, other than the subject, which is related to it; and further, that the relation proper can be transferred to the copula itself. For example, the expression *S-is-P* may be analyzed into *S-is RT*; and by transferring the relation *R* into the copula, the expression becomes *S-is R-T*. The advantage of this procedure is to allow the symbolization of relations, and thus to develop a calculus simplifying the otherwise cumbrous expressions involved in the traditional treatment of propositions containing relations as predicates. In such a calculus, the letters *R*, *S*, *T* can be used as symbols of relations, and the letters *x*, *y*, *z* as symbols of the various terms related. Such expressions as *xRy*, *xSz*, stand then for categorical propositions containing two terms linked up by a relation.

From these considerations, it follows that a simple categorical proposition of the form *S-is-P* can be represented by one or all of four types of expressions, such as p, ϕx, $a \subset b$, and xRy, according to the stress of its analysis. Hence these four types of expressions can be reduced to the standard subject-predicate form, which is their real ground and the means of their justification.

The operations to which these four types of propositional expressions may be submitted are also derived from the properties of the apofansis. Traditional logic already gives the principal rules for the combination of elementary propositions, for the quantification of propositions, and for the relations between classes. These rules are in fact used in the first three elementary calculi of modern logic, and hence their choice may be explained in terms of the implications of the apofansis. As regards the calculus of relations, it is true that it is not found as such in classical logic. But if a relation is considered as a class of classes, then the traditional theory of classes could be stated in such a way as to justify also the technique of a strict relational calculus.

We wish to emphasize here that mathematical logic has not invented new modes of predication, especially as it does not even use all the seventy-six different types of predication known to the medieval logicians, owing probably to the fact that it has been motivated historically by the endeavor to rationalize mathematics. But it has invented new technical ways of expressing certain fundamental modes of predication, thus bringing them into greater relief and allowing them a greater flexibility in their transformations. To give an example, the idea of equality was known and used by the ancients, but the symbol of equality was invented much later and undoubtedly helped to improve considerably the technique (but not the fundamental notion) of the operations using that symbol. Hence, we do not propose here that the symbolism used by mathematical logic should give way to the verbal and structural patterns of traditional logic; but simply that this symbolism

should be justified ultimately in terms of the apofansis and its metaphysical implications, rather than in terms of the nominalistic principles with which it may have been associated historically.

Let us say, however, that the actual symbolism of mathematical logic, because of its nominalistic background and its restricted motivation, cannot be applied without qualification to the various theories of both classical and modern logic, or even to the various theorems of mathematical logic. Many restrictions or reservations should be made in its use, as for example in the consequences derived from the elevation to the dignity of definitions of simple implications. Nevertheless, such restrictions and eventual improvements do not entail necessarily the invalidation of this or that portion of symbolic logic, but simply their re-interpretation and integration into a wider background. In any event, all doubtful cases can be analyzed and interpreted correctly by reducing them to the first principles involved in the apofansis.

IV

As a result of the foregoing remarks, we may offer the following conclusions. In the first place, mathematical logic has added an extraordinary wealth of new forms and concepts to the common pool of the science of thought; and these additions have brought closer together mathematics and logic, but without succeeding in proving their identity. The technical and epistemological interest of mathematical logic, however, is out of proportion to its likely use in everyday life, in formal debate, and even in scientific research. For such practical and scientific purposes, a sound knowledge of traditional logic, the correct use of language and of the usual scientific symbolism, and the practice of the methods of science are sufficient and effective. Hence it may be said that the development of mathematical logic has added to our knowledge of the inferential processes a wealth of details, rather than real generalizations. For the unifying value of their justification is rooted in the substantialist foundations of classical logic, as we have tried

to show. That is why it is idle to maintain that Aristotelian Logic is only a part of modern logic. But it is true that the symbolism or formalization of Aristotelian logic covers only a portion of modern symbolic logic, as it has been shown by J. W. Miller in *The Structure of Aristotelian Logic* (1938). Yet the spirit and strength of Aristotelian logic extend far beyond the actual formalization of what if formalizable in it: adequately expressed through their possible extensions, they even justify the various technical developments of modern logic. While the spirit and strength of the latter cannot account for all the implications of traditional logic.

Secondly, the apofansis, expressing a universal relation of inherence centered towards its subject, is more fundamental than any of the other types of relations between the terms of a proposition. For it expresses in a most direct way the basic operation of predication which is the initial step of any logical technique. There has been, of course, a great deal of controversy about the interpretation of the copula in a simple categorical proposition. But the explanations we have proposed indicate that the fundamental relation of simple inherence centered towards the subject must not be identified merely with the class relationships which are so prominent in traditional logic. This confusion is the source of many misunderstandings. In fact, the apofansis is not a particular aspect of a more general propositional form but the very source and justification of the extension of logical technique. The various copulas utilized by mathematical logic do not have a greater extension than the apofansis. Their mode of generation, as we have interpreted it, shows that each one of them involves a definite property which is added to the copula of simple attribution in order to express a definite relation. But such a property is assimilable to a specific difference which reduces in proportion the range of application of each one of the various copulas of mathematical logic.

The third conclusion concerns the analogies between the operations of the various logical calculi. These analogies imply a certain unity in the processes of thought, which could hardly

be justified by means of nominalistic principles. For if these operations warrant the formal truth of the laws of logic, they must emerge from a certain matter which gives them a ground of application as well as of existence. Mathematical logic either ignores this basic matter or tries to construct it, while classical logic asserts its primacy by reducing all the fundamental operations of thought to expressions of predicates, thus dispensing with an unsatisfactory theory of types.

The fourth conclusion concerns the criteriological value of mathematical logic. Considering that this discipline is a development of formal logic only, it should not aim at facilitating the discovery of truth, but simply at making explicit the various hypothetical combinations of logical forms. Yet many modern logicians forget this initial restriction and attempt to build up the whole fabric of knowledge on purely formal foundations. Hence the various endeavors of Carnap to generalize the syntax of language, of Frank to interpret physics, of Woodger to establish an axiomatic biology, of Schlick to form a positive morality based on psychology, and of Dewey to achieve a pragmatical theory of value. It is interesting to notice, however, that modern logicians have discovered that their alleged new organon is insufficient to satisfy all the modalities of thought; so they try to establish marginally various semantic theories for the determination of the meanings of the words used in the sciences. Having begun with the elimination of the traditional material logic from their intentions, they are somehow forced to return to it after a roundabout way in the course of which they have lost most of the values they wish to re-establish. This accounts partially for the misgivings with which many logicians consider the new technique. Our own treatment of the subject may serve as an effective means of reconciliation.

Thus mathematical logic may be considered as the latest stage of the central problem of philosophy, namely, the rationalization of existence. The attempt to integrate our thoughts and experiences in a single rational perspective is the natural tendency of every thinker. After the rudimentary endeavors

of the Ionians, a solution was offered by the Pythagoreans who thought that number is the ultimate essence of things. Yet, with the unavoidable restrictions of the integers and fractions and the obvious limitations of their operational symbolism, they soon came up against discouraging difficulties in the application of number to the continuum, which is the fundamental attribute of every sensible object. In spite of the artful dialectic of the Eleatics, the problem still remained not only to explain the irrationals and change as such, but also mathematics proper, which was becoming, because of its apparent rigor, the natural instrument of the rationalization of existence.

This was the assignment of Plato, who thought of arithmetizing the world of reality and meaning by developing the notion of number in such a way as to cover both the rational and the irrational numbers. This he tried to do with the elemental One and Dyad, without being able, however, to substantiate his intuitions in a technical way, owing to the lack of mathematical means at his command at the time. By taking refuge in the world of ideas, he opened the way to the thorough criticism of Aristotle, who sought further than mathematics the real instrument of the rationalization of existence. This tool or organon is the fundamental logic he has given us and which he centered on the apofansis as the most adequate expression of the intuition of being. In spite of its various technical shortcomings, the Aristotelian theory has withstood the impact of centuries of scientific progress, and has been the first to serve it.

The discussions of today about logic, mathematics, and science in general have their parallel in the basic controversies of the past. A more perfect logicization of mathematics (barring their identification) and a satisfactory metalogic cannot be established on formal grounds alone. Now, as then, the ground of the discursive operations of thought has to be sought beyond its elaborate expression, namely in the depths of a substantial ontology.

THOMAS GREENWOOD

University of Ottawa,
Ottawa, Canada.

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

BY JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

Translated from the Latin by

JAMES M. EGAN, O. P., and WALTER D. HUGHES, O. P.

CHAPTER III *

THE NATURE OF UNDERSTANDING

1. By way of preface to this more specialized treatment of the Gifts, it should be noted that it is not the burden of the present

* OUTLINE OF CHAPTER III

I. THE JUDGMENT INVOLVED IN THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

A. The difficulties involved in explaining the judgment in Understanding
   1. From the very words of St. Thomas (3)
   2. From the seemingly unnecessary multiplication of habits (4)
   3. From a dilemma concerning the mode of judgment in Understanding (5)
   4. From a confusion of the Act of Understanding and the Act of Faith (6)
   5. From the similarity of the judgment preceding Faith to the judgment of Understanding (7 and 8)

B. The doctrine of St. Thomas
   1. The judgment in Understanding (9)
      a) Compared with the judgment of the habit of First Principles (10)
      b) Based on supernatural principles (11)
      c) Knowing the truth in propositions (12)
      d) Possessing a "cleanness of heart" (13)
   2. An objection to the doctrine of St. Thomas (14)
   3. Reply (15 and 16)
   4. A question on the nature of the judgment in Understanding (17)
   5. Response (18 and 19)
   6. Another objection (20)
   7. Reply (21 and 22)

C. The solution of the initial difficulties
   1. Reply to the first difficulty (23)
   2. Reply to the second difficulty (24)
   3. Reply to the third difficulty (25)

tract to discuss all the difficulties which might arise concerning each gift. The treatment given here is limited to subjects which

4. Reply to the fourth difficulty (26, 27 and 28)
5. Reply to the fifth difficulty (29, 30 and 31)

II. The Duration of the Gift of Understanding (32)

A. The identity of this Gift in this life and in heaven (33)
B. Difficulty concerning the permanence of Understanding (33)
C. Solution of this difficulty
1. From the general doctrine on the Gifts (34 and 35)
2. From the general doctrine as applied to Understanding (36)
3. From additional notions on the two types of Understanding (37 and 38)
a) As evidenced in the example of subalternated sciences (39)
b) As found in this life and in heaven (40)
4. From a recapitulation of the doctrine on the essential identity of the Gifts in this life and in heaven (41)
a) In its formal motive (42)
b) Despite its divine application (43)
5. From a distinction in the notion of the clarity involved in Understanding (44)

III. The Act and Objects of the Gift of Understanding

A. The Act of Knowledge in the Gift of Understanding
1. Rendering the soul connatural to its object (45)
a) Called mystical knowledge (46)
b) Described by St. Thomas (47)
c) Described in Scripture (48)
2. Constituting a special habit (49)
3. Distinguishing Understanding from the other Gifts and the virtues (50)
4. Differing from the Act of Faith
a) By its penetration of its object (51 and 52)
b) Through a loving experience (53)

B. The objects of the Gift of Understanding
1. In general (54)
2. In particular (55 and 56)
3. Difficulty concerning the "cleanness of heart" in Understanding (57)
4. Resolution of this difficulty (58)
a) The true notion of "cleanness" in this Gift (59 and 60)
b) An apt description of cleanness by St. Augustine (61 and 62)
c) Recapitulation (63 and 64)

cast light upon the necessity of the gifts and their distinction from the virtues.

2. Isaias assigned a certain primacy to Understanding and Wisdom when he wrote, *There shall descend upon him the spirit of wisdom and understanding.*[1] Yet these two gifts are distinguished from Faith only with great difficulty. For it would seem that their entire function could be accomplished through the act of Faith. Moreover, distinguishing these gifts from one another raises the problem of assigning the act which is proper to Understanding and exclusive of Wisdom.

It is certain, however, that these gifts are not limited to the scope of Faith and the present life, since they are to be found in Christ and the blessed. Prescinding from Faith and the present life, then, the true explanation of these gifts must bring to light the exact nature of each gift, their mutual relationships, and the formal principle of their distinction from Faith.

There is a Judgment Involved in the Gift of Understanding and Not Merely a Simple Apprehension of Terms

3. On this subject many theologians entertain doubts because of the words of St. Thomas.[2] For in distinguishing the Gift of

IV. The Gift of Understanding as distinct from the Light of Glory

- A. Difficulty in distinguishing act of Gift from the Light of Glory (65 and 66)
- B. Solution of this difficulty (67)
  1. From an *a priori* argument (68)
  2. From an *a posteriori* argument (69 and 70)
     - a) An objection (71)
     - b) Its solution (72, 73, 74, and 75)
     - c) A question (76)
     - d) Its answer (77 and 78)
  3. Recapitulation of answer to initial objection (79)
     - a) A further objection (80)
     - b) Its resolution (81)
  4. Explanation of the text of St. Thomas used in initial difficulty (82 and 83)
  5. The necessity of the Gifts in heaven (84)
     - a) The classification of the Gifts (85)
     - b) The manner in which they remain distinct from the virtues (86)
  6. A final difficulty and its solution (87)

[1] *Isaias*, xi, 2.

[2] *Summa Theologica*, I-II, q. 68, a. 4.

Understanding from the Gifts of Wisdom and Knowledge, St. Thomas states that the apprehension of truth which is related to the speculative discovery pertains to the Gift of Understanding. The Gift of Counsel, on the other hand, perfects the practical intellect in its apprehension of truth. The judgment concerning truth is perfected in its speculative role through the Gift of Wisdom, and in its practical role through the Gift of Knowledge.

4. These statements raise difficulties. Since both apprehension and judgment can proceed from one habit, these two functions appear to offer insufficient foundation for a distinction in the gifts. Judgments are made concerning things apprehended and, consequently, apprehension is ordained to judgment. Therefore, it seems that both can be derived from one and the same habit.

Furthermore, one and the same habit of principles apprehends and assents to truth—and assent is a form of judgment. Therefore, the mere fact that one gift is ordained to the apprehension of supernatural truths and another gift to the judgment of the same truths hardly seems sufficient to distinguish the Gifts of Understanding and Wisdom. Moreover, in the natural order apprehending and judging do not proceed from distinct habits. A man does not apprehend truths with one habit and judge about them with another. Ennobled and unified in the supernatural order, these two functions would not distinguish the Gifts of Understanding and Wisdom. The argument is confirmed by the fact that in the will the Gifts of Fortitude, Piety, and Fear unite in themselves all the fields of activity of the various moral virtues.

5. In defense of St. Thomas' distinction it might be alleged that the Gift of Understanding serves both for the apprehension and the judgment of truth. Such a defense, however, is contrary to the opinion of St. Thomas. Furthermore, it assumes the inconvenient position of failing to distinguish the Gift of Understanding from the Gifts of Knowledge and Wisdom. For if it belongs to the Gift of Understanding to judge of the supernatural truths already apprehended, this same gift should judge of these truths either through their causes or their effects. Otherwise, its judgment would not be perfect. Presuming to judge without consideration of the causes or effects, the Gift would not penetrate the depths of truth. It would have a very superficial and hesitating judgment. Furthermore, if it judged in the light of a supreme cause,

or even an inferior cause or some effect, it would in no way differ from Wisdom or Knowledge, since it would perform no new function. On the other hand, if it should judge from effects, there is no reason why its judgment should be excluded from the Gift of Knowledge, since it pertains to Knowledge to judge from effects.

6. Moreover, it may be urged by some that the Gift of Understanding attains merely to a judgment of principles and in no way touches on conclusions. But this would make the Gift equivalent to the habit of principles, which is called understanding. This habit of principles judges and discerns truths, yet the truths it considers are not those known and inferred from causes but those ascertained from the terms themselves. If the Gift of Understanding were to judge in this way, it would not differ from Faith. For those truths which stand as principles are attained only obscurely in this life. Therefore, if the Gift of Understanding assents to them and judges of them obscurely, it surely assents to them in the same way as Faith. If, on the other hand, the Gift of Understanding judged and assented to supernatural truths as the principle of further knowledge, it could do so in one of two ways. It would either see them clearly, and this would be the light of glory in heaven, or it would see them obscurely, and this would be Faith. Furthermore, opinions and doubtful matters cannot be the endowments of supernatural habits.

7. Another defense of St. Thomas' distinction is sought in the statement that the Gift of Understanding does not directly pursue the truths of Faith. It considers their credibility or approaches them from the point of view of their meaning.

8. Contrary to this final allegation stands the fact that all considerations of credibility and meaning stand as a preamble to Faith. The evident credibility and even the suitableness of the things to be believed are known before the advent of Faith. A pious affection may move to an apprehension of the suitableness of the things to be believed, while before Faith a man must have some previous knowledge of the meaning of Scriptures and the articles of the Creed, otherwise he could not believe. For these acts a Gift of the Holy Ghost is not required, since the Gift could not antecede Faith. Yet if every Gift is found only in those having Charity, it presupposes Faith. Therefore, the Gift of the Holy Ghost is not absolutely necessary for the performance of acts which

precede Faith. Even presupposing Faith, such acts can be performed without the Gift of the Holy Ghost, since even then they proceed from the same motives as before, both in sinners as in those in the state of grace. Therefore, if the Gifts are found only in those who have grace, surely they are not necessary for functions which are found in those not having grace.

Furthermore, the formal motives which precede Faith in the judgment of the credibility of its mysteries are not always supernatural. By natural reason, many of the motives preliminary to Faith can be known. Moreover, no one can prudently believe without a sufficient motive of credibility. This situation does not require a special gift of the Holy Ghost. For these acts are common to sinners as well as those who are in the state of grace. The Gifts, however, are found only in those who are just and in the state of grace. Therefore, the Gifts are not required for acts concerning the credibility of mysteries or the meaning of Scripture.

9. Nevertheless, the Gift of Understanding is never found without some judgment of truth. This is evident from the doctrine of St. Thomas.[3] He remarks that "the reason is both speculative and practical: and in both is found the apprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery of truth) and judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of truth, the speculative reason is perfected by understanding, the practical reason by counsel. The speculative reason is perfected by wisdom in order that it may judge rightly, the practical reason by knowledge." Although St. Thomas had taught that the Gifts of Understanding and Wisdom are only in the speculative part, and Knowledge only in the practical, he[4] later changed that teaching when he affirmed that these Gifts perfect both the speculative and practical intellect. Similarly, Faith is practical since it believes truths and acts through love. However, St. Thomas never changed his doctrine concerning the fact that the Gift of Understanding apprehends, penetrates and knows; and without a judgment, truth is not apprehended, penetrated, or known.

Furthermore, St. Thomas did not affirm that it pertains to the Gift of Understanding simply to apprehend the terms from which the propositions are formed, as is the case with the apprehension

[3] *Ibid.* and II-II, q. 8, a. 1.
[4] II-II, qq. 8, 9, and 45.

in the first act of the mind. Rather, he taught that to the Gift of Understanding pertains the apprehension of truth, which is related to discovery. Truth and its apprehension consist in a judgment, apprehended by a complete statement and by composition and division, which are in the second act of the mind according to St. Thomas.[5] The act of discovery is not related to the simple apprehension of terms. It is related to truths and propositions discovered. A man learns some things while he discovers others for himself. Yet whatever is learned is not merely terms, but propositions and truths, known either from the terms or from argumentation. Similarly, then, discovery is not simply a matter of knowing terms, but includes the truths found and their expression.

10. From the way in which St. Thomas [6] enunciates his doctrine concerning the Gift of Understanding, it is clear that both the simple apprehension of terms and the penetrating and discerning judgment of truth pertain to this Gift. He compares the Gift of Understanding to the light of first principles, likewise called understanding. He [7] notes that the reasoning process always starts from understanding and ends with it. For a man reasons from things already understood and comes to understand what was previously unknown. It is evident, then, that the complete function of understanding in the reasoning process goes beyond the mere grasp of terms. It includes propositions or truths, self-evident by the light of reason, from which is evolved the truth of the conclusion.

11. The Holy Doctor then adds this statement: "The infused light bears the same relation to truths supernaturally known that the natural light bears to truths held as primary principles." This principle establishes a direct comparison between the Gift of Understanding and the natural light of first principles. Certainly the natural light of principles provides for a judgment of self-evident truths, over and above the apprehension of the terms involved. According to the comparison just indicated, the Gift of Understanding must likewise include a judgment concerning supernatural truths.

Moreover, St. Thomas [8] teaches that "the Gift of Understanding is concerned with the first principles of the knowledge of grace."

[5] I, q. 16, a. 3.
[6] II-II, q. 8, a. 1, ad 1.
[7] II-II, q. 8, a. 1, ad 2.
[8] II-II, q. 8, a. 6, ad 2.

These first principles are not mere terms but propositions or the statements of truths.

12. Finally in explaining the act of the Gift of Understanding, St. Thomas [9] makes a statement which cannot be understood without involving a judgment and the formation of a proposition: "In this life the Gift of Understanding does not penetrate the very essence of the thing known, nor is the truth of a proposition completely grasped. Yet it does understand that Faith is not to be abandoned because of any outward appearances." Certainly this cannot be accomplished without comparison and judgment. Moreover, St. Thomas [10] affirms that "through the Gift of Understanding the Holy Ghost enlightens a man's mind to know supernatural truth." Truth, however, is known through judgment.

Furthermore, when explaining the Fruit corresponding to the Gift of Understanding, St. Thomas [11] claims that Faith holds that place. However, he does not consider here the virtue or habit of Faith but the certitude of Faith. This certitude strengthens a man in his penetration and understanding of the things of Faith. It brings him tranquillity in his adherence to the things of Faith so that he does not waver in his belief.

Moreover, St. Thomas [12] notes that: "Faith cannot altogether precede understanding, for it would be impossible for a man to assent to what is proposed for his belief without first understanding it in some way. However, the perfection of understanding follows the virtue of faith, while an added certitude of faith in turn follows the perfection of understanding." He places this as the fruit resulting from the Gift of Understanding. Since Faith is an assent to revealed truths through a judgment, and since the Gift of Understanding fructifies in this firmness of assent and certitude of judgment, certainly the operation of this Gift should be a judgment. Otherwise, it could not affirm or verify any judgment and assent.

13. The Gift of Understanding disposes a man to understand rightly and purely, without any admixture of error. It unshackles him from the sensible images of material things, which are the greatest impediment to spiritual understanding, since the spiritual

[9] II-II, q. 8.
[10] II-II, q. 8, a. 4.
[11] II-II, q. 8, a. 8.
[12] II-II, q. 8, a. 8, ad 2

order cannot be understood in corporeal things. Only when the nature of spiritual things—or at least what the nature is not—is discerned without confusion and without any admixture of extraneous or erroneous ideas is there a correct spiritual understanding. So long as this discernment is lacking, the things are neither understood nor penetrated. For intellectual apprehension and penetration of truth means that the object known stands before the intellect with a certain clarity. The intellect can then discern the very nature of the thing—or at least what it is not—without confusing it with any other things. Likewise, the eye sees sharply and penetrates the visible reality, not when it sees obscurely or confusedly, but when it sees distinctly.

The Gift of Understanding quickens and perfects the mind, so that it may proceed without confusion and error. For this purpose the Holy Ghost illumines the soul. Consequently, the beatitude which corresponds to the Gift of Understanding is cleanness of heart. *Blessed are the clean of heart for they shall see God.*[13] In teaching that this beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Understanding, St. Thomas [14] notes that cleanness of heart can be understood in two ways. It may be taken as a cleansing from all inordinate affections. This cleansing is brought about by the virtues and the Gifts in the appetitive part of the soul. Cleanness of heart may also be understood as applying to a liberation from sensible images and errors, lest what is proposed by God be received in the manner of corporeal images or according to heretical perversity. Therefore, in the mysteries of Faith, the Gift of Understanding should discern truth from error and the spirituality of divine reality from corporeal forms. Without it, the mind remains unrefined and suffers from a certain lassitude and cloudiness. But when the Gift of Understanding illuminates the mind, it takes away any crudeness and lassitude. Yet, this discernment, penetration, and illumination cannot be achieved without a comparison and a collation of the truths of Faith with the error which is rejected. It must, likewise, distinguish between the spiritual purity and abstraction which it seeks and the materiality and dregs of corporeal forms which it casts aside. Therefore, the Gift of Understanding with its endowment of acumen and preparation for penetrating and knowing things clearly, should have the power of

[13] *Matthew*, v, 8. [14] II-II, q. 8, a. 7.

judging. Otherwise, it would not be able to discriminate and compare.

14. The objection may be raised that it is impossible in this life to remove the sensible images and corporeal forms from the act of Understanding. For a soul united to a body it is proper and connatural to understand in conjunction with the senses and by an appeal to them. In the next life, of course, sensible images will be cleared away, but in this life they are necessary, since ecstasy is extremely rare and, unlike the Gifts, it is not common to all the just. Therefore, to claim that the act of Understanding is a discernment and judgment clearing away sensible images and errors is to offer an insufficient explanation of the nature of the Gift.

This is especially true since material error does not destroy Faith, so long as there is no pertinacity—without which no one is a heretic. For material error is not a mortal sin, and it can coexist with grace and the Gifts which are found in those having grace.[15] Therefore, error and the Gift of Understanding are in some way compatible.

15. In reply to this objection it should be noted that understanding can rise above sensible images in two ways. In the first, sensible images are not present. In the second, understanding compares its proper object with sensible images and, realizing that they are not its object, it abstracts from them. By this negation and removal of imperfection, men know God and the spiritual order of this life. For, although spiritual realities are known through their similarity to sensible things, nevertheless these same sensible images are removed from the concept of God. "Intellectual knowledge does not remain in these sensible images, but in them it contemplates the purity of intelligible truth," according to St. Thomas.[16] The total obliteration of sensible images is a purification never attained in this mortal life in which the soul understands with a dependence on the senses. However, a relative purification by negation and removal of images is possible. In it realities are understood through their similarity to sensible things but not in the manner of sensible images as such. Yet this purification is brought about only through a discernment and a comparison of one thing with another—a judgment.

[15] II-II, q. 8, a. 4.

[16] II-II, q. 158, a. 5, ad 2.

16. It must be admitted that Faith and the Gift of Understanding are compatible with a material error.[17] They can coexist with ignorance or nescience of the matters of Faith which a man is not bound to know. It follows from this that the Gift of Understanding is not always perfect and consummate, so that it purges from all errors, even those which are material or accidental. For even in the angels there can be a cleansing away of this lack of knowledge by superior angels. Therefore, these facts do not prove that the Gift of Understanding does not cleanse away all formal errors adhered to with advertence, and those errors which, according to the degree of obscurity in the understanding of certain truths, can more or less impede salvation.

17. It might well be asked here what sort of judgment the Gift of Understanding offers, and how it differs from the judgment of the Gifts of Wisdom and Knowledge and from the judgment of Faith.

18. The reply involves the distinction of the twofold manner of judging. The first is an analytical judgment through causes or effects, by resolving and by reasoning. The other is a simple judgment of discernment. This latter judgment decides that one thing is not another or is not like another, either through comparison and reflection in the intellect or, more simply, in the discrimination of color and sound by the senses.

The Gifts of Wisdom and Knowledge judge of supernatural things in an analytic manner: Wisdom judges through the supreme causes, through an intimate union with God. Knowledge judges through lesser causes or effects, since it is concerned with creatures. Faith judges, or is moved to effective assent, through neither causes nor effects, but through the naked testimony of God revealing.

19. The Gift of Understanding does not judge analytically, nor does it reason about supernatural truths through their causes. From an interior impulse of the Holy Ghost and from an affection toward spiritual things, it discerns spiritual realities from corporeal, and separates the things to be believed from those which are not to be believed, or errors. The evidence of a reasoning process is not required for this type of judgment. It does not proceed from

[17] Cf. No. 14.

cause or from effect, nor does it resolve the conclusion to its principles, since the Gift of Understanding, like the habit of first principles, is concerned with principles. Rather, this judgment is formed from a better and keener penetration of the terms in these truths, their congruity, and the incongruity of the opposing errors.

Moreover, in natural things there are some principles known by all and called axioms, like " A thing either is or it is not." There are others, known only by the learned, whose terms are easily penetrated only by acute minds, for example: " Spiritual substances are not in place," " God alone is to be worshipped," " There are not many gods." The perception and the penetration of the terms of these latter axioms depend upon a comparison and a collation with their opposites, just as does the contrast of spiritual and corporeal realities. Nevertheless, this type of judgment is not made through an inference or a reasoning process but by a penetration of the terms in a sort of collation and comparison.

In much this same manner, the Gift of Understanding renders the mind keen and elevates it by an impulse and an illumination of the Holy Ghost. The mind may then seize and penetrate the terms in which the supernatural things of Faith are proposed. From such a penetration it may judge what truths must be believed.

20. A further objection presents itself. Either this penetration of the terms is done with evidence and clarity or it is done in obscurity. If it is done with clarity and evidence, spiritual things and matters of Faith are clearly understood. This is contrary to experience and is not compatible with Faith, which is of things that are not seen. If this penetration remains in some obscurity it should be founded upon the testimony of a witness, for it can have no other formal motive. In this case it would be the same as an act of Faith. Therefore, in its formal motive and specific nature, the Gift of Understanding is not distinguished from Faith.

21. However, according to St. Thomas,[18] the penetration and understanding of truth can be either perfect or imperfect. A thing is understood perfectly when its essence is known as well as its mode of being. A thing is imperfectly understood when its essence and mode of being are not known. Supernatural realities

[18] II-II, q. 8, a. 2.

are known as not running contrary to truth, despite external appearances, for a man knows that Faith is not to be abandoned because of external appearances. This is extrinsic and negative evidence, which is not incompatible with Faith. This negative evidence of matters of Faith can be experienced in an internal affection, even if the essences of these matters is not seen. The evidential certitude of Faith, its credibility, and the discernment of the truths of Faith from error and the things of sense (which provides an extrinsic and negative evidence) can be brought about by the interior illumination of the Holy Ghost through the Gift of Understanding. All this is not opposed to the obscurity of Faith. For the obscurity of Faith is concerned with the mystery of the realities themselves and not with credibility or certitude. Although this present life, in which the eyes of men are always veiled, does not permit positive experiential evidence of the realities of Faith, a man may sometimes feel a certain tranquillity concerning the meaning of Scripture, the credibility of God's testimony, the certitude of Faith and its discernment from errors. Impossible without some sort of evidence, this tranquillity cannot be acquired through a process of reasoning. Born only of an interior impulse and illumination, it is frequently the experience of simple, unlettered men who have never studied theology.

22. It follows from all this that the Gift of Understanding is particularly useful in contemplation. This Gift sharpens the mind, making it keen and penetrating so that it may understand and need not walk in darkness. The mind is then bathed in light, even while it treads in the obscure paths of divinity; now cleared from obstacles by the way of negation, it enters into the powers of God. Looking upon the glory of the Lord as it approaches Him, the mind is transformed from one power to another by the Spirit of the Lord.

There is a very striking sign of this change in the intellect. The Holy Ghost asserts Himself in the mind by a sublimation and elevation of the power of understanding. Yet the soul does not feel its own exaltation but the exaltation of God above all creatures. *Man shall come to a lofty heart, and God shall be exalted.*[19] It is most proper to the Gift of Understanding to render the heart lofty. It elevates the mind to a sublime kind of experience. Penetrating

[19] *Psalm* LXIII, 7, 8.

and understanding divine things, the mind knows that they vastly exceed all that can in any way be compared to them. However, from such a loftiness of heart, the heart itself is not vainglorious. Acquired knowledge too often puffs up the mind to its ruin. Through the Gift of Understanding the mind is raised up so that it may exult, and God may be magnified. The soul then knows that it is God alone who is great and not itself.

Solution of the Difficulties

23. The clarification of the difficulties presented at the beginning of this chapter is now possible. Concerning the statements of St. Thomas, it has already been shown that the Gift involves judgment and not merely apprehension. The Gift is ordained to the apprehension of truth, which cannot be had without a judgment and a statement, attained through a comparison. Wisdom, on the other hand, is ordered to a judgment through higher causes and by resolution to them. Such a judgment does not pertain to the Gift of Understanding. Its judgment is one of discernment only, by which truth is attained and penetrated by distinguishing truth from error and spiritual realities from the things of sense. The penetration of truth consists in entering into the interior of a thing and distinguishing it from the things which make it obscure and by which knowledge of it is impeded. This is done through a judgment of discernment, and not by a resolution to the causes of a thing, such as occurs in wisdom and knowledge. It is only this analytical judgment that St. Thomas denies to the Gift of Understanding.

24. In response to the second difficulty, it may readily be conceded that apprehension and judgment in the natural order pertain to the same habit. However, the Gift of Understanding involves a judgment and not merely an apprehension of terms. The objection was then raised that Understanding is not distinct from wisdom or knowledge to which judgment pertains, just as apprehension belongs to understanding. The reply to this has already been given. While it is proper to wisdom and knowledge to judge, this judgment is not just any kind of judgment but an analytical judgment proceeding through causes. St. Thomas denies that it pertains to the Gift of Understanding to judge of spiritual things according to their causes. It merely penetrates truths by

discerning them from falsehoods and errors. It directs judgment, so that spiritual things will not be considered the same as corporeal. Yet it does not at the same time analyze the cause of spiritual realities. It apprehends truth as different from falsehood, just as sight distinguishes among the colors without judging their causes.

25. Moreover, according to the next objection, if the Gift of Understanding judged of supernatural truths without judging of them through their causes or effects, its judgment would be superficial. This would indeed be true if it pertained to the Gift of Understanding to judge of these truths in an analytical manner. Then, of course, it would judge imperfectly, if it did not judge through causes or effects. But such judgment is not proper to the Gift of Understanding, just as it does not pertain to the habit of first principles, also called understanding, to resolve truths to their causes and principles. The sole function of this habit is to judge of the truths from a penetration of the terms. Likewise, it is the function of the Gift of Understading to judge according to its penetration of the terms, and to know supernatural truths which are the principles in matters of Faith. St. Thomas [20] teaches that the Gift of Understanding is concerned with the first principles of grace, whose terms are not known to all. The function, then, of the Gift of Understanding is to penetrate and understand these principles by distinguishing truth from error, and by discerning spiritual things from sensible. Understanding does not know from intrinsic and positive evidence the essence of the reality. It knows what the thing is not by an extrinsic and negative evidence. From this penetration and knowledge of the terms, through perception and comparison, a judgment is formed concerning the truth. It does not involve causes but only the penetration of the terms and the discernment of the truth from error. A natural example of this is offered in the case of many principles, which are of themselves not known to all but only to the learned. They presuppose a knowledge of their terms and a penetration not only through a simple inspection but through a judgment and a comparison wisely made plus the penetration of a keen mind. For this reason, they are said to be self-evident only to the learned.

26. Furthermore, the next objection claims that such a judgment pertains to Faith, which assents to principles, and that it is

[20] II-II, q. 8, a. 6, ad 2.

the function of wisdom to judge of divine realities, the things of God as the principles of all other things.

27. The judgment of Faith is an adherence to and a belief in the realities themselves, the supernatural truths. To believe is to think of a thing with assent, as the theologians teach following St. Augustine.[21] Because of the obscurity and lack of evidence, there is hesitancy and fluctuation. This is signified by the phrase "to think of a thing," and it indicates the motion of one hesitating and fluctuating, lacking not certitude but clarity. The mind is not yet satisfied by the vision of the thing. In the certitude of assent, however, there is only firmness. This firmness does not arise from the vision of the object, but extrinsically from the testimony of God accepted by the will with pious affection.

The judgment of the Gift of Understanding is a judgment not of belief but of understanding. It strengthens Faith at the point where Faith experiences fluctuations and movements arising from lack of evidence. The Gift of Understanding penetrates the terms which encompass the truths. It discriminates between truth and error, between sensible things and spiritual. It understands that spiritual things—being more exalted than anything attained in this life—are not such as may be conceived through sensible images. Deleting imperfections, the Gift forms an understanding of these things in such a way that it does not suffer the wavering possible to the virtue of Faith. For this reason, certitude in Faith is numbered among the Fruits of the Holy Ghost, and, according to St. Thomas,[22] it corresponds to the Gift of Understanding as an effect. The function of the Gift of Understanding is not to judge of the thing to be believed, but to judge by discerning spiritual things from corporeal, supernatural from natural, and truth from error. In this it enjoys a certain extrinsic and negative evidence, as has been already explained. The judgment proper to Wisdom will be discussed later. It may be noted here, however, that it is not repugnant that Wisdom should judge of the truth of the principles when it defends them, since even theology may do that.

28. Moreover, evidence of supernatural truths does not remove Faith, since in this life the Gift of Understanding does not comprehend perfectly. It does not have intrinsic evidence nor know the

[21] Cf. *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, c. 2—*MPL*, XLIV, 963.
[22] II-II, q. 8, a. 8.

essence of these truths with positive knowledge. Rather, according to St. Thomas,[23] it knows them negatively and extrinsically by knowing what they are not. Understanding knows that realities which are proposed concerning God are not to be held in the same way as things of the senses, nor according to heretical perversity. It may have this evidence without being opposed to Faith, which is concerned solely with the inevidence and obscurity of things as they are in themselves, and not with that extrinsic evidence through the negation of imperfections.

29. The final difficulty affirms that this extrinsic evidence, which is had concerning the credibility of the object, can be had without the Gift of Understanding, as in the case of one of the faithful in mortal sin. Again it may be that a convert to the Faith with the use of reason may gain evidence of the credibility of the object of Faith, even by an impulse of the Holy Ghost. Thus, the Gift of Understanding would precede Faith, while according to the doctrine of St. Thomas [24] it is found in those only who are in the state of grace.

30. The reply to this objection rests on the fact that the evidence of credibility in matters of Faith and the negative evidence of the suprasensible character of divine things can be had in two ways. The first way is through one's own effort and industry. The other is through an interior impulse and illumination of the Holy Ghost. This second way is also twofold. The first is more common and imperfect, and can be found even in sinners, as happened in the case of Caiphas, who had an internal impulse to prophecy, and in the case of Balaam who was prophetically illumined although he was a sinner. The other, possessed only by the just, is possessed through a correct appraisal of ultimate values. In this Understanding, the faithful know that all creatures are subject to God, Who should not be abandoned under any consideration. In this second type, fostered by the illumination of the Holy Ghost, the special nature of the Gift of Understanding is found. Therefore, according to the Holy Doctor, the perfect essence of the Gift can be had only where the will is in conformity with man's ultimate end.

31. The evidence of credibility and other extrinsic matters, the

[23] II-II, q. 8, a. 7. [24] II-II, q. 8, a. 2.

intrinsic and positive evidence of truths had by one's own effort and industry, even the illumination of the Holy Ghost which is common both to sinners and the just, all these precede Faith and can remain even in the soul of sinners.

However, the evidence springing from the special impulse of the Holy Ghost and proper to the just comes only with a correct and ordered appreciation of the ultimate end. This illumination is proper to the Gift of Understanding. It follows Faith and Charity. The Understanding is not referred to as "special" because it is extraordinary like prophecy or because it enjoys greater and more express light. It is called "special" because it is not found in sinners but only in the just, however simple and unlettered.

The Act of the Gift of Understanding is Distinct from the Act of Faith and from the Acts of the Other Gifts

32. The Gift of Understanding has two states, one in this life and the other in heaven. The presence of the Gift in this life is evidenced by many texts in Scripture, which have already been quoted. For example, there is the text of Ecclesiasticus: *And the Lord filled him with the spirit of wisdom and of understanding.*[25] Likewise, David asked God for the Gift of Understanding in this life. *Give me understanding that I may learn your commandments,*[26] and the Lord said, *I shall give you understanding and I shall instruct you in the way in which you shall walk.*[27] Consequently, the Gift of Understanding is part of this life for those who live the Faith.

Moreover, the Gift of Understanding pertains to the next life, being present together with the light of glory and the divine wisdom. For according to our Faith[28] the Gifts were found in Christ, yet in Him there was no virtue of Faith, since from the moment of His conception He possessed eternal happiness.

33. Difficulty: The distinction between the Gift of Understanding and Faith in this life as well as the light of glory in the next would not be difficult to prove if it were altogether certain that one and the same gift remains both during this life and in the next. Yet it is not difficult to imagine that a habit or Gift of the

[25] *Ecclesiasticus*, xv, 5.
[26] *Psalm* cxviii, 73.
[27] *Psalm* xxxi, 8.
[28] *Isaias*, xi, 2.

Holy Ghost is not the same in this life and in the next. For such a habit or Gift might experience an essential change in passing from an obscure to a clear and evident vision. In this life the Gift of Understanding cannot be clear with intrinsic and positive evidence of the mysteries of Faith. Such a positive and perfect evidence of the mysteries belongs to life in heaven. For this reason, St. Thomas [29] remarks that " the perfect vision of God, through which the divine essence is seen, pertains to the perfect Gift of Understanding, as it is in heaven." In heaven Understanding will be clear in all matters. It will not admit of any obscurity because of the soul's great happiness and the unique endowment called the Beatific Vision. From this vision Understanding will be richly endowed, attaining to a vision of all things. Such a night will have no obscurity; as St. Laurence [30] said, " My night has no obscurity, but all things shine in the Light." Therefore, it is impossible that one and the same habit be at various times both obscure and clear. Such a change cannot be merely accidental; it must be intrinsic and substantial, because " evident " and " inevident " pertain to the formal motive under which understanding tends to its object. Evidence arises from the intrinsic predicates of a thing which manifest its potentialities. But obscurity indicates an extrinsic motive, which does not attain to the essence of the thing. Hence no habit could be changed from obscure to clear and evident without involving its own destruction.

34. Solution: Despite this difficulty it is true that one and the same habit remains both in this life and in heaven. In a general way St. Thomas [31] affirmed this statement when he taught that without exception the Gifts of the Holy Ghost remain in heaven. Furthermore, he [32] specifically mentioned the Gift of Understanding. Nor can his statement be construed to mean that the Gift of Understanding remains generally and not specifically the same. St. Thomas: [33] " In every gift Gregory [34] includes something that passes away with the present state and something that remains in

[29] II-II, q. 8, a. 7.
[30] Cf. Rev. Alban Butler, *Lives of the Saints*, " Murphy," v. 3, p. 229.
[31] I-II, q. 68, a. 6.
[32] I-II, q. 68, a. 6, ad 2.
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] Cf. *I Moralium*, c. 32—*MPL*, LXXV, 547.

the future. For he says that ' wisdom strengthens the mind with the hope and certainty of eternal things '; and of these two hope passes but certainty remains. He says of Understanding, ' that it penetrates the truth which has been heard, refreshing the heart and enlightening its darkness.' The hearing of such things may pass away, since *they shall teach no more each man . . . his brother*,[35] but the enlightening of the mind remains."

From the foregoing paragraph it is quite evident that both St. Thomas and St. Gregory affirm the permanence of the Gift of Understanding. If the habit of this life were destroyed and if another specifically distinct gift were produced in heaven, then the statement that something passes away and something remains could not be verified. The whole specific nature of the earthly Gift would pass away, and a new one would be produced in heaven. For example, according to St. Thomas,[36] nothing remains of the virtue of Faith when the light of glory is attained; the whole nature and species of the habit is dissolved. Therefore, when he remarks in this passage that something passes and something remains, he is undoubtedly asserting that the Gift remains essentially the same, suffering only accidental change.

35. As St. Thomas [37] explains, " We may speak of the gifts in two ways. First, with regard to their essence, and thus they will exist most perfectly in heaven. . . . In another way, they may be considered as regards the matter about which they act. Thus in the present life they operate in matters with which they will have no concern in the state of glory. Considered in this way, they will not remain in the state of glory; just as we have stated [38] in the case of the cardinal virtues." Therefore St. Thomas is of the opinion that the Gifts change their material objects but not their formal objects. They remain the same, then, in their substance and species. His doctrine is manifested by the example of the cardinal virtues, about which there is no doubt of their remaining the same.

36. St. Thomas' general proof may be applied in particular to the Gift of Understanding. The general reason is based on the fact that the Gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect the human mind to utilize the motion of the Holy Ghost. In heaven more than ever before the mind will be moved and will follow the motion of the Holy

[35] *Jeremiah*, xxxi, 3, 4.
[36] I-II, q. 67, a. 5.
[37] I-II, q. 68, a. 6.
[38] I-II, q. 67, a. 1.

Ghost. Consequently, the Gifts of the Holy Ghost will be present in heaven.

However, this does not prove that they remain in heaven the same as they were in this life, for the motion of the Holy Ghost can be of many kinds. In this life a man may follow one kind of motion, in heaven another. Here he may have an obscure guide, there it may be evident and clear. From this it seems that his general argument does not prove that the same Gift belongs to the life on earth and life in heaven.

37. Indeed, before St. Thomas'[39] general argument can be utilized in this particular instance a further point of doctrine must be added. The Gift of Understanding is ordained to understanding either perfectly or imperfectly, not to believing. The Psalmist said, *Taste and see*,[40] for tasting and seeing are founded upon experience, upon mystical affective and experimental evidence. Understanding, as distinguished from believing, always involves evidence, either extrinsic or intrinsic, positive or negative. The fact that it does not attain to vision in this life is not due to any deficiency in its nature. Rather, it is due to a lack of visibility in the object, since we walk by Faith and an image. For example, from its very nature, the eye seeks evidence and experiential knowledge of the visible object. Accidentally, through lack of application, defective lighting, or because the object is not within the range of vision, it may happen that it sees only confusedly and imperfectly.

Since the Gift of Understanding moves the mind by the illumination of the Holy Ghost, it penetrates correctly and understands things proposed to it. Of its very nature it demands evidence. And it gives evidence in accord with the object proposed. In this life, where men walk by Faith and where things are proposed through hearing, the Gift gives an extrinsic and negative evidence. For, according to St. Gregory,[41] "The gift of understanding illumines the mind concerning the things which have been heard." Indeed, it makes a man see clearly that the things thus heard are truly credible and ought to be discerned from errors and the corporeal and sensitive characteristics of the imagination.

[39] II-II, q. 8.
[40] *Psalm* xxxiii, 9.
[41] *I Moralium*, c. 32—*MPL*, LXXV, 547.

In heaven, as a continuation of the light of glory to which it is subordinated, this Gift gives positive evidence.

38. It is not impossible for the one habit to have both types of evidence, now employing one kind, now another. The motion of the Holy Ghost is so universal that it extends to both. The Gift of Understanding, then, perfects the mind, making it alert so that it may see as clearly as it possibly can, either perfectly or imperfectly. Likewise, one and the same power of sight sometimes sees imperfectly and confusedly from a distance, and sometimes it sees clearly and distinctly. Yet it is the same power of sight.

39. This notion of two types of evidence in the same habit is better explained by the example of the subalternated sciences. Sometimes the superior science is continuous with the subalternated, when it exists in the same subject, and sometimes it is not. When the subalternated science is not a continuation of the superior science, it does not have evidence of its principles. It takes them on faith. Consequently a person knowing in this way cannot have evidence of conclusions although the science itself demands evidence. That evidence is actually had when the superior science, which offers the principles, is joined to the subalternated science.

Similarly, the Gift of Understanding, moving under the illumination of the Holy Ghost, perfects the mind and makes it clear-sighted in its perception and penetration of things proposed. It joins these things under one formal aspect, the apprehension and penetration of higher truths, and all truths ordained to them, through its own spirit and affection and experimental knowledge. These things are not experienced except through an affection and a correctly ordered estimation of the end. Such an understanding and knowledge of spiritual things from an experimental affection of its very nature tends to experimental evidence. For the unified and specific nature of this Gift is the perfection and illumination of the mind for the connatural and experiential understanding and penetration of spiritual truths. This connaturality is had only through love—*What adheres to God is one spirit.*[42] In heaven this affection which connaturalizes and unites souls to God is regulated and born of a plenitude of light. Then God Himself indicates to his beloved that He reposes in the full light of day. From this

[42] *I Corinthians*, vi, 17.

loving connaturality springs full and consummate evidence through the penetration and understanding of the mysteries outside the vision of the essence of God.

40. In the present life, however, love of God is born of an imperfect and enigmatic light in the shadow of Faith. The spouse has said, *I sat in the shadow of him whom I desired, and his fruit is sweet to my mouth.*[43] From such a reposing in the shadow of the beloved—from Faith operating through love—there arises a certain experiential sweetness of His fruit by mystic and affective knowledge.

The Gift of Understanding in this life has at least one thing in common with the Gift in heaven. It illumines the mind with the knowledge of spiritual truths by a sort of loving connaturality to them and an experience of their sweetness. But experiential knowledge of itself always demands evidence. Consequently, of its very nature the Gift of Understanding involves evidence. In this life the evidence given under Faith is only imperfectly perceived—as if one were to view a mountain from afar off. *Beholding them afar off, and saluting them,*[44] as St. Paul remarked. Hence, such an experience is more of what those joys are not than of what they are. In heaven, however, there is experiential evidence of spiritual truths as they are, evidence of their nature arising from a full love of things which are present.

41. All this brings out the efficacy of St. Thomas' reasons as applied to the Gift of Understanding. The human mind is moved by the Holy Ghost to follow His movements. The movement of the Holy Ghost which promotes the mystical knowledge and understanding of spiritual things, making men connatural with God and uniting them to Him, tends towards the intimate experience of divine things. It is directed to mystical, experiential and affective evidence both in this life and in heaven, for its nature involves no imperfection. Hence, it remains essentially one and the same, distinct from Faith in this life and from the light of glory in heaven. If then, the Gift of Understanding in heaven is separated from Faith, and on earth it is separated from the Light of Glory, obviously it is distinguished from both Faith and the Light of Glory.

[43] *Canticle of Canticles,* ii, 3. [44] *Hebrews,* xi, 13.

42. That this movement is of one species is proved from the fact that it proceeds from the same formal motive both in this life and in heaven. Its motive is the understanding of spiritual things in an affective and experiential manner. Thus men experience what these things are—or rather what they are not—by the affection with which they are united to them. This loving interior experience in no way implies formally distinct natures and motives for this life and for life in heaven. Likewise, charity in this life and in heaven is not a different virtue, although in heaven it expresses a more abundant experience and sweetness than it does here below. Both, however, tend to experiential evidence according to the frequently repeated quotation: *Taste and see that the Lord is sweet.*[45] The only change is in the object experienced. In this life there is not a fullness of light; the soul experiences spiritual things by discerning what they are not, by distinguishing them from corporeal and sensible images and from errors, just as a blind man distinguishes things by touching them to gain experiential knowledge of them. Similarly, anyone looking from afar off does not know the details of a thing, but he can distinguish men from trees, mountains from valleys, although he sees them only in a confused way.

In heaven Understanding gives an affection for things as they are in themselves. It has loving experience of things in their intimate reality, and it is refreshed by a torrent of delight at the font of life.

43. There is no difficulty in admitting that the one light, the same motive and the one power should have evidence in different stages according to the diverse matter to which it is applied. One stage may even seem like darkness compared to the other, just as the light of a candle and the light of the moon seem to be darkness when compared to the light of the sun. Differing only in mode of procedure and perfection of act, the light remains the same. In this life, neither the object nor the mode of acting admit of more than negative or extrinsic evidence. In heaven, proper and essential evidence is obtained. In its proper formality, the light of the Gift of Understanding does not change substantially with the passage from this life to that of heaven. The light merely increases. *The light of the moon will be like the light of the sun;*[46] *His*

[45] *Psalm,* xxxiii, 9. [46] *Isaias,* xxx, 26.

splendor will be the light.[47] Throughout the light is the same experiential and loving light flowing from a union with things divine. Yet it is distinct from the light of truth or investigation and from spiritual taste which is mystical understanding.

44. Any reply to the difficulty introduced at the beginning of this section[48] must admit as true that, according to its formal aspect, the same habit cannot be at one time obscure and at another clear. However, the same habit in one state may have but an imperfect clarity, while in another it may enjoy perfect illumination. Although the clarity of one seems obscure when compared with the clarity of the other—as the light of the moon with that of the sun, both are really clear and of the same specific essence. Both proceed under the same aspect of understanding, that is, from a simple understanding in an experiential and loving connaturality and union with divine things, which can be had by those only who are in the state of grace. It is called a simple understanding to differentiate it from the understanding which is had from causes or through causes, as wisdom, knowledge, or counsel. According to St. Thomas,[49] " Understanding seems to be called a simple apprehension, but wisdom indicates a certain plenitude of certitude for judging of the things attained."

The whole formal motive indicates a clarity which is neither perfect and consummate nor the obscurity of belief. For it does not pertain to the Gift of Understanding to assent to the testimony of the witness. Its function is rather to understand, discern, and penetrate from an experiential connaturality for spiritual things. Here below it experiences at least what things are not, while in heaven it sees what they are.

St. Thomas' discussion of how the Gift of Understanding is related to the vision of the Divine Essence in heaven will be reserved for later consideration.[50]

[47] *Habacuc*, III, 4.
[48] Cf. III, 33.
[49] III, d. 35, q. 2, a. 2 qu. 3.
[50] Cf. *infra*, No. 65.

The Distinction of the Act of the Gift of Understanding from the Act of Faith and the Act of the Other Gifts and Habits

The Object of the Gift of Understanding

45. Nearly all the answers to this question should be evident from the preceding arguments. St. Thomas [51] teaches that there can be two ways of knowing and judging. An object may be known and judged through inquiry and study, or it may be known and judged through experience and connaturality.

For example, a philosopher judges of chastity according to moral science and the speculative treatment of virtue, while a temperate man judges of it by his connaturality to continence and chastity.

Therefore, of spiritual and supernatural truths there is both knowledge and judgment through study and speculative inquiry, in an exact delineation of truth and also through connaturality, love, and experience. St. Denis [52] wrote of Hierotheus in his work on *The Divine Names* that " he had not only attained to divine things, but he had suffered them as well." Anyone suffers divine things when he is stirred to love and is moved by the Holy Ghost above the level measured by human rules. The term suffer is employed since acting under obedience and subjection to the motion of another is said to be a sort of suffering or receiving.

46. The Gift of Understanding does not sharpen and perfect the mind through study and metaphysical inquiry, but by mystical connaturality and union with divine truths. This union and connaturality is not in the order of being but in the order of love and is an aspiration of the will, called mystical to differentiate it from philosophical knowledge, acquired by study or speculative inquiry. Mere speculation moves the will but little—except to vanity. Science leads to pride. But the knowledge which moves a man toward a right ordering of love, in attaining greater experience of divine things, pertains to the Gift of Understanding.

47. St. Thomas [53] teaches this same doctrine when he remarks that " unless the human intellect is moved by the Holy Ghost in such a way that it has a correct estimate of the end, it has not yet obtained the Gift of Understanding, however much the Holy Ghost

[51] II-II, q. 8, a. 6 and q. 45, a. 2.
[52] *De Divinis Nominibus*, c. 3—*MPG*, III, 648.
[53] II-II, q. 8, a. 5.

may have enlightened it in regard to other truths which are preambles to the faith." The intellect forms a correct estimate of the end only by the exclusion of error concerning that end and firm adherence to it as most desirable. This can take place only in those who are in the state of sanctifying grace. Thus, in the order of moral virtues, a man has a correct estimate of the end through virtue.

According to the doctrine of St. Thomas [54] on the Gift of Wisdom, it is evident that the Gifts which are rooted in the intellect perfect it mystically, by reason of an experiential knowledge and judgment of things divine. Such an experience cannot be had without a love and savor which unites and connaturalizes the soul to supernatural truths.

48. Knowledge of this Gift is based not on philosophical inquiry but on Sacred Scripture, which asserts that knowledge in such Gifts is founded upon love and a sort of savor. *Taste and see,*[55] or again, *A good understanding to all who do it.*[56] *No one knows except him who has received,*[57] *or The spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding,* etc.[58] Therefore these types of knowledge are in a spirit of love—not any sort whatever, but one resting upon and uniting itself to men. Found in simple and unlettered men, who often have very reliable judgments upon things spiritual, this mystical and loving knowledge is rooted in experience, not in study or metaphysical speculation.

There is no reason why there should be an experiential knowledge of virtue in virtuous men and should not be such knowledge from a supernatural communication by which a man is moved by the Holy Ghost. If a temperate man can judge of chastity from his exercise of it, no less than a philosopher from his speculation about it, why cannot a man know and judge of divine truths from his love and experience of them?

49. It might be alleged that this does not prove that there ought to be a special habit or Gift for such knowledge or judgment, since there is no special habit for experiential knowledge and judgment.

However, these two cases are very different, since the moral virtues and their operations are connatural to the human manner

[54] II-II, q. 45, a. 2.
[55] *Psalm* xxxiii, 9.
[56] *Psalm* cx, 10.
[57] *Apocalypse,* II, 17.
[58] *Isaias,* xi, 2.

of acting. Furthermore, the same is true in the case of infused virtues. By their object they are elevated above the natural order, but in their manner of acting they proceed in accord with the limits of their subject and its rational activity. Hence, for such experiential knowledge a special habit or virtue is unnecessary.

But to know and understand supernatural and divine mysteries in a superhuman manner, and to distinguish them from error, a peculiar habit is necessary. For in such mysteries there is a special difficulty not found in experiencing things already connatural.

50. If the foregoing is admitted, the distinction of the act of the Gift of Understanding from every other type of knowledge and habit is easily made. The intellectual habits related to and attaining the knowledge of truth by their own effort and industry, whether they are purely of the natural order, as in philosophy, or founded upon Faith, as in theology, proceed according to their own discursive activity. All habits of this kind are distinct from the Gift of Understanding. For Understanding penetrates and knows the things of Faith from an impulse and motion of the Holy Ghost and not from the mind's own activity or natural knowledge of the terms, as in the habit of first principles.

Moreover, the Gift of Understanding is distinct from the other habits or infused illuminations, such as prophecy, which are found even in sinners or in those who have not the Faith.[59] For prophetical understanding is merely an illumination of the mind concerning the existence of things revealed.

It is the proper province of the Gift of Understanding to illumine the mind to make a correct estimate of the ultimate end. The mind is illumined concerning divine things according to an interior realization, connaturality, and loving union with the supernatural. Such experiential knowledge is vastly different from the acquisition of truth by discursive rather than loving knowledge.

Furthermore, Understanding differs from the other Gifts of the Holy Ghost, namely Wisdom, Knowledge and Counsel. They proceed in an analytic fashion, as is customary in science and prudence, yet their analysis differs from the intellectual virtue, as will be noted later, in the consideration of divine things and in the consideration of human actions. The Gift of Understanding, on the other hand, employs a simple judgment and intuition built upon a

[59] *Cf.* II-II, q. 8, a. 5, ad 2.

penetration of the terms, in a way similar to the habit of first principles.

51. The act of the Gift of Understanding differs from the act of Faith, which is also concerned with first principles and divine things. According to St. Thomas,[60] the Gift of Understanding is concerned with the first principles of grace in a way quite different from the concern of Faith. It is the function of Faith to assent, but it pertains to the Gift of Understanding to penetrate. A difficulty might arise here similar to the one concerning judgment: why does not one and the same habit penetrate and assent, and why is there a difference between the Gift of Understanding and Faith? The reply is based upon the fact that the Gift of Understanding assents to truth which it penetrates, not formally by believing, but by experiencing at least what these truths are not and how distant they are from sensible things, and that they should not be confused with error. Faith assents to truth by believing.

There is a difference between assent by belief and assent by penetration and experience. One who believes adheres to the testimony which has been offered and his action is restricted to assent, for he neither seeks nor probes further. Understanding, however, penetrates to the core, investigates the hidden reaches of the thing, extending even to its antecedents. It strives to lift the veil and to illuminate the darkness. Through the Gift of Understanding, God dispels the mists.

On the other hand, through Faith a man comes to a cloud-enshrouded mountain. In Faith the mind is held captive, the eye is covered, and a man walks through a deserted path to the mountain of God. Finally, in that desert land, without paths, without water, he appears in the holy place of God. This is the not uncommon experience of those who are constant in prayer with only naked and dry Faith. The soul seems arid and its tongue seems to cling to the side of its mouth, for it can only believe and cannot penetrate the mysteries of God.

However, when the Holy Ghost begins to breathe upon the soul, and to melt the frozen waters with His Spirit, through the Gift of Understanding, He lays open the hidden meaning of things. Through the breath of His Charity, which He places in the soul, there is an interior sense and taste of the sweetness of the Lord.

[60] II-II, q. 8, a. 6.

Then, surely as a *torrent in the south*,[61] He ends the captivity of the mind, just as a torrent frozen solid is loosed by warm air. Clouds are dispersed, and the aroma of the mysteries of Faith, like the odor of a plowed field, is spread abroad. The eyes of the soul are as doves, dwelling not in the barren and arid land, but alongside a full stream. The soul is filled with marrow and fatness by the light which is poured into it, and its prayer is like incense in the sight of God. All these things are results of the Gift.

52. What is the basis for this doctrine? From Sacred Scripture itself is derived the difference between Faith and the Gift of Understanding. However, in the natural order the same habit suffices for an assent to principles and a penetration of both the principles and the derived truths. Why then does not the one habit suffice for assenting to truths believed and for penetrating them through understanding? The answer to this question is based on a twofold distinction.

First, the assent of Faith is founded upon extrinsic testimony, and not on matters which are intrinsic to the reality in question. Faith does not assent in virtue of a knowledge of an object's intrinsic properties. It assents merely from the testimony of the witness, which is extrinsic to the object. The Gift of Understanding assents to the truth by penetrating deep into the object, by searching within it, either through negative evidence, removing imperfections, or in heaven through the positive evidence.

In Faith realities and essences remain clouded, since Faith is founded on the extrinsic testimony. Consequently, the eye is said to be clouded and the mind held captive. The soul suffers a great thirst for the understanding and penetrating of the object in all its aspects. For this reason, St. Thomas notes quite correctly that it is the province of Faith to assent to principles, while it pertains to the Gift of Understanding to penetrate them. This is to be understood in its precise formality. It is the function of Faith merely to assent, without any discussion or investigation or understanding of the intrinsic properties of the object. All the interior aspects of the object remain so hidden to it that it adheres to its object and assents to the truth proposed by reason of extrinsic testimony alone.

The Gift of Understanding, on the other hand, strives to get

[61] *Psalm* cxxv, 4.

within the object and to penetrate its interior aspects. "How shall this be done?" [62] the Blessed Virgin asked the angel. This question was not caused by any diffidence or hesitation. It was brought about by the Gift of Understanding seeking a full interior understanding of the mystery, in so far as it can be understood in this life.

It is necessary, then, to insist upon distinct habits for Faith and for the Gift of Understanding, since they proceed from distinct motives or formal principles. Faith is from a motive which is so extrinsic that it in no way penetrates to the interior aspects of the thing. The Gift of Understanding strives to penetrate the interior of the object. In this life it accomplishes its end imperfectly, in heaven, perfectly. In virtue of such penetration it assents and judges, but not in the same way as Faith.

53. The second difference is based upon the fact that the Gift of Understanding tends to knowledge and penetration of the truth in a very particular way, namely, the loving experience of things divine. Faith does not proceed from such experience but from the naked testimony of the witness. For this reason, Faith may be found in sinners, who are without grace and who cannot have the Gift of Understanding.

However, in the natural order, the same habit of first principles penetrates truths and assents to them, since such an assent is based merely on penetration and evidence. The assent is not founded upon the naked testimony of the witness, which is extrinsic to the object, as happens in the case of Faith.

Objects of Understanding [63]

54. In general, the object of the Gift of Understanding is whatever lies hidden and impenetrable to the light of natural reason. Along with St. Thomas, Cajetan [64] notes six kinds of objects. Therefore, the Gift should be used for the penetration of these six types of objects, which lie hidden. A thing may lie hidden either under accidents, or under words, or under figures or similitudes, or under appearances attained by the senses, or under its causes, or

[62] *Luke*, i, 34.
[63] Cf. II-II, q. 8, a. 1.
[64] *Commentaria* in II-II, q. 8, a. 1.

under its effects. Whatever lies hidden under these six veils forms the object of the Gift of Understanding. Primarily, supernatural truths, as the direct object of a supernatural light, are the object of the Gift. Secondarily, things of the natural order, inasmuch as they are subordinate to the supernatural, fall within the scope of the Gift. For, by being distinguished from errors and sensible appearances, even natural objects are illuminated.

Hidden beneath *accidents*, lies the substance, or even other accidents. It is the province of the Gift of Understanding to peel off these accidents. It knows that under the accidents of bread in the Eucharist the substance of bread is not found. It also knows how the whole body of Christ is substantially and not quantitatively present in the Eucharist. It recognizes that in the mystery of the Incarnation there is a human nature without its proper subsistence. These and many other things are investigated by the Gift of Understanding.

55. Under *words*, various meanings lie hidden. It is proper to the Gift of Understanding to attain a knowledge of the proper and literal meaning of Sacred Scripture. *Then he opened their minds, that they might understand the Scriptures.*[65]

Under *figures or enigmas* lie hidden mystical meanings, such as the moral, the anagogic, the allegorical, just as parables lie hidden in similitudes.

Beneath *sensible appearances* lie hidden intelligible and spiritual things, such as angels and God, known only by the removal of imperfections.

Effects lie hidden under the *causes*. For example, grace is concealed in the sacraments, Redemption and all its effects in the Passion of Christ.

Enveloped in causes are all their *effects*. For example, under the effects of Divine Predestination is the infinite abyss of the judgment of God.

The Gift of Understanding penetrates all these, in some souls more completely than in others, according to the dispensation of the Holy Ghost.

56. No difficulty should arise from the fact that many of these things can be known by study, especially by the study of theology. For, as St. Thomas often affirms, the natural light of reason is of

[65] *Luke*, xxiv, 45.

only a finite power. Man requires a supernatural power to carry his actions through to the end, to penetrate things which cannot be known by the natural light of reason. There are many things which the intellect cannot obtain by its native light, or even by the supernatural light of Faith. Many things are understood obscurely, with a thousand sensible images and with the possibility of many errors. For example, there may be a sinner who has a dead faith, but in whom there is some light. These things would overwhelm the mind were it not for the discernment of the Gift of Understanding. While many things may be understood with a peculiar enlightenment, without Understanding there is no correct estimate of or adherence to the ultimate end. Hence, the Gift of Understanding is necessary to perfect the mind in discerning errors and sensible images, as well as for experiencing the correct adherence to God, the soul's ultimate end.

57. How are cleanness and clearness of heart as well as the certitude of Faith effects of the Gift of Understanding? For it is obvious that in many who have evil and immoderate passions there is a penetration and an understanding of Sacred Scripture. Many who are most certain and firm in their Faith are sinners and hence lack the Gift of Understanding. On the other hand, there are many in the state of grace who suffer from a dullness of understanding and who experience many difficulties and temptations in matters of Faith.

58. This doubt is resolved by considering with St. Thomas [66] the twofold aspect of cleanness of heart. The first, like antecedent disposition, is a cleansing of the heart from inordinate affections. This is not the function of the Gift of Understanding. Rather through the virtues of the active life and through the Gifts in the appetitive part of the soul such a cleansing is brought about.

The other cleanness of heart is in the intellect through a cleansing from error and sensible images. Of course, images cannot be completely eliminated in human understanding. Yet judgment of spiritual things should not be made in accord with these limitations. According to St. Denis,[67] " those who tend to divine contemplation should escape from them (sensible images)." In fact, this is the whole struggle of meditation and of celestial contemplation, namely,

[66] II-II, q. 8, a. 7 and III, d. 24, q. 1, a. 4.
[67] *Theologia Mystica*, cf. *MPL*, CXXII, 267.

the removal or separation of spiritual things from their corporeal forms. The words of St. Paul may be used to describe this situation, *And even though we have known Christ according to the flesh, yet now we know him so no longer.*[68]

The Gift of Understanding has as its primary purpose such a purity of heart in the intellect. By eliciting a correct understanding of spiritual things, it purges away errors and removes sensible images. Of itself it does not bring about a cleanness from evil effects in the will and sensitive appetite, for that type of purity of heart is the result of the virtues and gifts in the will and sensitive appetite.

59. There are two important notes to be added to this consideration. The first is that it is one thing to have emotions which lie dormant, quite another to have emotions which are cleansed. The second is that, although the Gift of Understanding presupposes a cleansing and pruning of inordinate affections as far as sin is concerned, nevertheless it directs and causes in the appetitive power a more abundant cleansing—struggling with the emotions to bring them to a state of rest.

Christ Our Lord said, *every branch that bears fruit he will cleanse, that it may bear more fruit.*[69] The branch bearing fruit already has the Gifts of the Holy Ghost whose effects are the fruits of the Spirit. If, therefore, Christ purges the branch already bearing fruit—possessing these gifts, the Gifts can coexist with affections which require further cleansing. These are the affections breaking forth from the inclination to sin, which tire the soul but do not dominate it to the point of consent to sin.

60. The cleansing of the affections and emotions from anything mortally sinful is presupposed to the Gift of Understanding. Hence, it must be denied that the emotions leading to mortal sin can flourish in those who have the Gift of Understanding. Yet, cleansing the affections to the point of quietude and rest—that they neither break forth in the soul nor tire it—is not required for the Gift of Understanding. This cleansing is found in but a few and in them only after a long period of intense struggle.

There is in most souls a wrestling of the emotions and the contemplation of divine things and divine illumination (however

[68] *II Corinthians*, v, 17. [69] *John*, xxv, 2.

meager) of the Gift of Understanding, since *the light shone in darkness and the darkness grasped it not.*[70] The prophet did not lack the Gift of Understanding when he said: *I was in misery while the thorn of my sin tortured me. . . . Thou, O Lord, art my refuge from the trouble that besets me; my joy, O save me from the enemies that surround me. I, the Lord, will instruct and teach you the way you should take.*[71] The Gift of Understanding is granted as a protection against the enemies which surround the soul, against tribulation and the force of surging emotions, against the thorns of the tumultuous affections. A soul beloved of God is *as a lily among thorns.*[72] It can scarcely be touched without suffering the torturous thrust of the thorns.

In heaven, however, the lily will no longer dwell among thorns but amidst the plenitude of fruit, which is gathered into the barns while the chaff is burned. *Thy stomach* (that is mind, the stomach of the soul) *is a heap of wheat, set about with lilies.*[73]

61. St. Augustine[74] has described this beautifully. "What effect does concupiscence have in the flesh of the continent saint except to arouse the desires of sinning, against which, by not consenting, they wage a glorious battle? The mere desire of marriage in one who professes continence is not without evil. What effect does it have when its every act is evil, both in consent and in accomplishment? . . . In virgins and continent persons what effect does it have, I ask you, what effect does that lust which you praise in your raving, and combat when you are sane, have in them? What effect does it have where it does no good, or where no good is done for it? What is its result in those in whom whatever is done according to concupiscence is evil? What effect does it have upon those whom it compels to watch and to fight against themselves? If when in sleep any assent is stolen from them, when they awake they are forced to bewail it and amidst their groans to say, *my soul is full of ignominy?*[75] What effect does it have when 'dreams play in sleeping souls'[76] and chaste souls, I know not

[70] Cf. *John*, i, 5.
[71] *Psalm* xxxi, 4, 7.
[72] Cf. *Canticle of Canticles*, ii, 2.
[73] *Canticle of Canticles*, vii, 2.
[74] *Liber* IV, *contra Julianum*, c. 2—*MPL*, XLIV, 741, 742.
[75] Cf. *Psalm* xxxvii, 8.
[76] Cf. Virgil *Aneid*, x, 642.

how, fall into shameful consents, which if the Lord should impute, how could anyone live chastely?

"This, therefore, is evil . . . why then is it not rooted out of the continent saints? Why is it not completely taken away by the action of the mind? For you say 'this should be the case if it were evil.' And since it is not so in married people, where such a manner of acting is necessary, you think it good, although you see that the desire should not be aroused where there is no need for it. In fact, its presence is harmful, if not by destroying sanctity through consent, at least in diminishing the spiritual delight of holy minds, of which the Apostle wrote: *I delight in the law of God according to the interior man.*[77] This delight is surely diminished when the soul is occupied with fighting, even if not expelling, the concupiscence of the warring carnal appetite. The soul wages these glorious battles so that it might be called from strife to the delight of intelligible beauty."

62. The assault of the passions, without assent, does not impede the action of a good mind. It summons an abundance of contemplation to the battle and the trials of the wars of God, in which the glory of battle is excelled by the conquest of the mind through grace, by resistance to the assault of concupiscence and by the repression of pride. St. Augustine continues, "But since in this human misery the far worse enemy, pride, should be avoided, concupiscence is not completely extinguished from the flesh of the continent saints. While the soul fights against concupiscence it is aware of its other dangers, lest feeling secure it should become inflated. This continues until human frailty attains that perfection of health, in which none of the rottenness of lust and none of the cancer of pride can be formed. Thus power is perfected in infirmity, since it is the duty of the weak to fight. For the easier one finds it to conquer, the less he will fight."

63. It has been alleged above[78] that there are many without the Gift of Understanding, living in sin, who understand many things in the Scriptures and much concerning the mysteries of Faith. They also have a great certitude concerning the Faith. But it must be noted in reply that they have these things in another way and by another means than by the Gift. This under-

[77] *Romans*, vii, 22. [78] Cf. No. 57.

standing is acquired by study of the Scriptures, or by reading or listening to someone expound them. It is not had by an interior impulse. *His anointing teaches you concerning all things*,[79] wrote St. John, and Our Lord said, *He will teach you all truth*.[80]

Reading, study and human industry suffice for acquiring that knowledge and the beginning of certitude which is without the charity of God. Through these, however, the kingdom of heaven is not promised to men. " While reading," said St. Hilary,[81] " gives knowledge of doctrine, the name of Christ drives out demons."

On the testimony of unshakable divine truth, to which even sinners adhere, a sinner may have the certitude of Faith without the Gift of Understanding. This truth does not militate against the doctrine that from its deeper penetration of the truths of Faith and the terms in which these truths are proposed, the Gift of Understanding has another safeguard against temptations and hesitations concerning Faith, which sinners do not have. It has a certitude of the mysteries of Faith, a firm quietude springing from the interior illumination and experiential taste of spiritual things.

64. It has been added by way of objection [82] that there are many in the state of grace who have a dullness of understanding and who suffer hesitation in matters of Faith. St. Thomas [83] furnishes the answer. He teaches that they suffer a dullness concerning many things but not concerning anything necessary for salvation. Humbling them because of their lack of knowledge, such a dullness is useful in instructing them to flee the hidden temptations of pride. Their very ignorance gives them the highest type of knowledge for according to the Apostle *he has become a fool that he may be wise*.[84]

The just sometimes suffer vacillations in matters of Faith, but they are taught by God to overcome them. This itself is a Gift of the Holy Ghost. But concerning those things which are necessary for salvation, the just suffer no dullness of the mind, since *his anointing teaches you concerning all things* [85]—all things necessary for salvation.

[79] *I John*, ii, 27.
[80] *John*, xvi, 13.
[81] *In Mattheum*, c. 7—*MPL*, IX, 954.
[82] Cf. No. 57.
[83] II-II, q. 8, a. 4, ad 1 and 3.
[84] *I Corinthians*, iii, 18.
[85] *I John*, ii, 27.

In Heaven the Gift of Understanding is Distinct from the Light of Glory

65. From the foregoing it is evident that the Gift of Understanding remains in heaven. For Scripture bears witness to its presence in Christ, who had the beatific vision.

However, it is not easy to explain just what form the act of the Gift takes in heaven and how it is distinct from the Light of Glory. St. Thomas continually affirms that the act of this Gift in heaven is the vision of God and the perfect and positive evidence of divine things and the mysteries of Faith. Yet the vision of God and the mysteries of Faith are provided by the Light of Glory. Therefore, such a gift is identified with the Light of Glory, if it is from it alone that the beatific vision is elicited. In the face of this, St. Thomas [86] attributes the perfect vision of God in heaven to the Gift of Understanding. There is, he notes, a twofold vision. One is perfect, and through it the essence of God is seen. The other is imperfect, and through it the intellect sees, not the essence of God, but rather what He is not. Both types of vision are within the scope of the Gift of Understanding: consummate in heaven, incipient in this life. What could be more clear? Why does it require further consideration? St. Thomas expressly mentions the vision through which the essence of God is seen, and attributes it to the Gift of Understanding in heaven, while admitting only an imperfect knowledge in this life. In this life, the imperfect vision belongs to the Gift of Understanding in a very proper sense as an elicitive principle. Hence it is also an elicitive principle in heaven. The fact is clearer in St. Thomas' [87] *Commentary on the Sentences*: "The Gift of Understanding, whose province it is to apprehend in heaven spiritual things, attains to the divine essence by immediate experience." Therefore, the Gift of Understanding will be the Light of Glory itself, since this alone attains the divine essence by immediate experience.

Therefore, the Gift of Understanding does not endure in heaven, since the Gift is not the Light of Glory, yet in heaven it is the principle of the immediate experience of the divine essence, the Light of Glory.

[86] II-II, q. 8, a. 7.

[87] III, d. 34, 1, 4 c.

66. This argument seems to be confirmed by the fact that the Gift of Understanding is given for the purpose of knowing and penetrating spiritual things from an impulse of the Holy Ghost through an experiential knowledge of God and His mysteries. The greatest and clearest experience of God is Vision. Therefore, the Holy Ghost moves to the knowledge and intimate penetration of divine things through positive evidence. Moreover, another manner of penetrating divine things or of receiving an experience of the supernatural which would be inferior to the vision itself is not necessary.

If, however, the experience of divine things is had by evidence, the Gift of Understanding has evidence of them and is not distinguished from the habit which gives the vision of divine things, the habit of the Light of Glory.

As a matter of fact, St. Thomas [88] admits this. "Those Gifts which communicate with other virtues in an object which will remain in heaven will not be distinct from them in heaven, except by reason of perfection or imperfection of operation. This is evident in the case of Understanding and Faith, since the vision which takes the place of Faith pertains to the perfect Gift of Understanding, according to the Fifth Chapter of St. Matthew." Therefore, in heaven the Gift of Understanding is not distinct from the power which attains to God as He is in Himself, the Light of Glory.

67. In spite of this difficulty it must be maintained that the Gift of Understanding will remain in heaven, and that it will be distinct from the Light of Glory, although regulated by it and by the beatific vision. In these intellectual Gifts, then, a distinction must be made between a regulative principle and a formal principle.

In this life the regulative principle is Faith. In heaven it is the Vision. Here the mind is joined and united to God through Faith; in heaven, through the Vision. After the mind has been united to God and subjected to Him, it is moved through the Gift of the Holy Ghost to various acts by reason of the presence and the impulse of the Spirit, breathing where He will and making men the sons of God. For this reason, St. Thomas [89] asserts that "the theological virtues are to be preferred to the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, since through them the mind is united to God and made subject to

[88] III, d. 32, q. 1, 3 ad 6.

[89] I-II, q. 68, a. 8.

Him. Just as the intellectual virtues are greater than the moral virtues and regulate them, so the theological virtues are greater than the Gifts, since they regulate them."

If all the Gifts are regulated by the theological virtues, then it follows that the Gift of Understanding is so regulated, and it is regulated in a special way by Faith, since by Faith the mind is united to truth and to the divine testimony. Through the Gift of Understanding the mind is illuminated, so that it may penetrate and understand what is to be believed and discern it from error. For this reason St. Gregory [90] remarks, "The Gift of Understanding illumines the mind concerning the things that have been heard." It does this in the present life, in which it is regulated by Faith.

In heaven, vision takes the place of Faith. The Gift of Understanding is then regulated through vision and attains to an intimate knowledge, just as in this life it illumines the mind concerning the things which have been heard and it attains to the things heard with a special certitude.

On the other hand, the Gift of Understanding does not formally elicit the act of belief in this life, nor the vision in heaven, although it is regulated by the Vision and derived from it. The Gift of Understanding presupposes a mind united to God, so that it may make it movable by the Spirit for the understanding of mysteries. It is proper to the Gifts of the Holy Ghost to make the mind easily movable by Him for whatever actions He should wish. It should, therefore, presuppose a mind already united and subject to God so that it will be movable by the Holy Ghost. Consequently, according to St. Thomas,[91] the Gifts presuppose the theological virtues. The Gifts do not formally constitute a union with God but presuppose it and are regulated by it. Union with God in this life is accomplished through Faith; in heaven, through Vision. The Gifts, therefore, do not elicit the vision, nor do they elicit Faith. They presuppose both.

68. This argument is *a priori*, proceeding from the proper and intrinsic nature of the thing. In the same way, St. Thomas [92] proves that the Gifts will remain in heaven. For the Gifts are given so that the human mind may follow the motion of the Holy

[90] *I Moralium*, c. 32—*MPL*, LXXV, 547.
[91] I-II, q. 68, a. 7.
[92] I-II, q. 68, a. 6.

Ghost, especially in heaven where God will be all in all. Therefore, the Gift of Understanding is given so that the motion of the Holy Ghost may be followed. But the union and possession of God is accomplished by an eternal and immutable operation. Such an operation is not the act of that Gift which is given for obeying and following the impulse of the Holy Ghost united and joined to the soul through Vision. Accordingly, either this Gift is not given to the blessed or its operation cannot be the same as that of the Light of Glory.

69. Upon this basis an effective *a posteriori* argument may be formulated. That Christ Our Lord had the Gift of Understanding, together with the other six Gifts, is a matter of Faith from the passage in Isaias.[93] That the seven gifts which were in Christ are found in men is certain from the common consent of the Fathers and theologians, St. Thomas included. However, if the Gift of Understanding in Christ was the Light of Glory and if its act was the beatific vision, during this life no such act is possible to the faithful. Therefore, there would be no sufficient foundation for affirming that the faithful have the Gifts which were in Christ, the seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost.

70. The fact that the faithful do not have the beatific vision is quite evident, since they walk the way of Faith. If the Gift of Understanding in the blessed—such as it was in Christ—is the Light of Glory and has as its act the beatific vision, such a Gift of Understanding is not found in the faithful. The inference is certain, yet the Gifts are in the faithful, because they were in Christ. Hence, the same Gifts found in Christ should be present in the faithful. Otherwise the principal Scriptural foundation for the Gifts would be destroyed. Therefore, if the Gift of Understanding in Christ, who always enjoyed the beatific vision, is the same as the Light of Glory, that Gift is lacking to the faithful, who do not have the Light of Glory. Then there are only six Gifts and not seven.

71. It might be objected: The Gift of Understanding was distinct from the Light of Glory in Christ, since He was at the same time blessed and a wayfarer. There remains, then, a sufficient

[93] *Isaias*, xi, 2. Note: Although there is reason to doubt that Isaias listed seven Gifts in this passage the translators have followed the text of John of St. Thomas.

foundation for asserting that in those who walk in Faith there are seven Gifts, while in the blessed the Gift of Understanding will be supplanted by the Light of Glory.

72. On the contrary, if the gift of understanding was in Christ, as it is in us, that is, for his state a wayfarer, it was either an obscure light incompatible with the possession of the beatific vision, or an evident light and compatible, just as the infused knowledge and whatever clear experimental knowledge Christ had were not repugnant to His beatific knowledge and are even now found in Christ. If the first possibility is true such a gift cannot be placed in Christ any more than can the faith, since there was nothing obscure in the intellect of Christ, who was most completely blessed, full of grace and truth. If the second possibility is true, then why should not the Gift remain in Christ even in heaven? If this Gift is clear and in no way repugnant to the Light of Glory, there is no reason for its not remaining with Him even after He was no longer on earth. Being a perfection in itself like the infused knowledge of Christ, the Gift is not repugnant to the Vision. It need not cease nor be destroyed when this life comes to an end.

73. In heaven the other Gifts related to the intellect, wisdom, knowledge, counsel, will remain. They will not be mingled with the Light of Glory. Consequently, the same may be affirmed of the Gift of Understanding. The inference is evident, since the same basis prevails. The Light of Glory attains to God, and creatures "in" God, and their natures and causes, and it directs the will to act in accord with complete unfailing union. If, therefore, from the very fact that the Gift of Understanding has immediate experience of the Divine Essence, it is to be identified with the Light of Glory, by the same token so are the Gifts of Wisdom and Knowledge. They too know things through a union with God, considering things in their causes and through these causes providing a rule of action.

74. The proof for the principles of such a conclusion may be found in the words of St. Thomas: [94] "The Gifts of Knowledge and of Counsel will remain in heaven just as the Gifts which are concerned with the active life. They will not be concerned with the same matter nor actions which are in doubt. The act of

[94] III, d. 35, a. 4 qu. 3.

Knowledge will be occupied with God as the rule of judgment. The act of Counsel will be concerned with Him as the illuminator in discovery." Similarly, the Gifts of Understanding and Wisdom may remain, although in a different way. Understanding and Wisdom are concerned principally with divine things: Understanding with penetrating and apprehending, Wisdom with judging from causes and resolving to them. These Gifts do not need to change the matter of their operations. They need only change the manner. They will then attain to God perfectly and in a clear manner, at least according to presuppositive and regulative principles—as will be explained in the next chapter.

75. The reason for all this lies in the fact that infused knowledge, by which things outside the Beatific Vision are known through divine revelation and supernatural light, is given to the blessed and was found in Christ. Likewise, there is a Gift of Knowledge, which pertains to supernatural knowledge under the impulse of the Holy Ghost. The Gifts of Understanding and Wisdom are given in the same way, since they are mutually connected.[95] Wherever the Gifts of Knowledge and Wisdom are found, the Gift of Understanding should be presupposed, since it penetrates the principles of Wisdom and Knowledge in a way proper and connatural to them.

76. Another question now arises. By what formal principles are the Gifts of Understanding and Wisdom distinguished from the Light of Glory? Since they are concerned with the clear knowledge of God, what act do they exercise distinct from the Beatific Vision?

77. The reply to this question requires but a word. The Light of Glory elicits the Beatific Vision of God before there is any love, since it regulates and arouses love. The Gifts of Understanding and Wisdom are knowledge founded upon and following after the love and taste of divine union with the soul and its being connaturalized with God through love. As far as the Beatific Vision is concerned, the knowledge of the blessed is of God as He is in Himself. This knowledge precedes the beatific love of charity which arises from it. As far as the knowledge of God outside the beatific vision is concerned—knowledge from effects and in them—even the blessed have a manifold knowledge, both infused in the

[95] Cf. I-II, q. 68, a. 5.

supernatural order and acquired in the natural order. The first and most effective of supernatural things known is born of the love and internal fruition by which the soul adheres to God, is made connatural to Him, and is united to Him. This effect is something created. It is the province of the light and the habit of the Gifts of Understanding and Wisdom to penetrate and apprehend divine things and even the causes of mysteries from this connaturality and from this experience of His presence. The knowledge of divine things through their supernatural or natural effects will pertain to the other types of knowledge, either infused or natural. Because they do not proceed from an adherence to and loving connaturality with God, infused and natural knowledge are not Gifts of the Holy Ghost nor even mystical knowledge. They are purely intellectual experiences of reality.

78. In heaven, this experiential, loving, and mystical knowledge of divine things presupposes the Vision of God, regulating love for Him and, consequently, experience of the divine. By it the understanding is made quite adequate to divine things in a mystical and loving knowledge of truths outside the Beatific Vision. This mystical knowledge is not formally the Beatific Vision, although it is derived from it—just as in this life understanding is derived from Faith and regulated by it. In heaven the soul will be so absorbed by the visual presence of the divinity that in the spirit and love by which it adheres to Him it will mystically know and touch God. God Himself becomes all things in the soul. In whatever the soul sees in Him or outside of Him, it touches and tastes God in all. This experience is the summit of all mystical knowledge of God, but it is not the Beatific Vision. It is rather a motion of the Holy Ghost regulated by the Vision, so that in whatever it touches, and in whatever interior experience it may have, it tastes and experiences God, and is as if intoxicated with wine and the outpouring of the divine plenitude—where the flow of the river gives joy to the city of God.

79. A reply may now be formulated relative to the initial difficulty.[96] Regarding the argument from the authority of St. Thomas, it must be said that the Holy Doctor affirms that the Vision of the Divine Essence pertains to the perfected Gift of Understanding, not as though the latter elicited it, but rather because the Vision

[96] Cf. No. 65.

is regulative of the Gift. St. Thomas does not tire of teaching that the Gifts presuppose the theological virtues through which God is united to the intellect and the will. In this life He is united to the intellect by Faith. In heaven the union is accomplished by Vision. With God thus united and rendered connatural to the soul, the intellect is moved by the Holy Ghost to penetrate and apprehend God and His mysteries as they are in themselves, precisely as truths intelligible of themselves and known—as if speculatively—in the Beatific Vision. But even more, the intellect is moved so that it may lovingly and mystically know Him as He is knowable outside the Beatific Vision, and in His effects, that is, in an internal love, and fruition, and taste, which make the soul connatural with God and intimately united to Him through love and His indwelling. This is a created effect, the love left in the soul by the presence of Divinity. The apprehension and penetration of things divine, derived from this effect of union and connaturality with God, gives a mystical knowledge which is a result of the Beatific Vision and inferior to it (for the gifts are inferior to the theological virtues and hence to the Beatific Vision).[97]

Since, however, the Gift of Understanding is regulated and directed by the Beatific Vision, the vision of the divine essence is said to be within the scope of the Gift, as a presupposition and regulative norm, not as something the Gift elicits. From the vision comes love, and intimate affection, and a fruition of God. From the fruition comes a loving and experiential knowledge both of God as He is in Himself—this the Vision itself gives—and of God as He is attained and experienced within the soul.

80. It might be objected that all this does not seem to be more than a reflex knowledge of the Beatific Vision and fruition of God. The Gift of the Holy Ghost would not be required for such knowledge. Quite sufficient would be the infused knowledge through which graces and spiritual gifts like the Beatific Vision are known.

81. However, the taste and internal experience of divine sweetness, upon which mystical knowledge is founded, is not granted without some reflection upon the act of tasting and enjoying God. This reflection can be twofold. The first tends to a knowledge of the act as a being, its reality and nature. The other reflection is directed to knowledge of the exercise of that act, and

[97] Cf. I-II, q. 68, a. 8.

the effect which it leaves in the soul experiencing God. Mystical knowledge is founded upon the second, the loving knowledge or reflection on the act by which the blessed enjoy God.

It is a vastly different thing to know an object in its nature and being, even through reflection, and to know it experientially and lovingly. Through His beatific and infused knowledge Christ Our Lord knows most perfectly His own obedience in His Passion. Yet He *learned obedience from the things that He suffered.*[98] Similarly, the blessed see God most perfectly through the Beatific Vision. Nevertheless, the soul learns from the things that are experienced in joy and fruition. With the inundation and pouring forth of the whole Fount of Life through the Gift of Understanding the soul knows how sweet the Lord is.

82. The citation from St. Thomas' *Commentary on the Book of Sentences* has no more force than the one from the *Summa*. Yet it should be noted that the Gift of Understanding attains to the divine essence by having an immediate experience of it, not formally, as if the Vision itself were elicited by the Gift, but rather that the Gift presupposes and is regulated by the Vision. From the Vision there results a fruition and an intimate love, an experiential taste of God. This consummate and perfected Gift of Understanding attains to the divine essence by immediate contact, as regulated by the Beatific Vision which it always presupposes.

83. The Gift of Understanding in its formal aspect penetrates and apprehends the divine mysteries with an experiential and loving clarity, but it does not know the quiddity of divine things. It presupposes the immediate experience and experiential knowledge of God as a regulative principle. The Beatific Vision is intuitive knowledge of the essence of God, and in so far as it is intuitive it is experiential. From this experience arises an affection and an enjoyment of God by which the soul has fuller loving contact with Him. The presence of the Holy Ghost and the inflaming plenitude of Divinity is felt in the will. *My beloved put his hand through the key hole, and my bowels were moved at his touch. . . . My soul melted when he spoke.*[99] The beloved has a divine contact within his soul, in the bowels of love. The very sweetness of the act liquefies the soul and totally conforms it to

[98] *Hebrews*, v, 8.

[99] *Canticle of Canticles*, v, 46.

the Beloved, and unites it to Him. Such a contact can never be felt in this life although some shadow of it may be experienced: *In my bed by night I sought him whom my soul loveth: I sought him and found him not.*[100] Arising, the soul finds Him after a variegated experience. It finds Him in His effects, and it sighs for Him, bringing Him to the home of its mother and into her bedchamber, the eternal joys of the Lord. Accordingly, from this experiential and loving union, at its highest peak when regulated by the Beatific Vision, arises the knowledge which is the Gift of the Holy Ghost. This knowledge attains divine things in an experiential and loving manner. It is founded upon the experience of divine enjoyment and sweetness, which presupposes the Beatific Vision.

84. Even in heaven where there is an intuitive experience of God, the knowledge in the Gift of Understanding proceeding through a loving experience is not superfluous. It is not unfitting nor superfluous that God should be known in the same intellect, by both infused and acquired knowledge. So it is not unfitting that there be a twofold experience of God and divine things. One of these is intuitive and through Vision, *They shall see the king in his elegance.*[101] The other is loving and full of the joy of contact, *His right hand shall embrace me.*[102] His breasts are given to the soul since *we will be glad and rejoice in them remembering thy breasts more than wine.*[103]

This conjunction with the divine breasts, more sweet than wine, will be the loving and experiential knowledge in contact. It will be less intuitive than the Vision, since it is founded upon something created, upon divine enjoyment. However, it is not superfluous, since it knows God in another way and under another formality. Although it will not be a formal intuition of God, it will not be lacking in clarity. It will be similar to the knowledge of God which is had through infused knowledge or demonstration. These are not obscure, although they are not intuitive. It suffices that such knowledge be founded upon an effect derived from the Beatific Vision, manifesting the presence of God in the love of the soul.

[100] *Ibid.*, iii, 1.
[101] Cf. *Isaias*, xxxiii, 17.
[102] *Canticle of Canticles*, viii, 3.
[103] *Ibid.*, i, 3.

85. The statement [104] that in heaven the Gifts will not remain distinct from the virtues needs explanation. St. Thomas [105] is not referring to the substance of the Gift and to the species of act which it elicits, but to the manner and regulative principle which the Gift receives from the Beatific Vision and the Light of Glory. The Gifts will remain indistinct from the virtues as far as their regulative principle and manner of acting are concerned, but they will be specifically and essentially distinct.

The justification for this terminology comes from the text itself. St. Thomas distinguishes three kinds of gifts. There are some which share the same object with the theological virtues, since they are concerned with God and divine mysteries, for example, Wisdom and Understanding in their respective penetration and judgment. Others do not share the same material as the theological virtues. For example, the Gifts of Knowledge and Counsel are concerned with things created. Moreover, Fortitude, Piety, and Fear share the objects of the moral virtues.

The Gifts of the last group mentioned do not operate upon the same matter in heaven that they had in this life, yet the measure by which the Gifts exceed the virtues remains. It is not difficult to understand how the Gifts of the second type can remain in heaven as distinct from the Beatific Vision, for they are concerned with different objects.

86. The difficulty arises with respect to the Gifts of the first type and how they can remain, since they are concerned with the same object as the Beatific Vision, God. These Gifts perfect the contemplative life of man here below and remain in heaven with only a more perfect mode of the same act they had in this life. Although even in this life the Gifts elevate the soul to a higher manner of acting than is proportionate to the human nature, they can never attain to the mode of acting which they will have in heaven. St. Thomas [106] asserts that the Gifts which share the same object with the virtues will not remain in heaven. This should be understood to mean that they will not remain distinct as far as the manner in which they are perfected or as far as the

[104] Cf. No. 65.
[105] III, d. 32, q. 1, a. 3 ad 6.
[106] *Ibid.*

regulative principle is concerned. This does not apply to their specific natures or to the acts they elicit.

87. A final difficulty:—The Gifts of Understanding and Wisdom seem to be theological virtues since they have the same proximate object, God.

However, this argument fails since the Gifts do not have as their object God as He is in Himself. They are related to God as He is experienced and made connatural and united to the soul in something created, namely, in the loving and experiential union of charity. Hence, mystical and loving thoughts are not of the essence of the object in Itself. On the other hand, the theological virtue has as its object God as He is in Himself and not as He is in creatures.

(*To be continued.*)

BOOK REVIEWS

Inner Laws of Sociology. A New Sociology. By Luigi Sturzo. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1944. Pp. xxxvi + 314.

In this review we shall confine ourselves to the consideration of several main topics that seem particularly relevant for readers of a theological and philosophical magazine. To cover the book in any wider detail would be of interest primarily to those directly engaged in the study of sociology. We urge those concerned to read the book fully and carefully, for it has a profundity of observation and wealth of material notably lacking in the books usually written on sociology.

We shall, accordingly, divide this review into three parts. The first will concern a very broad outline of the book as a whole, commenting only on certain parts which require special consideration; this will serve also to sketch the extent of Don Sturzo's system of sociology. The second part will take up a crucial question, namely, the relation of society and the individual. The third part will consider, though inadequately, sociology as a science and its relation to other knowledge.

I.

The first pages of the Introduction set out the scope and method of Don Sturzo as a sociologist. Taking sociology as the " study of social life in its complexity and in its synthesizing factors," Don Sturzo assigns two possible methods to it: the experimental, an " analytic study of social facts, to bring out their constant elements and from these to derive their nature and laws "; and the historical, which is " studying the social syntheses and their factors in their concreteness and in the dialectic of human process." He chooses the latter method while not ignoring the advantages to be gained in the former. He rejects the school of positivist sociologists who have attempted to create a social biology with emphasis upon an organistic or mechanical conception of society. He likewise rejects those who have a " metaphysical " conception of society wherein society is variously conceived as principle, will, idea, or spirit.

For Don Sturzo, " the basis of society is simply the human individual taken in his concreteness and complexity as an original and irresolvable principle." Society is not an entity or an organism outside and above the individual, nor is the individual a reality outside and above society. Either taken in itself, as distinct and opposed to the other, is a logical abstraction.

Hence society is the "sum total of individuals." In an attempt to avoid the conclusion that society would "thus be reduced to a mere movement of individual actions and reactions," Don Sturzo maintains that he gives "to the associate instinct its full value as an ever-developing exigency and social impulse, and by this very fact we resolve the individual into society." This, however, is not an evident conclusion of the author's analysis of the relation of society and the individual in the main body of the book.

This initial view of sociology and its use of the historical method is the basic presupposition of Don Sturzo as a sociologist. His understanding of historicism is contained in the following definition: "Historicism is the systematic conception of history as human process, realized by immanent forces, unified in rationality, yet moving from a transcendental and absolute principle towards a transcendental and absolute end." This concerns, rather, the philosophy of history, which is not the same thing as history conceived as philosophy. The latter position is taken by Don Sturzo: ". . . history, thus conceived, presents itself with all the characteristics of philosophy. . . . Basically, philosophy and history might be said to be convertible, since both in different ways have as object the rationality that finds realization in human events according to the general laws governing reality." The full explanation sought in history requires philosophical knowledge, but this means that a historian, to the extent necessary, should also be a philosopher; he is not equipped to give such knowledge in virtue of his ability as a historian (though in fact many historians write as though history were the universal science). To insist upon the distinction between philosophy and history being kept clear is not by way of opposing them but rather of relating them in such a way that both benefit. To confuse or identify them results in false philosophical presuppositions or false historical generalizations in so far as the discipline proper to each is lacking. History—the knowledge of what has happened—in reality requires theology to be fully intelligible, since any account of what has happened presupposes principles of interpretation of why it has happened and this is determined ultimately in view of the operation of divine providence. This, of course, does not make history theology either. It means that a historian is fully accomplished when he is also sufficiently a theologian, at least in the sense of being able to ultilize theological knowledge, just as the theologian is enriched by the knowledge gained through history. The point of this, to which we shall return in the last part of this review, is really to underline the comprehensiveness with which Don Sturzo approaches sociology even though he mixes rather than relates different forms of knowledge.

Passing on from the Introduction (pp. xi-xxxvi), we find that a basic thesis of the book is that there are three fundamental forms of society or

"sociality" (the author's term for society concretized): the domestic, the political, and the religious. The basic error Don Sturzo finds in works on sociology is the confusion of society in general with political society. He accordingly devotes to these forms three informative and well developed chapters (Chapters II, III, and IV), in which certainly some of his best work as an analyst appears.

This is followed by what he calls the secondary forms of sociality, of which the first is economy (Chap. VII). His treatment of economy as a conditioning of social living and as a special, secondary form of sociality is particularly good and well developed. He shows the precise importance of economy and its influence on the social order and at the same time orders it in its proper place within society, contrary to the contemporary errors which assign a supreme and unique position to economy. On this point Don Sturzo, while exhibiting the extent to which an economic structure influences the social and conditions it, well points out:

"This phenomenon is so important as to have misled those who have made of economics the sole law of history, as a fundamental determinism from which all ethico-social manifestations hang. The historical materialism of Karl Marx had a following for half a century. This error and others like it in the sociological field are akin to a biological determinism resulting from bodily conformation and heredity. The error does not lie in the analysis of the possible influence of material causes on the individual and on society. The error lies in making of those material causes an unique fundamental principle, that is, in the monistic resolution of all the other factors into the material factor and hence—by logical consequence—giving to this a character of necessity. We do not deny the economic influence on society. We deny that it forms the sole social, historical causality, and that it is a deterministic causality. To our mind, economy is a conditioning of the forms of sociality, becoming an element of its structure and one of the immediate ends of social activity" (pp. 101-102).

The international community and such particular societies as labor organization form the other secondary forms of sociality. "The international community is to be reputed a secondary form of sociality, not because it is not a necessary form or unable to assume a character of primary importance, but because it cannot be considered original and is not irresolvable into other forms of sociality, from which it draws the elements for its constitution and development" (p. 129). Don Sturzo argues that the trend of social movement from the nineteenth century on "leads directly to the ethico-juridical construction of an international community of a stronger and more stable type than the attempts at The Hague and Geneva" (pp. 152-153). We may well wonder, with mixed feelings,

whether this movement will be effectively realized in the recent attempt at San Francisco.

The second part of the book is devoted to what Don Sturzo calls "The Syntheses of Sociality." These comprise Authority and Liberty (Chap. VIII), Morality and Law (Chap. IX), and Duality and Diarchy (Chap. X). It is perhaps the latter chapter we should consider first since it contains a basic explanation and summary of the other two.

There is, the author points out, a basic duality in the nature of man which follows on his being a creature of reason and sense. It is the duality of the rational, spiritual, ideal element on the one hand, and the practical, material, and realistic element on the other. Such a duality must reach a further resolution, a synthesis and a unification. In relating this to the sociological order, the author observes: "From what I have ascertained in studying the forms of sociality and their interference, the tendency to unification, the trend towards rationality, and the syntheses of 'liberty-authority' and 'morality-law,' it is clear that there is nothing social which is not moulded by the duality of the ideal and the practical, the spiritual and the material, the finalistic and the conditioned. . . . The duality does not remain a mere tendency or a transient expression of different states of mind, or of the manifold autonomous currents of thought and activity which form the material of social 'becoming.' In the concrete, all the diversity and variety of life is always polarized as a duality, and the duality always tends to elision and unification" (p. 241).

In this somewhat involved chapter, it seems that Don Sturzo, simply, has transferred the notion of man's mode of action—it can be called a basic contrariety in man—into the social order of man. Reason and sense in man, even apart from the consequences of original sin, form a natural contrariety and hence a duality. We would thus expect a similar situation in men acting together. Further, change in the physical order proceeds through contraries, as we know from philosophy of nature. It thus appears that by an extensive elaboration Don Sturzo has transferred the principles of man's mode of action and that of change in general to social movement as a means of rendering social process intelligible. This is commendable. It suffers only in that the terminology and analysis Don Sturzo uses appear somewhat burdensome. For example, he utilizes the word "diarchy" for "expressing the idea of a social duality, finding concrete manifestation in two forms of power, whatever their sphere, whether moral, political or religious" (p. 249). Again, his development of process and change in terms of duality and diarchy often gives the impression of a universal mobilism, for, even though the duality tends to unification, still any real unification (i.e., a positive accomplishment or termination) never appears to occur, and he further describes the sociological duality as a

" conflict, latent or open, between reality statically conceived and its 'becoming.'" The free use of terminology such as this suggests Marxian and Hegelian notions of being and becoming even though this is quite remote from Don Sturzo's intention.

While the structure of the physical universe, including man, is such that there is always change, yet there are successive terms to all changes and it is in virtue of such terms or resolutions that other change occurs. Without the fulfillment of changes in their terms, reality indeed would be an endless " conflict " and man's social movement an incessant revolution. But with the achievement of positive terms it is possible for change to become process, i. e., orderly movement. It is in the human order that the progressive movement of change can be thwarted, and the rectification of this is ultimately realizable only in man's conformity with the principle of movement, namely, divine movement. And so, to put the matter in its full intelligibility, social movement will be determined ultimately by its conformity with divine providence. Don Sturzo sees it as " unification in rationality " which may be a sociological way of phrasing it.

Finally, we should note that change is itself intelligible only in terms of rest, that is, its accomplishment or fulfillment. Becoming cannot exist nor can it be understood without being. This aspect does not seem sufficiently evident in Don Sturzo's analysis. For the nature of man, despite the duality of operation, is essentially one, and change, despite its movement by contraries, also terminates successively in positive forms. But perhaps, in discussing change in the sociological order, Don Sturzo considers this sufficiently accounted for by referring to the " crystallization of the diverse currents of activity in structural form, as suitable and permanent organs and means for achieving determined ends " (p. 243). By this he means institutions, such as the family, the state, the church, the municipality, and so on. However, the dominant impression gained from his whole analysis of sociological movement in terms of duality and diarchy is that of a somewhat preconceived system of " dualistic dynamism," and we can only report here that the author claims it as " a sociological vision of laws derived from human nature, from its rationality, from its mode of action, from its social effectiveness " (p. 258). The social movement of man appears to us, rather, as basically his conformity or lack of conformity with ethical, political, and theological principles.

Authority and Liberty (Chap. VIII) is a " synthesis of sociality " which " resolves itself into a duality of concrete forces which, on the plane of order, limit each other " (p. 240). Don Sturzo rightly emphasizes that authority is the principle of order and the means of unification. But his understanding of authority appears loose and inadequate: " We reiterate that the essence of authority is the social consciousness itself inasmuch as it is permanent, active, unifying and responsible consciousness. . . . In

consciousness alone can the deeper value of the social unification be found" (p. 161). This is hard to construe as the "essence" of authority, especially with such dependence upon the unsatisfactory and vague term "consciousness," upon which we shall comment later.

Don Sturzo distinguishes the sense of liberty he is to use: "Man's freedom in social relationships . . . is not to be understood either as his personal faculty of free choice (which it presupposes), nor as a lack of conditioning factors (which would hamper his action), but as the conscious sharing of the individual in social life" (p. 163). He further distinguishes this latter liberty into "organic": the free initiative in the creation and development of social organism, "finalistic": the free sharing in social ends, and "formal": the specified, concrete freedoms actually enjoyed, such as freedom of the press.

The basic relation of authority and liberty is well put in the following words: "While authority is the 'reductio ad unum' of the social body, liberty is its 'coexistentia membrorum.' To conceive of a society as under an authority and without liberty is to conceive of a material aggregation of men in which the spontaneous element of cohesion is lacking, its place of occasion being supplied by force. . . . To conceive of a professedly free society without authority, would be to conceive of a human aggregation lacking the organic means for achieving any social purpose. . . . Without a minimum of authority or a minimum of liberty society cannot be conceived under any aspect" (p. 164).

Any opposition between authority and liberty "will never be between authority and liberty taken in their abstract significance as antagonistic positions. The struggles in the concrete are always between the representatives of authority, because invested with power, with their followers on the one hand, and on the other, their opponents with their supporters" (p. 183). This leads him on to consider the method of authority and the method of liberty. But in this comparison he views authority as though it were intrinsically disposed to be socially unfavorable in its method: "We mean by the method of authority that which regulates the whole of public activity by law, imposing its observance by coercion and the application of penalties to transgressors, leaving nothing to private initiative, nor allowing the public opinion formed by individual citizens, or by the various moral bodies, to interfere in the activity of public power. . . . In substance, the method of authority starts from the conception that the authorities can have no confidence in the citizens, or in their self-discipline, having no confidence either in their initiative, in the usefulness of their criticisms or in their moral cooperation. Thus, the organism of authority tends to isolate itself and to rely on government by a strong hand, discipline, the law imposed from above" (pp. 196-197).

Despite the author's plea that he is not "painting too dark a picture,"

it must be said that in viewing authority on the concrete plane and with respect to method he appears to allow himself to be influenced by excesses of certain authoritarian abuses in contemporary government. Authority simply cannot be a constitutive element of society and yet intrinsically anti-social in method. That the author has permitted particular, if not even personal, considerations to affect his view can be determined from the uncritical and somewhat glowing manner in which he treats the method of liberty: "It starts from the conviction that the development of personality cannot be normal in a setting of coercion, but requires one of freedom. . . . In liberty the limits and restraints must proceed from conviction rather than from fear, from self-control and self-discipline rather than from external threats, from the value of a respected and cherished tradition, rather than from dread of spies. . . . The method of liberty in substance facilitates the cooperation between citizens and the public power, while the method of authority separates and opposes them" (pp. 198-199).

This treatment of authority and liberty is a notable weakness in the book's general analysis. The abuses of authority are, of course, enormous and, at the present moment, most obvious. But the abuses of an irresponsible liberty can be just as enormous and just as fatal to the social body. Liberty's good is attained only through authority's just limit, as authority's good is realized only in sufficient moral freedom. Obviously, the theoretical balance is to be striven for practically. Don Sturzo, of course, also insists upon this, but it is not a true balance he seeks, for it is out of fear of one extreme only: "Since it is easier for the excess to come from authority than from liberty, since authority has with it the law and force, the people should be summoned by referendum, elections local and general, administrative and political, to give its say on the course of the affairs of the country" (p. 202). But the excess can likewise easily come from a vitiated form of freedom which can be exploited by a minority for a tyranny disguised under the name of freedom. This formula is also evident in Europe and elsewhere. Consequently, the balance demands disciplined freedom as much as just authority, for tyranny is not restricted to the abuse of authority alone.

Limitations of space prevent commenting at any length on the chapter on "Morality and Law" other than to observe that it is a well-worked-out consideration of the relation of the two, especially the treatment on the error of separating and opposing individual morality and social morality. Similarly also we must dismiss briefly Chapter XI, "The Trend Towards Unification and the Modern State," by noting that it is a thorough analysis of the origins of the current movement toward a complete social unification in the state, which has appeared, Don Sturzo carefully notes, in the anti-organic individualistic form of state (with centralization) as well as in the totalitarian state.

The final chapter of the book is "Resolution and Transcendence." The first part of this, concerning the resolution of all elements of sociality into individual personality, we shall consider in the following section. The important part of the chapter, if not of the entire book, is his remarks on the final transcendence to a goal comprehending all else and which all men spontaneously seek. This goal, this fruition of all society, is God and the society we can have with Him. Don Sturzo summarizes it in this way:

"This goal for us is God, a goal both individual and social. 'If we say that we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth. But if we walk in the light, as he also is in the light, we have fellowship one with another. . . .' The society we form with God is a final transcendence, not purely ideal, but real and quickening and such as to give meaning to our whole life. From this point of view, we may call it a resolution of the human into the divine for the divine comes to us, abides with us, quickens us. . . . Moreover, this transcendence is the sublimation, in a new society established between man—the whole of man, individual and social—and God. That this society is perfected beyond our earthly life we believe, otherwise we should be the unhappiest of beings, but that this society has its beginnings on earth, even on the natural plane as rationality, cannot be doubted if we consider that the essence of our life consists in truth and love" (pp. 312-313).

II

A principal point of Don Sturzo's book is his understanding of society. In the first chapter of his book his initial statement is: "Society in general is merely an abstract concept. Society—or societies—in the concrete consists of individuals cooperating, from diverse reasons, for common ends" (p. 3). The principle of the concretizing of "sociality" is consciousness. Hence he continues: "Society is fundamentally a datum of historical consciousness. Just as the individual, through all the years of his existence, preserves and recognizes his identity through his consciousness of himself and of his past, so society in the concrete, that is, a given society, through the succession of years and generations preserves its identity through the consciousness formed among all its members that it is the same society as in the beginning."

This consciousness, which Don Sturzo utilizes freely, is not something apart from concrete individuality although it has a collective as well as an individual aspect. This initial dependence upon consciousness as the basic notion in society leads the author to state and resolve the following problem: "If it be asked whether the individual comes first and then society, first the individual consciousness and then the collective consciousness, the answer will be in the negative if 'first' and 'then' are taken as meaning

an order of time. If, on the other hand, they refer to a logical order, in a coexistent causality, the answer will be that the individual does come first and society afterwards. We, however, must not permit such abstract formulas to mislead us. Society is in the concrete in the individual by the very fact that there cannot be individuals outside society; the consciousness of the social datum may exist initially in the individual even before he arrives at the reflection of an individual consciousness of his own" (p. 5).

It can likely be said that as a consequence of these and similar initial notions of society Don Sturzo arrives at this conclusion: "An end of society extraneous to the individual and beyond or above him does not exist, for there is no such thing as a self-subsistent social entity outside individuals. Hence, it is rightly said that the individual is the end of society and not vice-versa, and it is usual to say, too, that society is the means for man to attain his end" (p. 7).

We shall quote also Don Sturzo's summarizing conclusions on this in the final chapter. "The State is not a goal of human activity, but merely a means. . . . The fundamental mistake lies in the false conception of society as a finalistic and self-subsistent entity, for society is essentially the coexistence of individuals and the projection of human personality. . . . It is through consciousness that the individual is a person, and society is such through the conjoined coexistence of several persons in their understanding, willing and expression. This conjunction is not a third formation, or an identification of two in one, but simply a particularizing through means and ends, a converging, a dualizing, a grading. All this is analysis; the syntheses demand the resolution into individuality. The individual through social life develops his personality, enhances its value in so far as he succeeds in reliving the social facts in his own consciousness as realities that he has made his own. In this individual consciousness the synthesizing resolution takes place. . . . Just as it is not possible, except by an abstraction, to conceive of the beginning of society in the concrete, so it is not possible, except in abstraction, to conceive of a personal initiative outside some sort of social synthesis; all analysis means an abstraction, under the aspect of forms, values, social structures. Therefore, we say that sociality starts from the individual person and resolves itself into the individual person, like the continuous cycle of the syntheses of human becoming" (pp. 299-302).

The main conclusion of these and similar passages throughout the book is briefly this: the common good is ordered to the individual good. We prefer to state it in these simple terms to avoid any ambiguity as well as to eliminate extraneous matter. Don Sturzo himself states the issue this way in one place but discards the resolution in these terms, resolving it rather through "consciousness" and "human personality." We shall try

to indicate, within the limits of brevity, the source of this erroneous conclusion as well as put forth positive reasons for the primacy of the common good.

Two prior matters arise which relate to this question. The first concerns Don Sturzo's treatment of the abstract and the concrete. Throughout the book he gives the impression that the abstract is to be associated with the unreal or the misleading, or that the abstract is a form of reasoning in the mind apart from a foundation in reality. Hence he tends to gravitate between some form of the wholly abstract and the concrete individuality. However, there is, as we know, apart from the wholly abstract (what we call " logical " abstraction, if unabused) three degrees of abstraction which approach a greater universality without ever departing from their grounding in reality. Thus we can and, in fact, should, in scientific procedure, consider society other than either merely as a concrete entity or in some form of pure abstraction. We must understand the nature of society as drawn formally from its concrete existence which gives us a real entity distinct from, and of course related to, these individuals forming this society. This is not the abstract to be confused with the ideal nor the abuse of the abstract that would mislead us but rather that abstraction which, in conformity with scientific procedure, would inform us. It is true, of course, that the study of a subject such as sociology terminates in the concrete order of the particular societies, but our arrival at that stage of investigation presupposes a sound understanding of the nature and characteristics of society and the social order itself, just as in psychology we must begin with sound notions of the nature of man. The relevancy of this becomes apparent concerning the relation of society and the individual, for it is by an assumption that reality is exhausted in the concrete existence of individuals in this society that one might be led to argue that the individual good is higher than the common good.

The second matter concerns the prominence of the term " consciousness," a somewhat unique abstraction in itself. What should we understand by " consciousness " and what importance should we attach to it? In its ordinary signification, to be conscious is to be aware of one's acts, or to act knowingly. To speak of a man as conscious does not appear to add a special quality to him. To speak of " consciousness " might appear to add some quality such as we hear in such expressions as " group consciousness " and the like, but what does it really imply other than that one member of a group is aware of another member of the group? If it means more than this, better terms could certainly express it, especially if it further implies some ordering of the members of the group both to each other and to an end, which significance is rather defeated by the vagueness of " consciousness." Does it have some special sociological meaning which

enriches it? Its particular force, as Don Sturzo appears to use it, is as a means to establish an identity or a unity of a society that it is a society, that it is a group with continuity. " . . . a given society, through the succession of years and generations preserves its identity through the consciousness formed among all its members that it is the same society as in the beginning " (p. 3). Whatever value the term may seem to have for sociologists (borrowed, perhaps, from modern psychological analysis), the whole point of it seems to have been expressed much better, as well as more briefly and clearly, by Aristotle's starting point: Man is by nature a social animal. Man's sociability flows from his rational nature and this precision contains more than countless sentences on " consciousness " as well as eliminates any vagueness or even misconception to be found in a term of dubious psychological analysis. Finally, on a properly theological level, " consciousness " when identified with person or proposed as its constituting note raises a serious difficulty with the dogma of the Church on the unity of person in the Incarnate Word (Denz. 1655). Christ was one person with a human and divine consciousness. How, then, can consciousness taken in the sense employed constitute or be identical with person?

Both of these points appear to contribute measurably to Don Sturzo's conclusion on the relation of society and the individual. For if we accept his dismissal of " society " as a misleading abstraction or if we accept his dictum that " Society is a sum total of individuals " we are with him not disposed to see concrete individuals ordered to the common good of society. Similarly, if " consciousness " is the unifying element of a society, we are not apt to see in society anything more than a series of associated " consciousnesses " of individuals. But this is hardly how we understand society and in fact act in the social order. There is nothing here which shows how a society is really a union of persons achieving a perfection of being unattainable by the individual, that it is a qualitative advance and therefore of a higher order. Or that in civil society there is the natural happiness of the perfect, or self-sufficient, human community and the happiness of individuals as they are members of such a community, to paraphrase Suarez in *De Legibus*.

The reluctance of many modern authors, as well as Don Sturzo, to order the individual good to the common good and to see in the good of civil society a natural though not an absolute end seems to have arisen from two principal sources.

The first source is the contemporaneous abuse of totalitarianism. Stated simply, many writers appear to argue from the abuse of this tyranny to the denial of any natural ordering of the citizens of a society to the natural good of that society. They see any ordering of the individual to the common good as a form of absolute political power, failing to note that the

function of the political power itself is ordered to this same common good, the civil well-being of the entire community. They fear that the supremacy of the common good means the cancellation of the individual good, and rhetorically we are laden with arguments centering on "human personality." Actually, however, human personality, whose preciousness really comes from God, is realized only in the ordering in the universe whereby human personality, through a hierarchy of ascending goods, is led from the original, inadequate, individual good to the ultimate final common good which is God Himself. Consequently, those who wish to exploit the order of the universe to exalt individual human personality precisely rob human personality of its ordained means of perfection. Therefore, the tyranny of totalitarianism tells us simply this, that when the political power of society abuses the natural order of the individual good to the common good by denying natural rights which belong to human nature, there is not in such a society either a common good or an individual good, for the moral and political good obtained in the common good necessarily presupposes not only the integral preservation of the individual good but the perfection of that very good in a higher condition. This refutes any supposition that the primacy of the common good implies totalitarian political power.

We should further realize, then, that civil society is a naturally perfect community able to give us natural happiness as a natural end. This, of course, is not an absolute end of a man but is further ordered, naturally as well as supernaturally, to God, Who is likewise understood, in the hierarchy of ascending goods, as the supreme common good. When Don Sturzo speaks of the relation of the individual to the religious society, namely the Church, he says: "The society, the Church, founded by Jesus Christ is a society in which the personality of each member is not lost, but enhanced through the mystical union with the Head, through being raised to the state of grace and being personally destined to the vision of God" (p. 85). Civil society is best understood as the natural counterpart of the religious society, and as the disposition both toward it and the final society with God. Hence, by paraphrasing Don Sturzo's own words, the relation of the individual to the civil society could be well put in this way: The society, the polity, is a society in which the personality of each member is not lost, but enhanced in value through the civil union with the ruling authority, through being raised to the state of civil well-being personally ordered to the realization of the civil common good.

The second source of error for the disordering of the common good and the individual good seems to be an analytic one. Don Sturzo is at pains to reject any notion of a "self-subsistent social entity outside individuals." To the extent that this means there cannot be society without individuals nor individuals without society, this is true. And to the extent that the

statement means that society cannot be given an independent, substantial existence, it is also true. But at the same time this does not argue that the good of an individual substance is higher than the good of civil well-being, an argument sometimes used by "personalists." To consider the argument predicamentally, as it should be considered, man as a substance is greater in being than an accident, such as the common good. This does not permit us to argue, however, that man, because he is a substance, cannot be ordered to any accident, which, predicamentally, is less in being. For man as a substance is perfected through the order of accidents, of which the most notable instance is grace, and so in the order of goodness, as distinguished from the order of being, man is rightly ordered to a higher good even if, predicamentally considered, it is an accident. Such a higher good is the social common good, perfecting man's substantial nature.

Those who wish to order the common good to the individual good no doubt seek what ultimately is true, the ordering of man to God. But God alone has perfect being and perfect goodness. We have substantial being which is, as substance, to have being absolutely. But we have goodness imperfectly; we lack the perfections which can come to our substantial being. God, in ordering the universe, orders the means by which we may obtain the goods that will give us perfect goodness. These means, of which the social common good is one, become ends for us to attain. The social common good is a true end, being a fulfillment of the natural order, which we call natural happiness. Those, then, who would place the individual good above this common good go directly against the order given in the universe and in the last analysis impoverish that very human personality they are most anxious to preserve. The perfection of human personality which they want will be realized only through and *in* the given hierarchical common goods. And in this way we can understand that the individual good is not the last end but is ordained to the common goods, to the family, to the state, to the Church, and thus to God.

III.

The opening remark of Don Sturzo's book is: "We do not intend to discuss whether sociology is or is not a science. This is an inexhaustible theme, on which much will be written, for and against, for a long time to come. We take the term, sociology, as meaning the study of social life in its complexity and in its synthesizing factors."

Even within the limits of a review, we cannot wholly lay aside the question of the sort of knowledge sociology claims to give, or at least its location in the realm of knowledge. Unfortunately, we cannot turn to the sociologists themselves for clarification. There is no fundamental

agreement upon its subject matter, the extent of its problems, nor even, as Don Sturzo notes, whether it is a science.

Questions and difficulties such as these are not confined to sociology; they are common to the present field of knowledge as a whole, and such a situation can exist only where there is a kind of anarchy in knowledge. By anarchy here we mean that modern sciences and studies have rejected a vertical or hierarchical ordering and have developed horizontally, each claiming an autonomy and ignoring or rejecting relations to other sciences. The net result is that we know a lot about a lot of things but we comprehend little about their intelligibility; we have obtained science without wisdom.

We may presume, in this review, the general comprehensive relation which should hold between the experimental sciences and philosophy. This was understood, at least in basic outline, by Aristotle who, in recognizing the superiority of philosophical knowledge because of its formal object and degree of abstraction, nevertheless also recognized the importance and necessity of experimental investigation. Each has its proper authority within its own sphere and yet the relation of the two, the sapiential ordering of philosophy and the concretizing descent of experimental science, is the essential part necessary for a synthesis of knowledge. The somewhat widespread confusion of today, aggravated by the phenomenal development of the experimental sciences, arises from the one rejecting the other, or from the failure of either to appreciate a distinction in method, but most profoundly it arises from the lack of a developed and ordered relationship with each other. We may also presume here the sound understanding of theology as the queen of the sciences whereby, in virtue of its privileged position of revealed doctrine, it can illuminate, even though extrinsically, the intelligibility of both philosophy and experimental science.

The observation of Don Sturzo, then, that " we do not intend to discuss whether sociology is or is not a science," apart from its anomalous character, raises nevertheless two important matters. The first concerns precisely what sort of knowledge sociology claims to give, which difficulty pertains to the social sciences as a whole. This question is not our direct concern here except to note that Don Sturzo's distinction of the " historical " method and the " experimental " method suggests that sociology is approached both philosophically and scientifically. The " historical " as used by Don Sturzo is in reality philosophical more than historical, if we keep the terms in their literal distinction. History, as Don Sturzo wishes to use it, involves philosophical and theological judgments which, instead of being properly within the sphere of history, exhibit, instead, its relation to philosophy and theology.

The second matter concerns the relation of sociology, however conceived

as knowledge, to other sciences. This is the point which concerns us briefly here.

Sociology, to whatever extent it utilizes the experimental method, and however much it analyzes the benefit of what has happened (which is history), certainly is founded in social philosophy. This being the case, it should be ordered to psychology, ethics, and politics as philosophical disciplines from which it draws its principles, primarily those concerning the nature of man and the nature of happiness. An outstanding defect in the development of sociology, owing to its positivistic inception with Auguste Comte, has been its refusal to locate itself in relationship to other branches of knowledge and to utilize sound principles upon which it must depend. Sociologists, in the main, either have treated "society" and "social problems" without any reliance upon psychological, moral, and political principles, or have assumed erroneous ones. This defect in the science of sociology has been accompanied by a parallel defect in the practical order of social workers. Just as sociology, in the field of knowledge, has come to treat the broad matters of social problems without any ordering to ethics or politics, not to mention theology and especially moral theology, so sociologists in the practical order have come to treat human beings as "social cases" with a calculated impersonalism and studied efficiency that denies the moral virtues and suffocates the corporal works of mercy. And in its worst aspects we witness, under the guise of social clinics, monstrous anti-moral teaching and guidance to the "underprivileged."

In view of this, it is clear wherein the chief value of *Inner Laws of Society* lies. It is that in the field of sociology we have someone such as Don Sturzo who, in virtue of his profession, possesses the qualifications and the intellectual discipline necessary to approach the subject matter comprehensively. In the modern situation of scientific and moral anarchy, Don Sturzo's work in such a field is especially welcome and it is to be hoped that the "Luigi Sturzo Foundation for Sociological Studies, Inc.," will accomplish much, theoretically and practically, by the integration of sociological work with philosophical and theological principles.

And in making a criticism of the book on this same important matter we do not mean to appear ungrateful for what he has accomplished in this regard. Yet what criticism we have made of the book really concerns this one point: the work does not rely upon nor utilize fully the illumination possible from philosophy and theology. We do not want to be misunderstood here. We assume a clear distinction of subject matter for the sociologist and the acceptance of his authority in his field. And by an illumination from philosophy and theology we do not mean some form of surface theologizing or philosophizing of sociology. Rather, we mean that

the work of sociology, starting with reliance upon sound principles from theology and philosophy, continues also to make use of those sciences in its own proper analysis. Thus, to take the highest example, a real synthesis occurs with the Faith illuminating the subject matter of sociology and the study of sociology extending the principles of Faith.

We are not unaware that Don Sturzo has achieved much in his book to realize just this. We stress also the value of a priest giving his ability to develop the science of sociology. Our criticism is fundamentally directed toward seeking a balance, development, and sapiential ordering of sociology that can be rightfully expected. And in this respect, to summarize broadly, Don Sturzo appears in his book primarily as an immersed sociologist and only incidentally as a theologian. Or, to put it a little differently, sociology is made to appear as itself a summation of philosophy and theology rather than as a subject whose most profound conclusions will arise from the illumination given through sacred doctrine.

This is a criticism that will be intelligible only to those who see acutely the need of overcoming the modern divorce of reason from revelation. Our need now is not merely specialists in this or that branch of knowledge nor, on the other hand, is it a need of masters of theology and philosophy who nevertheless remain on the level of barren principles. It is a need of accomplished students of theology and philosophy who will enter into the subject matter of any of the modern, highly specialized studies and exhibit their full intelligibility in the light of knowledge revealed and developed through the Faith.

JOHN A. OESTERLE, T. O. P.

Dale Mabry Field,
Tallahassee, Florida.

Form Criticism of the Synoptic Healing Narratives. By LAURENCE J. MCGINLEY, S. J. Woodstock, Md.: Woodstock College Press, 1944. Pp. 165. $2.75.

Some one has said of the German learning that it leaves one wondering why it ever existed, so nebulous and without genuine profit has it been. One can say more now; that it has been the cause of much evil in the world, for it was German rationalistic thought that ploughed and sowed the modern mind with its rank fruit. Perhaps it is not too much to hope that Naziism is not the only thing to go down to defeat before the awakened indignation of the world; that some of that indignation will be visited upon the temple of German rationalism where the learned world has so long bowed in reverential awe.

Christian tradition has always held that Matthew, Mark, and Luke

were, in the true sense of the term, the authors of the Gospels that bear their names, and that they were eyewitnesses of the facts they relate or at least gathered their material immediately from those who were eyewitnesses. That tradition is confirmed by the evidence of writers themselves almost contemporaneous with the origin of these Gospels and is supported by internal evidence from the Gospels themselves.

But to the erudite German learning such realism was all too simple and uncynical. It could not possibly be that the Gospels were written as other books were written; that Matthew, Mark, and Luke conceived the idea of writing the story of Christ, gathered their material, and wrote it down as other authors do. There must be found back of the simple Gospel narrative all the complexities of a "Logia" and an "Urmarkus" and a multitude of redactions, and out of fantastic combinations of these must come eventually our three Synoptic Gospels. And it could not be that the things recorded in those Gospels really happened in the way they are described. Even the primitive "Logia" and "Urmarkus" must not be left as simple, objective accounts; they become not a picture of Christ and a record of His teachings as they were in reality, but a community concept of the Christ, formulated after His death. Faith grew in the Christian community after the death of Christ, and the story of the Christ kept pace with the growth of faith, and so the Gospels are not an objective picture of Christ and His teachings but an idealized portrait of what the primitive Christian community thought the Christ ought to have been.

In our own century we have witnessed the growth of this "community production" theory, and especially the blossoming of that particular species called *Formgeschichte*. (In translating this German word, justly dubbed untranslatable, the happy result of "Form Criticism" has been arrived at. I say "happy" because the German term has no more definite meaning than has the translation, and it is to be supposed that a fugacious and nebulous term aptly fits a fugacious and nebulous theory.) Form Criticism supposes in the Gospels a fundament of what is called *Kleinliteratur*. By Kleinliteratur is meant that mass of narrative, principally oral, which is produced outside the standard, integrated literature of a people or language. The rabbinic tales of Judaism, as contrasted to the canonical Scriptures and the legalistic writings of the rabbins, are Kleinliteratur. The folk-lores of England and Ireland, as contrasted to the standard current of English and Irish literature, are Kleinliteratur. Such Kleinliteratur is not primarily intended nor composed as written literature; if it reaches the stage of writing, that is something accidental and the writing down is intended only as a means of preserving what is primarily oral narrative. Kleinliteratur reflects not the studied research nor the critical weighing and judging of what is recounted that is orthodox practice in standard

literature; it represents an uncritical acceptance of a story composed and told for the pure pleasure of story telling, or for the sake of the wonderment involved.

It is into such Kleinliteratur that Form Criticism would break down the Gospels. They would be but a collection of legendary tales that had been produced by the early Christian community in the same way that the legends of Charlemagne or the stories of the Arthurian court were produced. Afterwards, this Christian folk-lore was gathered together and set in a framework of chronology and topography that purports to be the life of Christ, but is, in reality, as much fiction and pure invention as is the framework of the *Idylls of the King*.

In an admirable study of the postulates and methods of Form Criticism, Fr. McGinley delves deep and strikes at the very roots of this noxious plant. He is not afraid to apply the principles of Form Criticism to the Synoptic narratives, and in that application show the essential falsity of the system. He meets the Form Critics upon their own grounds and he makes it very evident that they can reach their conclusions as to the composition and authenticity of the Gospels only by arbitrarily disregarding the evidence which Form Criticism itself furnishes.

The accounts of the three Evangelists are integrally and definitely personal and they manifest a definitely apologetic purpose that is quite foreign to Kleinliteratur. This definitely apologetic purpose is not attained by a mere patchwork compilation such as Form Criticism would like to suppose. The Form Critics err in an *a priori* assignment of the Gospels to the Kleinliteratur category, and then attempt to support that erroneous assignment by arbitrarily assuming that the distinctive traits which definitely mark the Gospels as not Kleinliteratur are fictitious interpolations and so to be excised from the text. It would seem that we can assign the cat to the species of non-tail-bearing animals and then cut off his tail to prove our contention!

That the Christian community exercised an influence in the writing of the Gospels, Fr. McGinley readily admits, but this influence had not at all the immediate and efficacious role that is ascribed to it by Form Criticism. The enthusiasm of the early Christians undoubtedly stimulated the Evangelists in their work and, undoubtedly also, certain members of the community aided the Evangelists in gathering the material of the Gospels. But this is quite a different thing from a community *creatio ex nihilo* that would disregard the objectivity of the facts by furbishing them and supplementing them according to its own impulse, or even creating "facts" from whole cloth.

All fairy stories ought to start with "Once upon a time" and ought to end with "And so they lived happily ever afterward." In the legendary

" units " postulated by Form Criticism as at the base of the Gospel narratives, the Form Critics pretend to find definite characteristic forms and styles which would constitute the " units " in definitely assignable categories: the " dispute," the " miracle story," the " pointed saying," and so on. By reason of such " forms " the Form Critic attempts to estimate the historical value of the " units " and fix them in a definite *milieu* that would produce them. *Milieu* and " social needs " of the *milieu* are the *Sitz im Leben* of the " unit."

One method establishes *a priori* what the needs of the primitive community must have been, and then fits the " forms " to those needs. Needless to say that the " community " in this case is the creation of the mind of the critic himself. We do not know enough of the primitive community and its needs to establish *a priori* what its precise needs were. Another method determines *a posteriori* what the " needs " of the community were. It examines the nature of the individual " forms " and finds that they are " pointed sayings," " miracle stories," and the like, and tailors the *milieu* to fit. And yet, as Fr. McGinley shows, the great majority of the supposed " forms " may be assigned to various and disparate *milieus*. In the end one is amazed at the hardihood that assigns the term *geschichte* to such a gossamer web of guesswork.

Either method, Fr. McGinley points out, disregards the strong traditional evidence for personal authorship of the Gospels, and there is a strange failure to take into account the implications of the time element in the supposed community formation of tradition, and this time element alone is sufficient to cut the supports from under the whole structure of Form Criticism. The formative period of the Synoptic tradition cannot be extended beyond the year 50, and that leaves but a scant fifteen or twenty years for the supposed development of traditional " forms " by the community and the subsequent redaction of these forms into the triple Synoptic narratives. Twenty years for the legend to be created and woven into the framework of the Gospels, and during that twenty years there were still living those who were eyewitnesses to the objectivity of the facts and who were zealous either to propagate the new religion or to destroy it!

In the *a priori* method of Form Criticism, the ultimate unit of Gospel tradition is supposed to be an " example " or a " miracle story." The " example " is an incident purportedly adduced from the life of Christ by early preachers in illustration of their preaching. Since the example is a preaching illustration, the incident could not, according to the Form Critics, be told in a " neutral " fashion but must be shaped to meet the preacher's need, and we must therefore renounce any idea of full objectivity or literal authenticity in these units. Why an early preacher couldn't have related an incident from the life of Christ in the exact

manner in which it happened is one of the mysteries of Form Criticism creation. You will recognize in each of these "examples" a certain *brevity* and *simplicity* and an *edifying* style. Why brevity and simplicity and edifying style should be characteristic of early preaching, and of early preaching only, so that one can always recognize an early preaching "example" by these notes, is another of the mysteries of Form Criticism. The "example" will also have *external completeness*, that is, be essentially unrelated to its context. This external completeness will be recognized when you strike out as unauthentic the phrases and circumstances by which the Evangelist actually links the incident with the context. As a result the words of Jesus are not always genuine, just as the stories of His deeds are not always reliable.

The analytical or *a posteriori* method considers these "examples" as fundamentally *decisive sayings* of Christ and not as preachers' illustrations. Around these decisive sayings of Christ the early Christian community built up controversial, instructive, and biographical settings to suit its needs, and of course in this method the ultimate "form" has no more objective reliability than does the "example" of the *a priori* method.

The "miracle story" has its origin either in some passage of the preachers' accounts of the life of Christ, which community narrators (whoever they were) have taken and furbished up, often borrowing details from the wonder stories of rabbinic and Hellenistic Kleinliteratur, or perhaps the story as a whole has been taken over from that Kleinliteratur and ascribed to Jesus by these primitive story tellers. Thus, even where there might be historic fact at the base of these miracle stories, the accounts as the Evangelists compiled them lack objective authenticity and are governed in their composition by the social situation of the primitive community. And in all this search after a *Sitz im Leben*, the Form Critics, says Fr. McGinley, have neglected the most influential and compelling of all, the desire of the early Christian to know the *truth* of the life of Jesus.

In his study of the healing narratives of the Synoptic Gospels, Fr. McGinley finds no analogy between them and the wonder stories of rabbinic and Hellenistic Kleinliteratur sufficient to warrant the inclusion of the Gospel stories in that category. If at times the Gospel miracles seem to have something in common with the rabbinic and pagan miracles, that is something due to common human nature and to choice of subject matter. Christ healed the sick; the rabbins did likewise, or at least are said to have done so. But the analogy ends there, for the Synoptic narratives so differ from their extra-Biblical parallels that their very form indicates an entirely different origin and development. They have a completely different "historical and spiritual tone."

In his judgment of Form Criticism, Fr. McGinley makes a concession. He thinks that there may be something of value in it for the Scripture

student. One wonders indeed if that can be! He specifies: "The new method illustrates many traits of the Synoptic forms by comparisons drawn from other literatures." Yes, but we owe nothing to Form Criticism on that score. Long before its introduction, the Kleinliteraturs and their superficial analogies to the Gospel miracles were known, and Form Criticism brings no new knowledge to the examination and evaluation of the rabbinic and paganistic wonder stories. Again: "It [the "new method"] merits no little praise for deterring rationalist critics from aimless vivisection of the text and from idle source-speculation which fails to take into account the oral period of Gospel tradition." Again, we wonder just how much of a deterrent it is or is going to be. Form Criticism is to be a deterrent of rationalist vivisection when it has itself so butchered the text that no integral Gospel is left! And if it "emphasizes the oral period of Gospel tradition," it does so by completely falsifying the nature of that development. As well say that the assassin benefits his victim by keeping him from future suffering, or that the slanderer benefits the object of his malice by emphasizing the slandered period of his life. We cannot agree with Fr. McGinley here; we cannot see that "there is wheat in the chaff for the winnowing."

However, these partial conclusions are but *obiter dicta* and they do not detract from the essential sanity and utility of Fr. McGinley's work. We can heartily agree with his broader judgment that "Form Criticism as hitherto applied has many serious and perhaps irremediable defects." Indeed, there is no *perhaps* about it; the defects are so universal and so irremediable that to excise them is to destroy Form Criticism in its entirety. It neglects, he says, the essential difference between the Gospels and Kleinliteratur; it sins in applying the theory of collective production to a community in which such collective production did not historically exist and could not have existed; it mistakes simplicity of style for patchwork compilation; a *Sitz im Leben* is sought in every phase of Christian life except in the most important and compelling, the desire of the Christian to know the life of Jesus as it really was; no place is given to historical testimony concerning the Gospel origins, and no account is taken of the time element in development of tradition.

On the whole, it is a deadly indictment that Fr. McGinley brings against this system of investigating the beginnings of Christian literature, and he draws that indictment clearly and convincingly. His book is going to be of immense profit to every Christian student of the New Testament.

Wm. A. McLoughlin, O.P.

Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D.C.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Approaches to National Unity: A Symposium. Ed. by Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, Robert M. McIver. New York: Harper Bros., 1945. Pp. 1037, with index. $5.00.

Bielak, V. *The Servant of God: Mary Theresa, Countess Ledóchowska.* St. Paul, Minn.: Sodality of St. Peter Claver, 1944. Pp. 226.

Bodin, J. *Method For the Easy Comprehension of History.* Translated by Beatrice Reynolds. New York: Columbia University Press, 1944. Pp. xxix + 402, with index. $6.00.

Bourke, V. J. *Augustine's Quest of Wisdom.* Milwaukee: Bruce, 1945. Pp. 323, with index. $3.00.

Cassirer, E. *Rousseau, Kant, Goethe.* Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1945. Pp. 98. $1.50.

The Catholic Booklist. Ed. by Sr. Mary Louella, O. P. River Forest, Ill.: Rosary College, 1945. Pp. 101.

Cunningham, B. J. *The Morality of Organic Transplantation.* Washington, D. C.: Catholic University Press, 1944. Pp. 119, with index.

Family Faces Forward. (Proceedings of the Family Life Conference, Jan. 30-Feb. 2, 1945.) Washington, D. C.: NCWC, 1945. Pp. 157, with index. $1.00.

Frank, J. *Fate and Freedom.* New York: Simon & Shuster, 1945. Pp. 375, with index. $3.00.

Geoghegan, A. T. *The Attitude Towards Labor in Early Christianity and Ancient Culture.* (Catholic University of America Studies in Christian Antiquity, No. 6). Washington, D. C.: Catholic University Press, 1945. Pp. 250, with index. $3.00.

Harrold, C. F. *John Henry Newman.* New York: Longman, Green & Co., 1945. Pp. xv-472, with index.

Hodges, H. A. *Wilhelm Dilthey: An Introduction.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1944. Pp. x + 174, with index. $3.50.

Koyré, A. *Discovering Plato.* Translated by L. C. Rosenfield. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945. Pp. 119, with index. $1.50.

Myers, H. A. *Are Men Equal?* New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1945. Pp. viii + 188, with index. $2.50.

Peguy, C. *God Speaks.* New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1945. Pp. 83. $1.50.

Spellman, F. J. *No Greater Love.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945. Pp. 147. $2.00.

Vann, G. *The Heart of Man.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1945. Pp. 182. $2.00.

INDICES OF VOLUME VIII (1945)

INDEX OF AUTHORS

PAGE

ALLERS, R. Review of *History of Psychology from the Standpoint of a Thomist*, by R. E. Brennan 287
CREAVEN, J. A. Personalism, Thomism and Epistemology 1
DAVEY, W. R. Review of *The Judgment of the Nations*, by C. Dawson 136
EGAN, J. M. Translation of The Gifts of the Holy Ghost, by John of St. Thomas 244, 369, 471
FARRELL, P. The Portals of Doubt 293
FEARON, J. The Lure of Beauty 149
GERHARD, W. A. Instinctive Estimation of Practical Values . . . 185
———. The Intellectual Virtue of Prudence 413
GREENWOOD, T. The Unity of Logic 457
HEALY, K. Review of *Carmelite and Poet*, by R. Sencourt 131
HUGHES, W. D. Translation of The Gifts of the Holy Ghost, by John of St. Thomas 244, 369, 471
———. Review of *Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth*, by E. Frank 404
JOHN OF ST. THOMAS. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost (English Translation, with Introduction, by J. M. EGAN and W. D. HUGHES) 244, 369, 471
KANE, W. H. The First Principles of Changeable Being 27
KELEHER, J. F. The Value of Creation 233
McLOUGHLIN, W. A. Review of *The New Testament in English*, by R. Knox 285
———. Review of *Form Criticism of the Synoptic Healing Narratives*, by L. J. McGinley 535
McNICHOLL, A. J. Science and Philosophy 68
OESTERLE, J. A. Review of *Inner Laws of Sociology* by L. Sturzo . 520

INDEX OF ARTICLES

Beauty, The Lure of ——. J. FEARON 149
Being, The First Principles of Changeable. W. H. KANE 27
Changeable, The First Principles of —— Being. W. H. KANE . . . 27
Creation, The Value of ——. J. F. KELEHER 233
Doubt, The Portals of ——. P. FARRELL 293

PAGE

Epistemology, Personalism, Thomism and ——. J. A. CREAVEN . . 1
Estimation, Instinctive —— of Practical Values. W. A. GERHARD . 185
First Principles, The —— of Changeable Being. W. H. KANE . . 27
Gifts, The —— of the Holy Ghost. JOHN OF ST. THOMAS . 244, 369, 471
Instinctive Estimation of Practical Values. W. A. GERHARD . . . 185
Logic, The Unity of ——. T. GREENWOOD 457
Personalism, Thomism and Epistemology. J. A. CREAVEN . . . 1
Philosophy, Science and ——. A. J. MCNICHOLL 68
Practical Values, Instinctive Estimation of ——. W. A. GERHARD . 185
Prudence, The Intellectual Virtue of ——. W. A. GERHARD . . . 413
Science and Philosophy. A. J. MCNICHOLL 68
Thomism, Personalism, —— and Epistemology. J. A. CREAVEN . . 1
Value, The —— of Creation. J. F. KELEHER 233

INDEX OF BOOK REVIEWS

BRENNAN, R. E. *History of Psychology from the Standpoint of a Thomist* (R. Allers) 287
DAWSON, C. *The Judgment of the Nations* (W. R. Davey) . . . 136
FRANK, E. *Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth* (W. D. Hughes) 404
KNOX, R. A. *The New Testament in English* (W. A. McLoughlin) . 285
MCGINLEY, L. J. *Form Criticism of the Synoptic Healing Narratives* (W. A. McLoughlin) 535
SENCOURT, R. *Carmelite and Poet* (K. Healy) 131
STURZO, L. *Inner Laws of Sociology* (J. A. Oesterle) 520

END OF VOLUME VIII